Author
Steven R. Reed
Bio: Steven R. Reed is an academic researcher from Chuo University. The author has contributed to research in topics: General election & Politics. The author has an hindex of 19, co-authored 68 publications receiving 1420 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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180 citations
TL;DR: A structural generalization of simple plurality elections with multi-member districts to elect its lower house was proposed in this article. But the causal mechanism behind this generalization is not strategic voting, although strategic voting occurs, but elite coalition building.
Abstract: Japan uses simple plurality elections with multi-member districts to elect its lower house. This system tends to produce competition among n + 1 candidates per district. This ‘law of simple plurality elections’ is a structural generalization akin to Duverger's Law. Evidence from Japan also indicates that the causal mechanism behind this ‘law’ is not strategic voting, although strategic voting occurs, but elite coalition building. It is further argued that the connection between structure and behaviour is learning and not rationality. Equilibria are reached slowly through trial and error processes. Once reached, the equilibrium is unstable because parties and candidates try to change it. Even without rational actors and stable equilibria, however, this structural generalization accurately describes the dynamics of electoral competition at the district level in Japan.
161 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors distinguish between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal act for electoral gain (cheating), and show that electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.
Abstract: When do politicians resort to corrupt practices? This article distinguishes between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). Looting generally involves a politician "selling" influence while cheating involves a politician "buying" votes. Individual‐level analyses of new data on financial scandals and election law violations in Japan show that the determinants of cheating differ from the determinants of looting. Most notably, political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating.
117 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the role of policy preferences in the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan and found that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways.
Abstract: Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way.
97 citations
TL;DR: The loss of power by the Liberal Democratic Party after more than half a century of dominance was the most obvious outcome of Japan's 2009 election, but together the 2005 and 2009 elections demonstrate significant shifts in both the foundations of party support and the importance of national swings in support for one party or another as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The loss of power by the Liberal Democratic Party after more than half a century of dominance was the most obvious outcome of Japan’s 2009 election, but together the 2005 and 2009 elections demonstrate significant shifts in both the foundations of party support and the importance of national swings in support for one party or another. Since 2005, urban-rural differences in the foundations of the leading parties have changed dramatically, and Japan has moved from a system dominated by locally based, individual candidacies toward a two-party system in which both party popularity and personal characteristics influence electoral success or failure.
86 citations
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TL;DR: For instance, the authors found that the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if it fosters party reputation-seeking.
2,007 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2006TL;DR: The politics of vote-buying and the game of electoral transitions are discussed in this article, where the authors focus on the structural determinants of mass support and the electoral fraud.
Abstract: 1. Equilibrium party hegemony 2. Structural determinants of mass support 3. Budget cycles under autocracy 4. The politics of vote-buying 5. Judging economic performance in hard times 6. Ideological divisions in the opposition camp 7. How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas 8. Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions 9. Conclusion.
1,227 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2004TL;DR: In this paper, the impact of electoral engineering on voting behavior is discussed. But the authors focus on the role of electoral rules and do not consider the effect of the rules on the behavior of voters.
Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. Do rules matter? 2. Classifying electoral systems 3. Evaluating electoral systems Part II. The Consequences for Voting Behavior: 4. Party systems 5. Social cleavages 6. Party loyalties 7. Turnout Part III. The Consequences for Political Representation: 8. Women 9. Ethnic minorities 10. Constituency service Part IV. Conclusions: 11. The impact of electoral engineering.
832 citations
01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the nature and dynamics of institutions supporting exchange in a market economy, and the role of market institutions in the creation of new markets and new markets.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION.- THE DOMAIN OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time - Douglass C. North.- The Institutional Structure of Production - Ronald Coase.- Transaction Cost Economics - Oliver E. Williamson. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE: Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization - Gary Cox.- Presidential versus Parliamentary Government - John Carey.- Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle - Matthew McCubbins.- The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective - Barry Weingast. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF A MARKET ECONOMY: The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments - Gillian K. Hadfield.- Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges - Paul Rubin.- Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking - Benito Arrunada and Veneta Andonova.- Legal Institutions and Financial Development - Thorsten Beck. MODES OF GOVERNANCE: The New Institutional Approach to Organization - Claude Menard.- Vertical Integration - Paul Joskow.- Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms - Gary Miller.- The Institutions of Corporate Governance - Mark Roe.- Firms and the Creation of New Markets - Erin Anderson and Hubert Gatignon. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS: The Make or Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical Studies - Peter Klein.- Agricultural Contracts - Douglas Allen and Dean Lueck.- The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering - Victor Goldberg. REGULATION: The Institutions of Regulation. An Application to Public Utilities - Pablo Spiller and Mario Tommasi.- State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources - Gary Libecap.- Property Rights, and the State - Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller.- Licit and Illicit Firm Responses to Public Regulation -Lee Benham. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: Institutions and Development - Mary M. Shirley.- Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanation of Economic Differences - Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff.- Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies - Peter Murrell.- Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics - Philip Keefer and Steve Knack.- Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange - Avner Greif. PERSPECTIVES: Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics - Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg.- Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies - Elinor Ostrom.
667 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors tried to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s, and exploited the cross-country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform.
Abstract: Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? Recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer. But little is known about the data. We try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s. We exploit the cross-country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors. Larger voting districts— and thus lower barriers to entry— are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists— and thus less individual accountability— are associated with more corruption. Individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality-rule elections, even though open party lists also seem to have some effect. Because different aspects roughly offset each other, a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption. (JEL: E62, H3)
544 citations