Stephen M. Walt

Bio: Stephen M. Walt is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Foreign policy & International relations. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 64 publications receiving 9488 citations. Previous affiliations of Stephen M. Walt include University of Chicago & April.

The Renaissance of Security Studies

Abstract: This article examines the evolution of security studies, focusing on recent developments in the field. It provides a survey of the field, a guide to the current research agenda, and some practical lessons for managing the field in the years ahead. Security studies remains an interdisciplinary enterprise, but its earlier preoccupation with nuclear issues has broadened to include topics such as grand strategy, conventional warfare, and the domestic sources of international conflict, among others. Work in the field is increasingly rigorous and theoretically inclined, which reflects the marriage between security studies and social science and its improved standing within the academic world. Because national security will remain a problem for states and because an independent scholarly community contributes to effective public policy in this area, the renaissance of security studies is an important positive development for the field of international relations.

Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Abstract: The question \"what causes alignment?\" is a central issue in debates on American foreign policy, and the choices that are made often turn on which hypotheses of alliance formation are endorsed. In general, those who believe that American security is fragile most often assume that Soviet allies are reliable and America's are prone to defect, while those who believe it is robust tend to view American allies as stronger and more reliable than those of the U.S.S.R. These divergent beliefs clash over a variety of specific issues. For example, should the U.S. increase its commitment to NATO, to prevent the growth of Soviet military power from leading to the \"Finlandization\" of Europe? Alternatively, should the U.S. do less in the expectation that its allies will do more? Should the U.S. oppose leftist regimes in the developing world because their domestic ideology will lead them to ally with the Soviet Union, or can a policy of accommodating radical nationalist regimes lead to good relations with them? Can Soviet or American military aid create reliable proxies in the Third World? Is it worth the effort and expense? Each of these questions carries important implications for American national security policy, and the answers ultimately turn upon which hypotheses of alliance formation are believed to be most valid. Despite the obvious importance of understanding how states select their partners, most scholarly research on alliances has ignored or obscured these questions.' This article is intended to, correct these omissions by outlining

International Relations: One World, Many Theories

Abstract: Why should policymakers and practitioners care about the scholarly study of international affairs? Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptuous of "theory" must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one's basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories-whether he or she knows it or not-and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes. Take, for example, the current debate on how to respond to China. From one perspective, China's ascent is the latest example of the ten-

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

Abstract: The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory.’ Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?

Rationalist explanations for war

Abstract: Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.