Steven A. Lippman

Bio: Steven A. Lippman is an academic researcher from University of California, Los Angeles. The author has contributed to research in topics: Reservation price & Holding cost. The author has an hindex of 33, co-authored 98 publications receiving 8377 citations. Previous affiliations of Steven A. Lippman include Saint Petersburg State University & Stanford University.

Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition

Abstract: Causal ambiguity inherent in the creation of productive processes is modeled by attaching an irreducible ex ante uncertainty to the level of firm efficiency that is achieved by sequential entrants. Without recourse to scale economies or market power, the model generates equilibria in which there are stable interfirm differences in profitability, an above-normal industry rate of return, and a lack of entry even when firms are atomistic price-takers. The free-entry equilibrium for rational noncollusive firms is characterized for atomistic firms and for firms of fixed size, and some analytic results are obtained for the more realistic case in which firms have an arbitrary cost function. Numerical results for the associations implied between concentration, industry profitability, fixed entry costs, and the dispersion of firm profitabilities are obtained for selected cases.

The economics of job search: a survey*

Abstract: Part I of this survey presents a comprehensive and inte- grated analysis of job search. The labor market is characterized by incomplete information and search is conducted in an optimal manner. A variety of job search models are studied in this microeconomic setting. The paper contains a number of new results. Part 11 of the survey [to appear in the September 1976 issue of Economic Inquiry] addresses the empirical and policy implications of search theory.

Applying a New Device in the Optimization of Exponential Queuing Systems

Abstract: We consider the problem of controlling M/M/c queuing systems. By providing a new definition of the time of transition, we enlarge the standard set of decision epochs and obtain a preferred version of the n-period problem in which the times between transitions are exponential random variables with constant parameter. Using this new device, we are able to utilize the inductive approach in a manner characteristic of inventory theory. The efficacy of the approach is demonstrated by successfully finding the form of an optimal policy for three distinct models that have appeared in the literature, namely, those of i Miller and Cramer, ii Crabill and Sabeti, and iii Low of particular note is our analysis of the Miller-Cramer model, in which we show that a policy optimal for all sufficiently small discount factors can be obtained from the usual average cost functional equation without recourse to further computation.

A bargaining perspective on resource advantage

Abstract: Whereas prices serve to allocate many resources in market economies, there remain vast reservoirs of unpriced resources to be managed. Business management and strategy concerns the creation, evaluation, manipulation, administration, and deployment of unpriced specialized scarce resource combinations. This paper applies the formalism of cooperative game theory to these concerns. In cooperative game theory, rents appear as the negotiated payments for the services of scarce valuable resources. The division of surplus is determined by the relative values created by different use combinations of resources. Within this framework, the strategy problem is clearly seen as one of discovering or estimating the value of various resource combinations. New wealth can be created by trade in resources as long as there are hitherto unexamined combinations. Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Competitive Newsboy

Abstract: We consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem-in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand, and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution-and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory. A splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory. We examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium. Our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated, i.e., there is perfect substitutability, then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory.

Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage

Abstract: Scholars of the theory of the firm have begun to emphasize the sources and conditions of what has been described as “the organizational advantage,” rather than focus on the causes and consequences of market failure. Typically, researchers see such organizational advantage as accruing from the particular capabilities organizations have for creating and sharing knowledge. In this article we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the following arguments: (1) social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital; (2) organizations, as institutional settings, are conducive to the development of high levels of social capital; and (3) it is because of their more dense social capital that firms, within certain limits, have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing intellectual capital. We present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces...

The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage

Abstract: In this article we offer a view that suggests that a firm's critical resources may span firm boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm resources and routines. We argue that an increasingly important unit of analysis for understanding competitive advantage is the relationship between firms and identify four potential sources of interorganizational competitive advantage: (1) relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge-sharing routines, (3) complementary resources/capabilities, and (4) effective governance. We examine each of these potential sources of rent in detail, identifying key subprocesses, and also discuss the isolating mechanisms that serve to preserve relational rents. Finally, we discuss how the relational view may offer normative prescriptions for firm-level strategies that contradict the prescriptions offered by those with a resource-based view or industry structure view.

The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource‐based view

Abstract: This paper elucidates the underlying economics of the resource-based view of competitive advantage and integrates existing perspectives into a parsimonious model of resources and firm performance. The essence of this model is that four conditions underlie sustained competitive advantage, all of which must be met. These include superior resources (heterogeneity within an industry), ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility, and ex ante limits to competition. In the concluding section, applications of the model for both single business strategy and corporate strategy are discussed.

Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance

Abstract: This paper draws on the social and behavioral sciences in an endeavor to specify the nature and microfoundations of the capabilities necessary to sustain superior enterprise performance in an open economy with rapid innovation and globally dispersed sources of invention, innovation, and manufacturing capability. Dynamic capabilities enable business enterprises to create, deploy, and protect the intangible assets that support superior long- run business performance. The microfoundations of dynamic capabilities—the distinct skills, processes, procedures, organizational structures, decision rules, and disciplines—which undergird enterprise-level sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capacities are difficult to develop and deploy. Enterprises with strong dynamic capabilities are intensely entrepreneurial. They not only adapt to business ecosystems, but also shape them through innovation and through collaboration with other enterprises, entities, and institutions. The framework advanced can help scholars understand the foundations of long-run enterprise success while helping managers delineate relevant strategic considerations and the priorities they must adopt to enhance enterprise performance and escape the zero profit tendency associated with operating in markets open to global competition. Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.