Author

# Stephen A. Ross

Other affiliations: University of Pennsylvania, Yale University

Bio: Stephen A. Ross is an academic researcher from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Capital asset pricing model & Arbitrage pricing theory. The author has an hindex of 62, co-authored 122 publication(s) receiving 49063 citation(s). Previous affiliations of Stephen A. Ross include University of Pennsylvania & Yale University.

##### Papers published on a yearly basis

##### Papers

More filters

••

TL;DR: Ebsco as mentioned in this paper examines the arbitrage model of capital asset pricing as an alternative to the mean variance pricing model introduced by Sharpe, Lintner and Treynor.

Abstract: Examines the arbitrage model of capital asset pricing as an alternative to the mean variance capital asset pricing model introduced by Sharpe, Lintner and Treynor. Overview of the arbitrage theory; Role of the arbitrage model in explaining phenomena observed in capital markets for risky assets; Influence of the presence of noise on the pricing relation. (Из Ebsco)

6,388 citations

••

TL;DR: In this paper, a simple discrete-time model for valuing options is presented, which is based on the Black-Scholes model, which has previously been derived only by much more difficult methods.

Abstract: This paper presents a simple discrete-time model for valuing options. The fundamental economic principles of option pricing by arbitrage methods are particularly clear in this setting. Its development requires only elementary mathematics, yet it contains as a special limiting case the celebrated Black-Scholes model, which has previously been derived only by much more difficult methods. The basic model readily lends itself to generalization in many ways. Moreover, by its very construction, it gives rise to a simple and efficient numerical procedure for valuing options for which premature exercise may be optimal.

5,581 citations

••

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test whether innovations in macroeconomic variables are risks that are rewarded in the stock market, and they find that these sources of risk are significantly priced and neither the market portfolio nor aggregate consumption are priced separately.

Abstract: This paper tests whether innovations in macroeconomic variables are risks that are rewarded in the stock market. Financial theory suggests that the following macroeconomic variables should systematically affect stock market returns: the spread between long and short interest rates, expected and unexpected inflation, industrial production, and the spread between high- and low-grade bonds. We find that these sources of risk are significantly priced. Furthermore, neither the market portfolio nor aggregate consumption are priced separately. We also find that oil price risk is not separately rewarded in the stock market.

5,046 citations

•

TL;DR: The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows as discussed by the authors : the agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen.

Abstract: The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social interaction. We will say that an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems. Examples of agency are universal. Essentially all contractural arrangements, as between employer and employee or the state and the governed, for example, contain important elements of agency. In addition, without explicitly studying the agency relationship, much of the economic literature on problems of moral hazard (see K. J. Arrow) is concerned with problems raised by agency. In a general equilibrium context the study of information flows (see J. Marschak and R. Radner) or of financial intermediaries in monetary models is also an example of agency theory. The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows. Assume that both the agent and the principal possess state independent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, G(.) and U(.) respectively, and that they act so as to maximize their expected utility. The problems of agency are really most interesting when seen as involving choice under uncertainty and this is the view we will adopt. The agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen. By assumption the agent and the principal have agreed upon a fee schedule f to be paid to the agent for his services. T he fee, f, is generally a function of both the state of the world, 0, and the action, a, but we will assume that the action can influence the parties and, hence, the fee only through its impact on the payoff. T his permits us to write,

3,795 citations

••

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that if managers possess inside information about the activities of firms, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated.

Abstract: The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.

3,488 citations

##### Cited by

More filters

••

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.

Abstract: In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature, such as the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness-of-markets problem.

45,832 citations

••

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, including three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity.

Abstract: This paper identities five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity. There are two bond-market factors. related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have shared variation due to the stock-market factors, and they are linked to bond returns through shared variation in the bond-market factors. Except for low-grade corporates. the bond-market factors capture the common variation in bond returns. Most important. the five factors seem to explain average returns on stocks and bonds.

22,909 citations

••

TL;DR: In this paper, Bhandari et al. found that the relationship between market/3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable, and when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size.

Abstract: Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market 3, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size, the relation between market /3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable. THE ASSET-PRICING MODEL OF Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average returns and risk. The central prediction of the model is that the market portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). The efficiency of the market portfolio implies that (a) expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market O3s (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return), and (b) market O3s suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns. There are several empirical contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model. The most prominent is the size effect of Banz (1981). He finds that market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by market Os. Average returns on small (low ME) stocks are too high given their f estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. Another contradiction of the SLB model is the positive relation between leverage and average return documented by Bhandari (1988). It is plausible that leverage is associated with risk and expected return, but in the SLB model, leverage risk should be captured by market S. Bhandari finds, howev er, that leverage helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns in tests that include size (ME) as well as A. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity, BE, to its market value, ME. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find that book-to-market equity, BE/ME, also has a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks.

13,618 citations

••

TL;DR: In this paper, a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity is considered, and an equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision is developed under these assumptions.

Abstract: This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to know more about the firm's value than potential investors. Investors interpret the firm's actions rationally. An equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision is developed under these assumptions. The model shows that firms may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable investment opportunities. The model suggests explanations for several aspects of corporate financing behavior, including the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Extensions and applications of the model are discussed.

12,954 citations

•

TL;DR: The authors surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and presents a survey of the literature.

Abstract: This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

12,833 citations