The capabilities for visualization, rapid data retrieval, and manipulation in geographic information systems (GIS) have created the need for new techniques of exploratory data analysis that focus on the “spatial” aspects of the data. The identification of local patterns of spatial association is an important concern in this respect. In this paper, I outline a new general class of local indicators of spatial association (LISA) and show how they allow for the decomposition of global indicators, such as Moran's I, into the contribution of each observation. The LISA statistics serve two purposes. On one hand, they may be interpreted as indicators of local pockets of nonstationarity, or hot spots, similar to the Gi and G*i statistics of Getis and Ord (1992). On the other hand, they may be used to assess the influence of individual locations on the magnitude of the global statistic and to identify “outliers,” as in Anselin's Moran scatterplot (1993a). An initial evaluation of the properties of a LISA statistic is carried out for the local Moran, which is applied in a study of the spatial pattern of conflict for African countries and in a number of Monte Carlo simulations.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1538-4632.1995.tb00338.x

Local Indicators of Spatial Association—LISA

This paper analyzes a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries. Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth. The results are robust to controlling for endogeneity by using an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument.

/pdf/corruption-and-growth-2z9d0x0u16.pdf

Corruption and Growth

THE SPHERE of model financial economics encompasses finance, micro investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty. As is evident from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance, industrial organization and monetary theory, the boundaries of this sphere are both permeable and flexible. The complex interactions of time and uncertainty guarantee intellectual challenge and intrinsic excitement to the study of financial economics. Indeed, the mathematics of the subject contain some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. But for all its mathematical refinement, the research has nevertheless had a direct and significant influence on practice. ’ It was not always thus. Thirty years ago, finance theory was little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data with an almost exclusive focus on corporate financial management. There is no need in this meeting of the guild to recount the subsequent evolution from this conceptual potpourri to a rigorous economic theory subjected to systematic empirical examination? Nor is there a need on this occasion to document the wide-ranging impact of the research on finance practice.2 I simply note that the conjoining of intrinsic intellectual interest with extrinsic application is a prevailing theme of research in financial economics. The later stages of this successful evolution have however been marked by a substantial accumulation of empirical anomalies; discoveries of theoretical inconsistencies; and a well-founded concern about the statistical power of many of the test methodologies.3 Finance thus finds itself today in the seemingly-paradoxical position of having more questions and empirical puzzles than at the start of its

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04565.x

A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information

Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?

Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention. In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. Praise for the first edition:"The book is a major contribution to the literature on the theory of bankingand intermediation. It brings together and synthesizes a broad range ofmaterial in an accessible way. I recommend it to all serious scholars andstudents of the subject. The authors are to be congratulated on a superbachievement." -- Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, WhartonSchool, University of Pennsylvania "This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the microeconomicsof banking. It gives an impressive synthesis of an enormous body ofresearch developed over the last twenty years. It is clearly written and apleasure to read. What I found particularly useful is the great effort thatXavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet have taken to systematicallyintegrate the theory of financial intermediation into classicalmicroeconomics and finance theory. This book is likely to become essentialreading for all graduate students in economics, business, and finance." -- Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia University Graduate School of Business "The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey ofmicroeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to beboth rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking andfinance." -- Mathias Dewatripont, Professor of Economics, ECARES, Universit

Microeconomics of banking

Contemporary Banking Theory

Notes on bribery and the control of corruption

Optimal design of bank bailouts : The case of transition economies

We review the contemporary theory of financial intermediation. The focus is on contributions in the past 15 years or so that have advanced our understanding of why financial intermediaries exist, the credit allocation and other services they provide in spot and forward credit markets, the contractual nature and allocational consequences of the claims they issue, and the optimal design of bank regulation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 310, 312, and 314.

Sudipto Bhattacharya

Papers

Contemporary Banking Theory

Notes on bribery and the control of corruption

Optimal design of bank bailouts : The case of transition economies

Contemporary Banking Theory

Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures