Subhashish Banerjee

Bio: Subhashish Banerjee is an academic researcher from Indian Institute of Technology, Jodhpur. The author has contributed to research in topics: Quantum decoherence & Quantum entanglement. The author has an hindex of 30, co-authored 201 publications receiving 2710 citations. Previous affiliations of Subhashish Banerjee include Kaiserslautern University of Technology & Raman Research Institute.

Relationship between quantum walks and relativistic quantum mechanics

Abstract: Quantum walk models have been used as an algorithmic tool for quantum computation and to describe various physical processes. This article revisits the relationship between relativistic quantum mechanics and the quantum walks. We show the similarities of the mathematical structure of the decoupled and coupled forms of the discrete-time quantum walk to that of the Klein-Gordon and Dirac equations, respectively. In the latter case, the coin emerges as an analog of the spinor degree of freedom. Discrete-time quantum walk as a coupled form of the continuous-time quantum walk is also shown by transforming the decoupled form of the discrete-time quantum walk to the Schr\"odinger form. By showing the coin to be a means to make the walk reversible and that the Dirac-like structure is a consequence of the coin use, our work suggests that the relativistic causal structure is a consequence of conservation of information. However, decoherence (modeled by projective measurements on position space) generates entropy that increases with time, making the walk irreversible and thereby producing an arrow of time. The Lieb-Robinson bound is used to highlight the causal structure of the quantum walk to put in perspective the relativistic structure of the quantum walk, the maximum speed of walk propagation, and earlier findings related to the finite spread of the walk probability distribution. We also present a two-dimensional quantum walk model on a two-state system to which the study can be extended.

Squeezed generalized amplitude damping channel

Abstract: Squeezing of a thermal bath introduces features absent in an open quantum system interacting with an uncorrelated (zero squeezing) thermal bath. The resulting dynamics, governed by a Lindblad-type evolution, extends the concept of a generalized amplitude damping channel, which corresponds to a dissipative interaction with a purely thermal bath. Here we present the Kraus representation of this map, which we call the squeezed generalized amplitude damping channel. As an application of this channel to quantum information, we study the classical capacity of this channel.

Controlled bidirectional remote state preparation in noisy environment: a generalized view

Abstract: It is shown that a realistic controlled bidirectional remote state preparation is possible using a large class of entangled quantum states having a particular structure. Existing protocols of probabilistic, deterministic and joint remote state preparation are generalized to obtain the corresponding protocols of controlled bidirectional remote state preparation (CBRSP). A general way of incorporating the effects of two well-known noise processes, the amplitude-damping and phase-damping noise, on the probabilistic CBRSP process is studied in detail by considering that noise only affects the travel qubits of the quantum channel used for the probabilistic CBRSP process. Also indicated is how to account for the effect of these noise channels on deterministic and joint remote state CBRSP protocols.

Thermodynamics of non-Markovian reservoirs and heat engines

Abstract: We show that non-Markovian effects of the reservoirs can be used as a resource to extract work from an Otto cycle. The state transformation under non-Markovian dynamics is achieved via a two-step process, namely an isothermal process using a Markovian reservoir followed by an adiabatic process. From second law of thermodynamics, we show that the maximum amount of extractable work from the state prepared under the non-Markovian dynamics quantifies a lower bound of non-Markovianity. We illustrate our ideas with an explicit example of non-Markovian evolution.

I and i

Abstract: There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality. Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

The Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black Hole Merger

Abstract: On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0×10(-21). It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. The signal was observed with a matched-filter signal-to-noise ratio of 24 and a false alarm rate estimated to be less than 1 event per 203,000 years, equivalent to a significance greater than 5.1σ. The source lies at a luminosity distance of 410(-180)(+160) Mpc corresponding to a redshift z=0.09(-0.04)(+0.03). In the source frame, the initial black hole masses are 36(-4)(+5)M⊙ and 29(-4)(+4)M⊙, and the final black hole mass is 62(-4)(+4)M⊙, with 3.0(-0.5)(+0.5)M⊙c(2) radiated in gravitational waves. All uncertainties define 90% credible intervals. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger.

Stochastic Processes in Physics and Chemistry

Abstract: N G van Kampen 1981 Amsterdam: North-Holland xiv + 419 pp price Dfl 180 This is a book which, at a lower price, could be expected to become an essential part of the library of every physical scientist concerned with problems involving fluctuations and stochastic processes, as well as those who just enjoy a beautifully written book. It provides an extensive graduate-level introduction which is clear, cautious, interesting and readable.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index