: Since the 1970s, the U.S. Congress has been concerned with energy policy as a result of the 1973 oil crisis due to the Arab oil embargo. With the Department of Defense (DoD) being the major consumer of energy within the federal government, specifically as it relates to petroleum-related products (gasoline, diesel, and JP8...), it has been directed to implement cost cutting measures related to energy dependence through numerous Executive orders and Congressional Acts. Therefore, the DoD has mandated that each military service find ways to reduce energy requirements in order to meet both Presidential and Congressional mandates. This thesis provides a historical review (1973-2014) of energy related literature and identifies current gaps between strategy and research through the use of content analysis. It focuses primarily on operational energy research, but briefly discusses installation energy as it relates to the DoD Operational Energy Strategy.

/pdf/department-of-defense-operational-energy-strategy-a-content-37ky616806.pdf

Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy: A Content Analysis of Energy Literature from 1973-2014

The Australian Trade Deficit (TD) has been increasing in the past 50 years, and this deficit has become more significant in the last few decades. This rising TD level in Australia has brought the national debt level to a new height, making this country one of the world‟s highest debt-ridden countries. The most alarming fact associated with these trends is that Australia‟s ability to service the increasing debt levels in the future has been diminishing since the increasing debt levels in Australia have been predominantly used for Consumption (C) rather than for gross capital formation. The diminishing ability to service the increasing debt levels in Australia is due to the fact that the TD level is increasing as a proportion of the Australian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while the Australian gross capital formation as a proportion of the Australian debt is one of the lowest amongst the major debtor countries in the world.

Trade patterns and determinants in selected trade deficit categories in Australia: 1990-2006

Electricity has assumed immense significance in modern world and we are concerned with its numerous dimensions such as electricity demand, supply, sustainability of electricity generation options, renewable electricity, energy security, reforms in electricity sector and so on. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain it in environmental friendly ways. The present study attempts to review the existing literature on various dimensions of electricity and to explore the areas where further research is required. The first section introduces the significance of electricity and the second reviews some of the studies regarding the various facets of electricity. The final section draws some conclusions and offers policy implications besides mentioning the areas for further research. The strategic conclusions of the study are that sector reforms are currently at their preliminary stage and a strong will and efficient governance is required to improve the viability of power sector. Moreover, the need for promoting environmentally benign sources of electricity generation cannot be overemphasized.

Dimensions of Electricity Economics: A Literary Review

In this study, the research showed that the success of a disruptive energy technology like biofuels depended on: (a) the politics and the leadership of the industry related to the disruptive energy...

Biofuels has become disruptive technology to the energy market

The relationship between international trade flows and key macroeconomic variables such as
economic growth, Export (X), and Import (M), among others is one of the most widely debated areas
among economists and policy makers around the globe. The aim of this paper is to review the
extensive literature in this area, focusing on both the theoretical debate and empirical evidence. This
review is important in order to learn from past experience and to derive major conclusions which can
be beneficial in macroeconomic debates. In addition, this review could also assist policy makers in
formulating the right economic policies to tackle problems such as the high Trade Deficit (TD) and
high debt levels associated with international trade flows. The majority of these studies used X, M,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and related relative competitiveness variables, such as relative prices
to examine the economic prosperities various countries’ overtime. The key outcomes from these
studies showed that relatively open economies countries seem to achieve higher economic prosperity
than the less open economies. However, unbalanced trade, in particular the TD and subsequent rising
debt levels with the Rest of the World (RoW), lead to undesirable macroeconomic consequences. In
relation to Australia, the bulk of the empirical studies show that Australia has experienced a persistent
TD for the past 30 years, with increasing TD as a percentage of the GDP. The key outcomes from
empirical studies presented in this paper show that Australia’s growing liabilities with the RoW are
intended predominantly for other than investment purposes, which may perhaps weaken the economic
prosperity in Australia in the future. In addition, various policy implications which might arise from
the debates are also discussed in the paper. The title was erroneously published as 'Unbalanced international trade flows and their implication: an extentensive review'.

https://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/file/48f10fed-fa09-4b20-b694-da136d2ddf12/1/PDF (Published version).pdf

Unbalanced International Trade Flows and Their Implication: An Extensive Review

ABOUT 40 MILES southwest of Las Vegas, drivers on Interstate 15 reach a section of the Mojave desert called the Ivanpah Valley. For most travelers, the valley is a nondescript landscape of creosote bushes, cactus, and sand; but devotees of the desert sometimes leave the main road to see much more. The uninterrupted views of the surrounding mountains are especially crystalline on early spring mornings when unusual plant species like the Mojave Milkweed and the Desert Pincushion are in bloom. Several birds that nest in the valley, including the burrowing owl and the loggerhead shrike, have protected status under federal law, as does a reptile called gopherus agassizii, or desert tortoise. BrightSource Energy, a firm that plans to develop a 390-megawatt solar complex in the valley, has been counting the tortoises it would have to relocate in order to proceed with the project, and BrightSource's census takers are finding far more than they, or anyone else, expected. Since the history of successfully relocating this tortoise is not encouraging, and since the small reptile has an ever-growing cohort of protectors, BrightSource is no longer as sure as it once was that this project, at the scale proposed, will be feasible. Currently, the Bureau of Land Management has about twenty solar, wind, and geothermal projects under various stages of development review in the desert Southwest--Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and California--and two more wind projects in Oregon. All of these face varying degrees of opposition from environmental groups. Some are also being contested by Native American tribes, whose objections are both environmental and cultural, in that some of the lands are considered sacred burial grounds. For environmental advocates of renewable and sustainable energy, their colleagues' objections can be both nettlesome and embarrassing. The Mojave is ideally situated for solar development; these desert lands are bombarded with more of the sun's rays than almost any place on earth, and that sunshine conveniently arrives at the perfect time to he converted to electricity to meet the peak power requirements of large nearby population centers: Las Vegas, Phoenix, San Diego, and the megalopolis that combines Riverside, Orange, and Los Angeles counties. Since more than one million acres of the Mojave have already been excluded from such development by a law sponsored by U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein in 2.009, projects like BrightSource's become an even more important element in fulfilling California's ambitious plan to obtain at least 30 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2020. Feinstein's original proposal was to exclude over 2..5 million acres, but that was scaled back in the face of opposition from unions who foresaw an enormous loss of construction jobs. But the same groups that encouraged the set-aside in 2,009--organizations like the Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society--continue to push for further restriction of energy development on any public lands that come close to being in pristine condition. There is some irony in the fact that the main reason such lands are "pristine" is that they were unsuitable for any other kind of development. Except for their mostly newly discovered environmental sanctity, these desert areas would have been the cheapest land upon which to develop solar resources. In some locations, wind power can compete in the marketplace even without production tax credits, but solar still heavily relies on subsidies or renewable energy mandates to compete with fossil fuel. So, until renewables have become fully competitive in the marketplace, does the outcome of these struggles between environmental supporters and opponents of utility-scale projects really matter? The answer is surely yes. Geothermal, like wind power, is already competitive in many locations; meanwhile, solar energy's costs are decreasingly fairly rapidly. The price of silicon the primary raw material in solar has fallen dramatically; so have engineering costs, as successful techniques are increasingly replicated and perfected. …

The Environmentalist's Dilemma

WHEN HE TOLD Congress last winter that the the United States is "addicted to oil," George W Bush joined every president since Richard Nixon in calling for some measure of energy independence But Bush's goals were more modest than his predecessors' The centerpiece of his energy statement was a proposal to eliminate 75 percent of our Middle East oil imports by 2020 Since even today our imports from that region are less than a fifth of the total--our three largest suppliers are Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela--that would require minor adjustments However, Bush's modesty may be warranted In 1973, when Richard Nixon first called for energy independence, the United States imported about 25 percent of its annual oil needs; now it imports over 60 percent Oil and gas imports now account for over $200 billion of the current trade deficit Nevertheless, it's questionable whether energy independence has ever really been a national goal; it isn't even clear what the term is supposed to mean Former CIA director James Woolsey, whose work with organizations like the Energy Future Coalition places him among the staunchest advocates of reducing our reliance on foreign oil, prefers to avoid the term "energy independence" altogether If the phrase is meant to suggest that the United States can somehow isolate its energy future from everyone else's, then of course Woolsey is right--it is a fatuous notion It counters the entire trend of globalization and suggests that vital parts of the nation's economy can be segregated from the rest of its trade patterns But energy independence need not imply energy isolation In fact, the United States had almost complete control of its own energy destiny until the 1960s even as its energy trade with the rest of the world was growing America's excess capacity could be tapped when the country chose to alleviate oil shortages elsewhere in the world, and its enormous domestic market assured that periodic oil gluts were no menace either The stubborn facts of geology and economics rule out the possibility of the United States' achieving energy independence based upon oil--or upon natural gas, since gas deposits are mainly found in the same areas But can other energy sources replace oil in key economic sectors just as oil, in the past century, frequently replaced coal? The iron age didn't end because the world stopped using iron, but because iron lost its relative importance If the "oil age" can be brought to a similar conclusion, the country's economic power might again achieve parity with its geopolitical power Of course, the reverse would also be true: If we don't find oil substitutes, a growing thirst for petroleum may sap our military, economic, and diplomatic strength Energy-independence hawks claim that this is already happening The vision of energy abundance is appealing, but scenarios for achieving that goal haven't captured the popular imagination Since few Americans want to contemplate the opposite future--gasoline lines, brownouts, and reduced living standards--the politics of energy remain in a chronic a state of denial The ceremonial exhortations found in State of the Union speeches and election campaigns have lost their credibility as statements of policy The past 35 years have made the public skeptical that government will ever address energy problems successfully--or will work effectively with markets toward that end When President Jimmy Carter said, in 1977, that energy independence was "the moral equivalent of war," he had broad support for programs that both spurred an increase in fuel efficiency and jump-started research into alternative fuels But he also confounded markets Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's chief domestic policy advisor, later told an energy seminar that "one of the worst things I ever recommended to the president was in the midst of the Iranian crisis suggesting that we maintain price controls on gasoline at the pump It was an absolute disaster …

Breaking the Oil Habit

IN OCTOBER, THE United States posted a 12-month trade deficit of nearly $600 billion. That figure has been rising steadily and breaking its own record month by month. Each increment adds to the United States' external debt, which is now estimated at over $2.6 trillion. The chart below shows how each has been increasing as a percentage of GDP. Are these increases in the trade deficit and the external debt matters of great immediate concern? No, say a remarkably large number of respected economists, adding that the only imminent danger in these figures is that they might provoke unwise but irresistible calls for protectionism and other equally harmful measures. One of those respected economists is Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. Addressing a bankers' conference in May, Greenspan acknowledged that the trade deficit, at over 5 percent of GDP, was testing historic limits, especially since it was accompanied by a record budget deficit and record household debt. So why isn't Greenspan alarmed? Because, as the chairman said, the United States is simultaneously benefiting from a "one-time shift in the degree of globalization and innovation." Rapid industrialization and freer trade have lowered the cost of merchandise. The internationalization of investment and banking, coming at a time when America's robust capital markets are so attractive throughout the world, has lowered the cost of credit. The growing flexibility of world financial markets has made it easier for equity prices, product prices, and exchange rates to reestablish global balance without the sort of abrupt impacts on the U.S. economy that create crises. However, Greenspan stressed that one-time shifts don't last forever, and lately his optimistic outlook appears somewhat dampened by the large and ongoing accumulation of dollar assets by Asian central banks. In November, when he told another banking conference that "net claims against U.S. residents cannot continue to increase forever in international portfolios at their recent pace," Wall Street reacted as though it had received new and unpleasant information. At any rate, those massive currency interventions, particularly by China and Japan, have kept the dollar artificially high and Asian imports artificially cheap, and they trouble some economists much more than they do Greenspan. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, for one, worries that the United States has found no effective way of preventing these currency transactions. [GRAPHIC OMITTED] In fact, Summers shares little of Greenspan's calm view of the trade deficit, and is especially concerned about the geopolitical implications of the rising external debt. "There is surely something odd," Summers told a group at the International Institute of Economics, "about the world's greatest power being the world's greatest debtor." He has a point. While it isn't easy for other nations to use the threat of calling that debt in order to achieve other political ends, neither is it impossible. The situation of the U.S. today stands in sharp contrast, for example, to that of the British Empire in the nineteenth century, when it was both the world's major power and major creditor. Divided commission IT IS NO SURPRISE that a Federal Reserve chairman and a former secretary of the Treasury from different political parties view a highly charged issue like the trade deficit from dissimilar perspectives. International trade has always been a subject from which professionals can draw vastly different conclusions using the same set of facts. At least Summers and Greenspan do share large areas of agreement, which is more than can be said of some of their colleagues. When Congress established the Trade Deficit Review Commission in 1999, it may have foreseen an end product that would represent bipartisan consensus. The commission's final report was well-researched and thorough, but bipartisan it definitely was not. …

Trade out of Whack: Making Sense of the Trade Deficit

THERE'S BROAD AGREEMENT that America should reduce its dependence on imported oil, but far less agreement on why. Are we combating global warming, or are we distancing ourselves from hostile and unstable regimes? The popular reply is that it hardly matters--we need to do both and the goals reinforce each other. But these two national energy goals are not only different but frequently in conflict, and effective policy will not be forged until those conflicts are addressed. Meanwhile, we'll continue to see watered down legislative efforts similar to the Energy Act of 2007 and its predecessors. When dependence on foreign oil first became a major issue in 1973, the country imported less than a third of its petroleum; it now imports over 60 percent. It was never easy to convince the public that we should curb oil use for security reasons alone. As foreign sources grew more numerous, credible energy experts insisted that this diversity of supply provided ample security. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was widely accepted that no single country, nor even the entire OPEC cartel, could pose a real threat. The fact that America was devoting increasing military resources to protecting the international oil trade was viewed as just another consequence of being the "sole remaining superpower." So in pleading the case for lowered oil consumption, energy security advocates gratefully accepted a new rationale--concerns about climate change. In 1973, those concerns were barely a blip on the political radar screen, but they have grown steadily since about 1988. "Stop global warming" has become a remarkably effective rallying cry, even inspiring award-winning documentaries and TV specials. Commercial interests have also latched onto this movement. Automobile makers find it easier to market gas-electric hybrid cars in the interest of saving the planet from excessive warming than in saving the country from Middle Eastern extremists. The ethanol lobby, too, identifies its raison d'etre more with greening the planet than with energy security. Combating climate change somehow seems more inclusive and less confrontational than mere energy security. For all these reasons, advocates of the latter (let's call them the "oil independents") have eagerly accepted a strategic partnership with the climate change establishment (the "climate greens"). Unfortunately, however, the partnership rests on unstable ground. Three fault lines THERE ARE THREE conspicuous fault lines between the positions of oil independents and climate greens. The first and most obvious is that mitigating climate change requires curtailing not just consumption of oil and gas, but also of coal, which has even higher carbon dioxide emissions. Since CO2 is fingered as the main culprit in man-made global warming, it isn't surprising that coal becomes continually less welcome. But America has far more coal than it has oil or natural gas, and from the viewpoint of energy independence, that can't be ignored. The partners' attempts to bridge their differences on coal are not yet promising. Second, oil independents and climate greens face conflict over oil substitutes that emit no carbon at all. Climate-change activists have deep environmentalist roots. These often lead them to oppose large hydroelectric dams and even wind and solar projects. And one important noncarbon fuel--nuclear energy--remains anathema to the environmental establishment. The most recent report of the UN's International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) halfheartedly notes nuclear energy's positive attributes, but few climate greens concur. This is more typical view: "We believe that the financial and safety risks associated with nuclear power are so grave that nuclear power should not be a part of any solution to address global warming. There is no need to jeopardize our health, safety, and economy with increased nuclear power when we have cleaner, cheaper solutions to reduce global warming pollution. …

Steve Stein

Papers

The Environmentalist's Dilemma

Breaking the Oil Habit

Trade out of Whack: Making Sense of the Trade Deficit

Energy Independence Isn't Very Green