Susan B. Haire

Bio: Susan B. Haire is an academic researcher from University of Georgia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court & Judicial opinion. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 29 publications receiving 970 citations. Previous affiliations of Susan B. Haire include National Science Foundation & University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals

Abstract: Prior scholarship on the effect of the increasing number of female judges leads to three contrasting sets of expectations. Early writings and views of affirmative-action activists suggested that female judges would be more liberal than male judges. On the other hand, a series of empirical studies suggest that we should expect no gender differences. In contrast to both of these perspectives, several feminist scholars suggest that women will be more liberal only when that position expresses support for full participation in the community. These contrasting expectations were tested by analyzing the votes of appeals court decisions in three issue areas. No differences were discovered between male and female judges in obscenity or criminal search and seizure cases. However, in employment discrimination cases, female judges were significantly more liberal than their male colleagues.

Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Abstract: This analysis explored the relative impact of various influences on judges' votes in obscenity decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals. It builds upon previous studies that have examined separately the effects of political attitudes, case characteristics, nature of the parties, changing Supreme Court precedent, and defenses raised by litigants. When examined individually, 18 variables from these five approaches were related to a statistically significant extent to judicial votes, but each variable still left much of the variance unexplained. To assess the relative contributions of each of the previously used approaches, an integrated multivariate model was created that combined the five approaches. This overall model correctly predicted close to 80% of the judges' votes with a reduction in error of 46%.

Do the "haves" come out ahead over time? Applying Galanter's framework to decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988

Abstract: This investigation examines the success of various types of litigants appearing before the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1925 to 1988. The analysis parallels the earlier studies by Songer and Sheehan (1992) and Wheeler et al. (1987) that applied the core concepts introduced by Galanter's groundbreaking analysis of why the haves come out ahead to study litigant success on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and state courts of last resort. The findings suggest that repeat player litigants with substantial organizational strength (haves) are much more likely to win in the federal courts of appeals than one-shot litigants with fewer resources. The haves win more frequently in published decisions, even after controls are introduced for the ideological makeup of the panel. The advantage in appellate litigation enjoyed by repeat player haves is remarkably consistent over time. In particular, the U.S. government has compiled an impressive record in these courts by dominating opposing litigants over the 64-year period of analysis

Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals

Abstract: While many fine works of scholarship examine the role of the Supreme Court in American politics, there has been a dearth of scholarly books that focus on the Courts of Appeals. "Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals "is unique both in its focus on this level of the judiciary and its approach that examines major trends over the twentieth century. Since the Supreme Court has the discretion to refuse to hear almost all cases appealed to it, the Courts of Appeals are usually the final option for litigants in the federal system. Unless overturned by the Supreme Court or, in cases decided on the basis of statute, by Congressional action, the rulings can have a significant impact on government policy.The authors present the first comprehensive examination of the shifting role of the Courts of Appeals, investigating changes over time and presenting the first systematic analyses of those changes. Their work is the first book to utilize the database of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, analyzing over 15,000 cases to examine trends between 1925 and 1988. The book answers questions such as who are the judges? What are their decisional tendencies? What has been the role of region and partisan politics? Who are the litigants? And who has won and who has lost throughout the twentieth century? It is the only current, up-to-date book on the Courts of Appeals and an essential read for all scholars and students interested in American politics and judicial behavior.Donald R. Songer is Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina. Reginald S. Sheehan is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program for Law and Juridical Politics, Michigan State University. Susan B. Haire is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia

Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective

Abstract: In this article, we examine factors that influence appellate supervision in the lower tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy. Drawing on the insights of agency theory, we develop a framework to assess the determinants of circuit panel decisions to affirm or reverse federal district court rulings. Our analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals' published civil rights decisions over a 29-year period (1971-1999) offers support for several hypothesized relationships. As expected, the outcome of appellate review varied with the level of agreement between the preferences of the circuit (as principal) and the policy position of the trial court (as agent). In addition, we found that circuits were more likely to affirm trial court decisions that were contrary to the preferences of the federal district court judge, suggesting that circuit judges may rely on ideological signals when evaluating appeals before them. We also hypothesized that the monitoring activities of circuits would be influenced by individual circuits' relationship with their principal, the Supreme Court. Consistent with these expectations, panels were more likely to reverse district court rulings that were incongruous with the policy predisposition of the High Court. In addition, as Supreme Court scrutiny of a circuit increased, the likelihood of a circuit panel subsequently reversing a district court also increased. Although further inquiry is necessary to clarify the interpretation of this result, the finding does suggest that district courts are more likely to engage in decision making that deviates from circuit preferences when that circuit faces more intense supervision from the Supreme Court. Introduction "In theory,... federal judges form a pyramid that supports the will of [Supreme Court] Justices. In reality, federal judicial power is widely diffused among lower court judges who are insulated by deep traditions of independence" (Howard 1981:3). As this quote describes, the federal judicial hierarchy is designed to enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the system's apex, to impose its collective will on lower federal judges. Yet the Court's control is far from absolute: the decentralized structure of the federal judicial system, in combination with the Court's limited institutional capacity, provide lower court judges with considerable discretion to fashion case outcomes in accordance with their own legal and policy preferences. These cross-pressures in the federal court system have led scholars to examine the extent to which the High Court successfully influences the decisional outputs of the courts below (Johnson 1979; Gruhl 1980; Songer 1987; Songer, Segal, & Cameron 1994; Cameron, Segal, & Songer 2000; Baum 1994). Appellate supervision over lower courts is not exercised solely by the U.S. Supreme Court. In the lower tiers of the hierarchy, circuit courts are expected to monitor the decisional outputs of the federal district courts (Baum 1980). Of course, the most significant supervisory tool available to the circuit court is the power to reverse or affirm the lower court. Although the power to reverse is exercised relatively infrequently by the circuit courts, it nevertheless serves as a compelling mechanism to shape lower court decision making and to signal the circuit's preferences concerning legal policy. Affirmances also serve to signal the circuit court's preferences and shape lower court decisional outcomes by confirming the approach adopted by the trial court. In this article, therefore, we ask how appellate courts use this significant power of review to control decision making in the lower courts. In particular, we seek to identify the critical determinants underlying appeals court judges' choices to alter the status quo created by the lower court's ruling. As part of that effort, we recognize that this decision may be influenced by an institutional environment in which resources are scarce and caseloads are high. Drawing from a theoretical perspective that recognizes the interplay between attitudes and institutional structures in models of judicial decision making, we identify and evaluate the determinants of circuit court decisions to affirm or reverse the judgment of the district court in civil rights and liberties cases over a 29-year period. …

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

Abstract: Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging

Abstract: We enter the debate over the role of sex in judging by addressing the two predominant empirical questions it raises: whether male and female judges decide cases distinctly (individual effects) and whether the presence of a female judge on a panel causes her male colleagues to behave differently (panel effects). We do not, however, rely exclusively on the predominant statistical models - variants of standard regression analysis - to address them. Because these tools alone are ill-suited to the task at hand, we deploy a more appropriate methodology - non-parametric matching - which follows from a formal framework for causal inference. Applying matching methods to sex discrimination suits resolved in the federal circuits between 1995 and 2002 yields two clear results. First, we observe substantial individual effects: The likelihood of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases by about 10 percentage points when the judge is a male. Likewise, we find that men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant when a woman serves on the panel. Both effects are so persistent and consistent that they may come as a surprise even to those scholars who have long posited the existence of gendered judging.

Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas:

Abstract: The importance of lower federal courts in the policymaking process has stimulated extensive research programs focused on the process of selecting the judges of these courts and the factors influencing their decisions. The present study employs judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals as a window through which to reexamine the politics of selection to the lower courts. It differs from previous studies of selection in three ways. First, it takes advantage of recent innovations in measurement to go beyond reliance on political party as a measure of the preferences of actors in the selection process. Second, employing these new measures it examines the relative effects of the operation of policy and partisan agendas in the selection process. Third, a more complex model of selection is assessed than in most previous studies-one that expressly examines the role of senators and senatorial preferences in the selection process. The results clearly suggest that the politics of selection differ dramatic...

The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions

Abstract: We examine Supreme Court-circuit court interactions from a principal-agent perspective, employing a fact pattern analysis to determine the extent to which circuit courts follow their own policy preferences versus the extent that they follow the policy dictates of the Supreme Court. We then examine whether monitoring by the Supreme Court can affect those interactions. We find that the courts of appeals are highly responsive to the changing search and seizure policies of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the strong independent effect of the ideologies of the judges gives evidence that judges do find opportunities to "shirk" to satisfy their own policy interests. We also find strong evidence that litigants play an active role in influencing monitoring by the Supreme Court.