Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Naming and necessity

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. By L. Wittgenstein. Edited by G. H. Von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Pp. 400. 37s. 6d. 1956. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford)

1. Introducing the Puzzle 2. Contextualism and the Puzzle 3. Invariantist Treatments 4. Sensitive Moderate Invariantism Bibliography

Knowledge and lotteries

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The Scientific Image

Doubts about a maxim like Hume’s have a variety of historical sources. Some date back as far as Descartes’s claim that, since he can conceive himself in a purely mental condition, his essence is only to think. “How does it follow,” Arnauld asks, “from the fact that he is aware of nothing else belonging to his essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it?” Others are as recent as the discovery by Kripke and Putnam of necessary truths knowable only a posteriori: May 24, 2004 Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? S. Yablo

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Is conceivability a guide to possibility

There is the following predicament. One, we find ourselves uttering sentences that seem on the face of it to be committed to so-and-so's – sentences that could not be true unless so-and-so's existed. But, two, we do not believe that so-and-so's exist. 1 What is someone caught up in The Predicament (as let's call it) supposed to do? The official standard menu of options was given by Quine in Word and Object. Our choices are three: (1) show how the commitment can be paraphrased away – thus Quine himself on chances. (2) stop uttering the problematic sentences – thus Quine on glints. (3) give up one's resistance to the commitment -thus Quine on sets. Those who reject these options are subjected by Quine to some pretty withering criticism: "I deplore the philosophical double talk, which would repudiate an ontology while simultaneously enjoying its benefits" (242).

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Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism

The usual charge against Carnap’s internal/external distinction is one of ‘guilt by association with analytic/synthetic’. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within makebelieve games and those made outside them—or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. Not that I would undertake to limit my use of the words ‘attribute’ and ‘relation’ to contexts that are excused by the possibility of such paraphrase... consider how I have persisted in my vernacular use of ‘meaning’, ‘idea’, and the like, long after casting doubt on their supposed objects. True, the use of a term can sometimes be reconciled with rejection of its objects; but I go on using the terms without even sketching any such reconciliation.1 Quine, Word and Object

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Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake

Etude de la critique du consensus entre semantique du premier ordre, semantique du second ordre et theorie des ensembles chez Quine, developpee par G. Boolos a partir d'un scheme distinguant les quantificateurs monadiques et les quantificateurs polyadiques.

Stephen Yablo

Papers

Is conceivability a guide to possibility

Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism

Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake

Nominalism through de-nominalization

Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility