Susan Saab Fortney

Bio: Susan Saab Fortney is an academic researcher from Texas A&M University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Legal profession & Legal malpractice. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 44 publications receiving 162 citations. Previous affiliations of Susan Saab Fortney include Texas Tech University & Hofstra University.

Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements

Abstract: This article analyzes the results of an empirical study to illustrate the effect of billable hour requirements on associate satisfaction and law firm culture. Part I briefly describes the survey design and the general profile of the survey respondents. Part II discusses current billing practices and pressures analyzing the study results related to billing expectations and guidance as well as firm culture and work alternatives. Using findings from the study, Part III considers the detrimental micro and macro effects of increasing billable hour expectations. Part IV proposes various steps and measures that can be taken to address the negative consequences of emphasizing billable hour production. Part V concludes by reasserting that bar and firm leaders who address the deleterious effects of high billable hour expectations will improve both the quality or work for clients and the quality of life for firm attorneys.

The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points

Abstract: If you ask law firm attorneys to identify their biggest complaint related to private law practice, most will probably respond with one word: billing. At the same time, clients are likely to identify billing as their most serious concern associated with obtaining legal services. The irony in clients and attorneys sharing frustration over hourly billing relates to the fact that the initial interest in hourly billing stemmed from attorneys' desire to be efficient and to maximize their earnings and clients' preference for only paying for the actual time expended on their behalP Since the 1960s, hourly

Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements

Abstract: I. STUDY DESIGN AND GENERAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 243 A. Methodology 243 B. Sampling and Non-Response Errors 244 C. Survey Timing and Bias 244 D. Respondents' General Profile 245 II. BILLING PRACTICES AND FIRM CULTURE 246 A. Current Hourly Billing Practices and Pressure 246 B. Study Results on Billing Pressure 249 C. The Need for Guidance on Billing 252 D. Study Results Relating to Billing Guidance and Ethics Systems 253 E. Billing Practices Addressed in ABA Ethics Opinion 93-379 257 F. Survey Results Related to Double Billing and Recycled Work 258 G. Work Alternatives 260

I Don’t Have Time to Be Ethical: Addressing the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure

Abstract: This article discusses the unintended consequences of the billable hour derby and suggests changes to address the deleterious effects of increasing billable hour requirements. A brief introduction identifies law firms’ recent tendency to increase the billable hour requirements to fund the heightened salaries of associates. This article analyzes the results from an empirical study focused on the effects of billable hour expectations and firm cultures. Part I generally reviews the study findings. Part II discusses the work and report of the ABA Commission, while Part III indentifies those issues and approaches that the ABA and firm managers should explore. Recognizing the unlikelihood that hourly billing can be completely eliminated, the conclusion calls on bar and firm leaders to reexamine compensation and partnership models that result in attorneys sacrificing their personal lives in order to achieve professional success.

Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences--The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms

Abstract: I Introduction "Where were the professionals?"' This infamous question posed by U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin ignited a national debate on the role of accountants and attorneys in the savings and loan debacle.2 Banking regulators embraced this quotation as their rallying cry in malpractice actions against attorneys and accountants.3 Government regulators pursued claims against hundreds of attorneys and accountants, including those affiliated with prestigious law firms and accounting firms.4 These actions, which sought millions in damages and restitution, threatened firm members who practiced in general partnerships because the individual members could be held personally liable if firm assets did not satisfy a malpractice judgment.5 Claiming that the potential exposure to these suits was so high and the defense costs so expensive, the professionals and their insurers paid millions of dollars to settle the lawsuits.6 Ironically, the malpractice suits against attorneys and accountants successfully galvanized these professionals to obtain protection from future professional liability claims.' Thereafter, a question on the whereabouts of professionals could easily be answered the professionals were actively lobbying state legislatures to limit the vicarious liability of firm partners for the acts and omissions of other firm partners. These professionals sought legislation that would enable them to limit their vicarious liability without having to organize as professional corporations and risk double taxation. The coalition of professionals and business lobbyists successfully convinced state legislators to adopt legislation providing for limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships (collectively called "limited liability firms"). Because limited liability firms provide liability protection without subjecting firms to double taxation, these new limited liability structures rapidly gained popularity. As described by a partner in a large Boston law firm, big firm partners look at limited liability firms with "an enthusiasm perhaps more appropriately reserved for the Holy Grail. "8 The flurry of firms to reorganize as limited liability firms reflects the enthusiasm for the new business structures. Within a few years, the limited liability firm movement swept the country.9 Those firms that have not yet organized as limited liability firms probably will consider doing so in the future." When they do, there may be little opposition to converting to a limited liability firm because attorneys have wholeheartedly embraced the limited liability firm structure.l' Commentators also herald the coming of the limited liability firm. Even the titles of law review articles reflect how authors have warmly received limited liability firms.'2 Although a plethora of these articles discuss the features and advantages of these limited liability firms, a relatively small number of the articles question the advisability of law firms rushing to reorganize as limited liability firms.'3 The paucity of articles scrutinizing the limited liability form suggests that commentators have devoted little attention to analyzing the negative implications of attorneys' practicing in limited liability partnerships or limited liability companies.'4 Similarly, in converting their practices to limited liability firms, attorneys may overlook the consequences of abandoning the traditional partnership structure. They may not realize how conversion to a limited liability partnership (LLP) or a limited liability company (LLC) completely transforms the dynamics and culture of law firm practice, creating financial and administrative problems.15This Article considers some of the unintended consequences of attorneys' limiting their vicarious liability in limited liability firms. After Part II reviews the forces behind the limited liability movement and the emergence of limited liability law firms, Part III surveys the statutory approaches to limiting vicarious liability in LLCs and LLPs. …

Current index to legal periodicals

Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

Hourly Payment and Volunteering: The Effect of Organizational Practices on Decisions About Time Use

Abstract: We examine how organizational practices making an economic evaluation of time salient, such as hourly pay, can lead people to spend less time on uncompensated work—volunteering. Using nationally representative survey data, in Study 1 we showed that, with other factors that might affect time decisions controlled, people paid by the hour were both less likely to volunteer and spent less time volunteering than counterparts who were not paid hourly. Study 2 showed that having people calculate their hourly wage was associated with decreased willingness to volunteer and that this experimental manipulation only affected people not paid by the hour. Because work organizations are typically institutionalized in every sense of that term (Scott, 1995), with their management practices often assuming a taken-for-granted quality (e.g., Zucker, 1977), people can learn decision rules and ways of thinking at work that they may then take with them into other spheres of their lives. Specifically, people may develop a particular psychology of time and come to make different decisions about time use depending on the management practices relevant to the evaluation of time to which they are exposed. Although we believe that management practices and the dimensions of decisions about time that they may affect are many, we begin our inquiry by focusing on the effects of hourly payment on the decision to volunteer time. We argue that being paid by the hour almost inevitably makes salient an economic frame for the evaluation of time. Being compensated on an hourly basis predisposes people to assess how they spend their time in terms of the monetary returns from their decisions (e.g., Evans, Barley, & Kunda, 2004). We further argue that this monetary or economic frame surrounding time use is particularly relevant for decisions about work and work-like activities. In this article, we focus on volunteering, a theoretically important class of work that is freely undertaken without remuneration (Tilly & Tilly, 1994). Because volunteering has been defined as work done without pay, it is logical to argue that to the extent that the practice of hourly payment increases the salience of the economic evaluation of time, people paid by the hour should be less willing to volunteer and should volunteer less of their time than those not paid by the hour. We used a large nationally representative survey with numerous control variables as well as an experiment in which people calculated their hourly wage to illustrate the effect of the framing of compensation on decisions about time use.

Bad apples, bad barrels and bad cellars: a “boundaries” perspective on professional misconduct

Abstract: Professions have traditionally been associated with a public safeguard role, with their superior ethical standards usually invoked to justify their occupational privileges and special labour market position. As such professionals have been thought to act as 'social trustees' (Brint, 1994) of key skills for the benefit of society as a whole or as 'gatekeepers' (Coffee, 2006) who play a fundamental role in maintaining the integrity of broader institutions. Yet recent scandals from Enron, to Parmalat and the recent financial crisis call into question the fiduciary role played by the professions. Thus, rather than as gatekeepers and social trustees, professions may have acted, perhaps unwittingly, as accomplices if not masterminds in recent episodes of corporate wrongdoing and malpractice. This chapter focuses on the role of professions in processes of malpractice and approaches this through the consideration of a number of key boundaries which frame professional practice and the tensions, conflicts and opportunities or temptations these generate. These include: 1) internal divisions within professional services firms between different services and the conflict of interests these may produce (thus the tensions between auditing and consulting within large accountancy firms), 2) the relationship between professional advisers and external stakeholders such as clients and increasingly financial investors, and the capture dynamics which may be at play here, 3) the boundaries which exist between different firms and professions engaged in gatekeeping functions and the systemic myopia that this allows and 4) the existence national and regional boundaries between jurisdictions with different standards of professional practice and regulatory oversight.

Comparing self-regulation and statutory regulation: Evidence from the accounting profession

Abstract: The accounting profession in the United States recently shifted from self-regulation by peer review to statutory regulation by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Using this shift, I compare outcomes from self-regulation and statutory regulation for the same group of firms. I find that firms choosing their own reviewers, and firms choosing reviewers likely to be connected through prior relationships, tend to receive peer review opinions more favourable than their subsequent PCAOB reports, suggesting that some firms obtained ‘friendly’ reviews in the peer review era. On the other hand, reviewers with relevant industry knowledge are less likely to give such favourable reviews. Further, reviewers from the same geographic area are likely to give peer reviews that are more negative than the subsequent PCAOB reports. Additional analysis suggests that peer reviewers from similar industry or geographic areas bring greater firm-specific expertise to the reviewing process. In the PCAOB regime, I find that firms inspected later tend to receive PCAOB reports more favourable than their peer reviews, suggesting some trends over time in PCAOB reporting. Overall, the findings help in understanding the influences on each approach to regulation, and suggest a nuanced understanding of both approaches as having strengths as well as weaknesses.