Stephanie Golski

Bio: Stephanie Golski is an academic researcher from Johns Hopkins University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Water maze & Cognition. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 4 publications receiving 1410 citations.

Learning and memory

Abstract: How the brain codes, stores, and retrieves memories is among the most important and baffling questions in science. The uniqueness of each human being is due largely to the memory store—the biological residue of memory from a lifetime of experience. The cellular basis of this ability to learn can be traced to simpler organisms. In the past generation, understanding of the biological basis of learning and memory has undergone a revolution. It is clear that various forms and aspects of learning and memory involve particular systems, networks, and circuits in the brain, and it now appears possible to identify these circuits, localize the sites of memory storage, and analyze the cellular and molecular mechanisms of memory.

Effects of Linopirdine (DuP 996) and X9121 on Age-Related Memory Impairments and on the Cholinergic System

Abstract: Linopirdine (DuP 996) has been shown to enhance K+-stimulated release of acetyl- choline from cerebral cortex, striatum, and hippocampus of rats in vitro. X9121 is a structurally different compound identified as having similar release properties. The present experiments com- pare the effects of linopirdine and X9121 on cognitive deficits in aged rats, and on the pharmaco- logical properties in young rats. For cognitive testing, aged male Fischer-344 rats (24 months old, n = 116) received either vehicle or one of 5 doses of linopirdine or X9121 prior to behavioral testing; young rats (4 months old, n = 13) were controls and received vehicle prior to testing. Place discrimination and repeated acquisition were tested in the water maze, and a variety of sensori- motor tasks were given. Aging impaired performance in all tasks. Linopirdine (0.25, 2.5, and 8.5 mg/kg PO LO.64, 7.4, and 25 pnol/kgl) and X9121 (0.85 and 8.5 mg/kg PO (2.1 and 24 pmollkg)) moderately improved place discrimination. None of the doses tested improved repeated acquisi- tion or sensorimotor function. No behavioral indications of toxicity were observed. Acetylcholine release, acetylcholinesterase (AChE) inhibition, and nicotinic and muscarinic binding were mea- sured in vitro in cerebral cortical tissue from young male Wistar rats (2 months old). Both linopir- dine and X9121 enhanced K+-stimulated release from cerebral cortex; X9121 produced greater release with a broader range of active concentrations. Linopirdine weakly inhibited AChE (1,000 x weaker than physostigmine) and X9121 did not. Neither drug bound significantly to muscarinic or nicotinic cholinergic receptors. These results support the hypothesis that linopirdine and X9121 have some cognition enhancing properties which may be due to enhancement of stirnulation- induced acetylcholine release. These results suggest that linopirdine and X9121 may be useful in treating disorders involving cognitive impairment. o 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Design of Everyday Things

Abstract: Revealing how smart design is the new competitive frontier, this innovative book is a powerful primer on how--and why--some products satisfy customers while others only frustrate them.

Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to developmental research

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. The emergence of learning activity as a historical form of human learning 3. The zone of proximal development as the basic category of expansive research 4. The instruments of expansion 5. Toward an expansive methodology 6. Epilogue.

On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Author's response

Abstract: of the original article: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different consciousnesses. Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of consciousness based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct guesses. They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness.