Author
Sukanta Bhattacharya
Bio: Sukanta Bhattacharya is an academic researcher from University of Calcutta. The author has contributed to research in topics: Joint and several liability & Limited liability. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 14 publications receiving 37 citations.
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that as the demand for higher quality of the public services rises with income, the rising income in the hands of the rich leads to their dissatisfaction about the quality of available public services, thereby inducing them to form their own club for self-provisioning of public services whenever possible, resulting in a lowering of quality available to the others outside the club despite less crowding at the publicly provided facilities.
11 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a theory on optimal group size in JLGL, and showed that under reasonable specification of effort cost, both optimal cooperative effort level and the deviation incentive from that effort level rise monotonically for any individual borrower.
Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to offer a theory on optimal group size. To overcome the problems of institutional credit facilities to the poor and marginal people, Joint Liability Group Lending (JLGL) is often considered as a better option. However, the literature in the field is surprisingly silent about the issue of group-size. This paper tries to fill the vacuum in a theoretical framework. Design/methodology/approach – Using a standard theoretical model, this paper shows that even with costless peer monitoring, there exists an upper bound on the size of group, and this upper bound is exactly pinned down by the strength of the social sanction. Findings – This paper shows that under reasonable specification of effort cost, as group size increases, both optimal cooperative effort level and the deviation incentive from that effort level rise monotonically for any individual borrower. Thus, given the strength of social sanction, the rising incentive for deviation uniquely determines the optimal group size even ...
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a model of group lending with moral hazard is proposed to solve the informational problems in the rural poor in developing economies by rewarding group success by promising a joint benefit, and the optimal group size can be endogenously determined.
Abstract: Lending to the rural poor in developing economies, although crucial from the perspective of poverty management, is often subjected to severe informational problems. The literature on group lending with joint liability attempts to resolve these problems by making failure more costly for the borrowers. We take a different approach. In a model of lending with moral hazard, we show that rewarding group success by promising a joint benefit can be used as an alternative mechanism to solve informational problems. We also show that, unlike joint liabilitymechanism, this joint-benefit mechanism would ensure higher repayment probability even in the absence of peer-monitoring. Moreover, in this model, the optimal group size can be endogenously determined.
8 citations
01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify factors which are responsible for sorting of students by socio-economic groups across different types of schools and elaborate on the sorting mechanism by analyzing schools choice decisions where parents decide on the following: whether to send their children to private/public school and conditional on that whether to sending them to good or bad school.
Abstract: Sorting of students over school type by their social standing creates the problem of social segregation and educational inequality. This paper, both theoretically and empirically, identifies factors which are responsible for sorting of students by socio-economic groups across different types of schools. We elaborate on the sorting mechanism by analyzing schools choice decisions where parents decide on the following: whether to send their children to private/public school and conditional on that whether to send them to good or bad school. We find that household characteristics such as the number of siblings, caste identity affect these two choices differently. For example we find that general caste students are more likely to attend private school but within the private category they are more likely to end up in bad schools. We develop our theory using a two period household level optimization framework and validate the prediction using a school survey data (Young Lives Survey). ∗This is a preliminary draft †University of Calcutta. Email:bsukanta@gmail.com ‡Population Council, New Delhi. Email:aparajita.dasgupta@email.ucr.edu §University of Calcutta. Email:kumarjitm@hotmail.com ¶University of Calcutta. Email:anirban1976@gmail.com
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the possibility of licensing between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly market, where the cost information of the licensee is private in the pre-licensing stage.
Abstract: This paper investigates the possibility of licensing between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly market. Unlike Heywood, Li, and Ye (2014. “Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalties under Asymmetric Information.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 37:38–46), the cost information of the licensee is private in the pre-licensing stage. If inspection of the licensee’s technology is not possible by the licensor i) technology is never transferred from the low-cost firm (licensor) to the high-cost firm (licensee) via fixed-fee and ii) in the case of royalty licensing technology will be transferred only if the cost difference between the firms is sufficiently high. Moreover, under fixed-fee and royalty licensing, the licensee will always allow the licensor to inspect its technology, if inspection is possible. If inspection is undertaken by the licensor, technology will be transferred i) if the cost difference is low via fixed fee and ii) always via royalty.
6 citations
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TL;DR: The coronoid process was found to be a key varus stabilizer in the elbow and may contribute more to elbow stability in extension than in flexion, and resistance to varus displacement tended to decrease more as a percent of control at lower flexion angles than at higherflexion angles after removal of more than 50% of the coronoid.
108 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring, and find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the amount of monitoring, peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies, higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring.
Abstract: This paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the presence of moral hazard and (costly) peer monitoring. We compare peer monitoring treatments in which credit is provided to members of the group to individual lending treatments with lender monitoring. We find that if the cost of peer monitoring is lower than the cost of lender monitoring, peer monitoring results in higher loan frequencies, higher monitoring and higher repayment rates compared to lender monitoring. In the absence of monitoring cost differences, however, lending, monitoring and repayment behavior is mostly similar across group and individual lending schemes. Within group lending, contrary to theoretical predictions, simultaneous and sequential lending rules provide equivalent empirical performance.
60 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an integrated SERVQUAL model, analytic hierarchy process, and technique for order performance by similarity to ideal solution (AHP-TOPSIS) method is proposed to evaluate service quality among employment-related government agencies.
Abstract: This paper proposes an integrated SERVQUAL model, analytic hierarchy process, and technique for order performance by similarity to ideal solution (AHP-TOPSIS) method to evaluate service quality among employment-related government agencies. A case study was conducted in the Philippines to establish critical dimensions attributed to the modified SERVQUAL model investigated covering five government agencies. It is found out that responsiveness dimension needs the most improvement in terms of carrying out quality service while promptness of services is considered as the most important sub-dimension. Furthermore, the proposed approach can enable government administrators to lead its efforts and resources in improving service quality to critical dimensions and sub-dimensions.
56 citations
Dissertation•
01 Jan 2018
27 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors used the random assignment of students to Korean middle school classrooms and showed that the female students perform substantially better on standardized tests when assigned to female teachers; there is little effect on male students.
Abstract: Gender disparities in academic performance may be driven in part by the interaction of teacher and student gender, but systematic sorting of students into classrooms makes it difficult to identify causal effects We use the random assignment of students to Korean middle school classrooms and show that the female students perform substantially better on standardized tests when assigned to female teachers; there is little effect on male students
27 citations