Showing papers by "Steven H. Strogatz published in 2015"

The dynamics of correlated novelties.

Abstract: Novelties are a familiar part of daily life. They are also fundamental to the evolution of biological systems, human society and technology. By opening new possibilities, one novelty can pave the way for others in a process that Kauffman has called “expanding the adjacent possible”. The dynamics of correlated novelties, however, have yet to be quantified empirically or modeled mathematically. Here we propose a simple mathematical model that mimics the process of exploring a physical, biological, or conceptual space that enlarges whenever a novelty occurs. The model, a generalization of Polya's urn, predicts statistical laws for the rate at which novelties happen (Heaps' law) and for the probability distribution on the space explored (Zipf's law), as well as signatures of the process by which one novelty sets the stage for another. We test these predictions on four data sets of human activity: the edit events of Wikipedia pages, the emergence of tags in annotation systems, the sequence of words in texts and listening to new songs in online music catalogues. By quantifying the dynamics of correlated novelties, our results provide a starting point for a deeper understanding of the adjacent possible and its role in biological, cultural and technological evolution.

Nonlinear dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game with mutations

Abstract: We analyze the replicator-mutator equations for the rock-paper-scissors game. Various graph-theoretic patterns of mutation are considered, ranging from a single unidirectional mutation pathway between two of the species, to global bidirectional mutation among all the species. Our main result is that the coexistence state, in which all three species exist in equilibrium, can be destabilized by arbitrarily small mutation rates. After it loses stability, the coexistence state gives birth to a stable limit cycle solution created in a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. This attracting periodic solution exists for all the mutation patterns considered, and persists arbitrarily close to the limit of zero mutation rate and a zero-sum game.

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making.

Abstract: We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Toward the Darwinian transition: Switching between distributed and speciated states in a simple model of early life

Abstract: It has been hypothesized that in the era just before the last universal common ancestor emerged, life on earth was fundamentally collective. Ancient life forms shared their genetic material freely through massive horizontal gene transfer (HGT). At a certain point, however, life made a transition to the modern era of individuality and vertical descent. Here we present a minimal model for stochastic processes potentially contributing to this hypothesized "Darwinian transition." The model suggests that HGT-dominated dynamics may have been intermittently interrupted by selection-driven processes during which genotypes became fitter and decreased their inclination toward HGT. Stochastic switching in the population dynamics with three-point (hypernetwork) interactions may have destabilized the HGT-dominated collective state and essentially contributed to the emergence of vertical descent and the first well-defined species in early evolution. A systematic nonlinear analysis of the stochastic model dynamics covering key features of evolutionary processes (such as selection, mutation, drift and HGT) supports this view. Our findings thus suggest a viable direction out of early collective evolution, potentially enabling the start of individuality and vertical Darwinian evolution.

Synchronization as Aggregation: Cluster Kinetics of Pulse-Coupled Oscillators.

Abstract: We consider models of identical pulse-coupled oscillators with global interactions Previous work showed that under certain conditions such systems always end up in sync, but did not quantify how small clusters of synchronized oscillators progressively coalesce into larger ones Using tools from the study of aggregation phenomena, we obtain exact results for the time-dependent distribution of cluster sizes as the system evolves from disorder to synchrony

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making

Abstract: We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible, and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions where having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition, and demonstrate necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Frequency Spirals

Abstract: We study the dynamics of coupled phase oscillators on a two-dimensional Kuramoto lattice with periodic boundary conditions For coupling strengths just below the transition to global phase-locking, we find localized spatiotemporal patterns that we call "frequency spirals" These patterns cannot be seen under time averaging; they become visible only when we examine the spatial variation of the oscillators' instantaneous frequencies, where they manifest themselves as two-armed rotating spirals In the more familiar phase representation, they appear as wobbly periodic patterns surrounding a phase vortex Unlike the stationary phase vortices seen in magnetic spin systems, or the rotating spiral waves seen in reaction-diffusion systems, frequency spirals librate: the phases of the oscillators surrounding the central vortex move forward and then backward, executing a periodic motion with zero winding number We construct the simplest frequency spiral and characterize its properties using analytical and numerical methods Simulations show that frequency spirals in large lattices behave much like this simple prototype

Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract: We explore a replicator-mutator model of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma involving three strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). The dynamics resulting from single unidirectional mutations are considered, with detailed results presented for the mutations TFT $\rightarrow$ ALLC and ALLD $\rightarrow$ ALLC. For certain combinations of parameters, given by the mutation rate $\mu$ and the complexity cost $c$ of playing tit-for-tat, we find that the population settles into limit cycle oscillations, with the relative abundance of ALLC, ALLD, and TFT cycling periodically. Surprisingly, these oscillations can occur for unidirectional mutations between any two strategies. In each case, the limit cycles are created and destroyed by supercritical Hopf and homoclinic bifurcations, organized by a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation. Our results suggest that stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLC, ALLD, and costly TFT; the existence of cycles does not depend on the details of assumptions of how mutation is implemented.