Suparna Chakraborty

Bio: Suparna Chakraborty is an academic researcher from University of San Francisco. The author has contributed to research in topics: Business cycle & Productivity. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 41 publications receiving 226 citations. Previous affiliations of Suparna Chakraborty include University of Minnesota & City University of New York.

Business cycle accounting of the BRIC economies

Abstract: We apply the Business Cycle Accounting methodology developed by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) to study the economic resurgence of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) over the last decade. We document that while efficiency wedges do contribute in a large part to growth, especially in Brazil and Russia, there is an increasing importance of investment wedges especially in the late 2000s, noted in China and India. The results are typically related to the stages of development with Brazil and Russia coming off a crisis to grow in the 2000s, while India and China were on a comparatively stable growth path. Relating wedge patterns to institutional and financial reforms, we find that financial market developments and effective governance in BRICs in the last decade are consistent with improvements in investment and efficiency wedges that led to growth.

Foreign direct investment and regulatory remedies for banking crises: Lessons from Japan

Abstract: Can regulatory interventions alleviate financial crises? If so, which ones work? We draw inferences from the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s using a hand-gathered database of bank loans gathered from original sources. Our results indicate that whereas risk-based capital infusions in Japan (similar to those following the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (stress tests) in the US) were successful in stimulating aggregate lending by Japanese banks, earlier blanket infusions (comparable to the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the US) were not effective. Moreover, changes in accounting rules in Japan that revalued bank assets (similar to the relaxation of mark-to-market requirements for banks in the US) did not increase aggregate Japanese bank lending, but rather reallocated it. Capital constraints during the crisis also induced many Japanese banks to close their overseas branches and switch their charters from international to domestic. This endogenous charter switch reversed the process of foreign direct investment (FDI) for many Japanese banks. Therefore we use the Japanese banking crisis as a natural experiment to test FDI theories and find empirical support for the relative access hypothesis, but not for the industrial organization approach or for the relative wealth hypothesis.

Regulatory Remedies for Banking Crises: Lessons from Japan

Abstract: In this paper, we utilize a hand gathered, bank specific database covering the period 1993 to 2007 to empirically examine the reactions of individual Japanese banks to governmental policies designed to end Japan’s financial crisis. Our unique database allows us to examine the composition of Japanese bank lending across three sectors (commercial and industrial lending, residential real estate and non-residential real estate), as well as aggregate lending activity. Our empirical results suggest that substantial risk-based capital infusions (similar to the 2009 stress tests in the US) were effective at stimulating aggregate bank lending activity, whereas regulatory forbearance (in the form of changes in accounting valuation procedures) had only allocative effects on bank lending activity. Our analysis indicates that across the board capital infusions (similar to the TARP capital infusions in October 2008) were ineffective in impacting bank lending activity during the Japanese financial crisis. Moreover, we find that regulatory capital was a binding constraint on Japanese banks, inducing some to switch their charter and abandon their international operations in order to reduce their capital requirements. We draw parallels to the public policy programs implemented in the US during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and conclude that policies must be substantial in size and risk targeted to be effective.

Can International Productivity Differences Alone Account for the US Current Account Deficits

Abstract: An influential explanation for the recent rise in the US current account deficit is the boom in US productivity. As US productivity surged in the mid-1990s, capital was attracted to the US to take advantage of the higher real returns. Using a two-country general-equilibrium model, this paper quantitatively shows that the gap in productivity growth between the US and the “rest of the world” cannot explain the US current account deficits, especially in the 1980s and the 2000s. This is because on a GDP-weighted basis, the “rest of the world” actually had higher productivity growth during these periods, and standard macroeconomic models would predict an outflow of funds from the US to the rest of the world, and a consequent US current account surplus. We show that changes in global financial integration can help explain this anomaly in US current account behavior.

Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?

Abstract: This paper describes the correlations between inequality and the growth rates in cross-country data. Using non-parametric methods, we show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the next period. The estimated relationship is robust to variations in control variables and estimation methods. This inverted U-curve is consistent with a simple political economy model, although, as we point out, efforts to interpret this model causally run into difficult identification problems. We show that this non-linearity is sufficient to explain why previous estimates of the relationship between the level of inequality and growth are so different from one another.

Financial Integration, Financial Development, and Global Imbalances

Abstract: Global financial imbalances can result from financial integration when countries differ in financial markets development. Countries with more advanced financial markets accumulate foreign liabilities in a gradual, long‐lasting process. Differences in financial development also affect the composition of foreign portfolios: countries with negative net foreign asset positions maintain positive net holdings of nondiversifiable equity and foreign direct investment. Three observations motivate our analysis: (1) financial development varies widely even among industrial countries, with the United States on top; (2) the secular decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position started in the early 1980s, together with a gradual process of international financial integration; (3) the portfolio composition of U.S. net foreign assets features increased holdings of risky assets and a large increase in debt.

International Competition and Exchange Rate Shocks: A Cross-Country Industry Analysis of Stock Returns

Abstract: It is widely accepted that, for some industries, competition across countries is" economically important and that this competition is strongly affected by exchange rate changes." This paper explores the validity of this view using weekly stock return data on 320 industry pairs" in six countries from 1975 to 1997. It is found that common shocks to industries across countries" are more important than competitive shocks. Weekly exchange rate shocks explain almost" nothing of the relative performance of industries. Using returns measured over longer horizons the importance of exchange rate shocks increases slightly and the importance of common shocks" to industries increases more substantially. Both industry and exchange rate shocks are more" important for industries that produce goods traded internationally, but the importance of these" shocks is economically small for these industries as well.