Susanna Kim Ripken
Bio: Susanna Kim Ripken is an academic researcher. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 34 citations.
01 Aug 2019
TL;DR: For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to claim an extensive array of constitutional rights as discussed by the authors, and the justifications for these rights have developed from the many different conceptions of the corporation as a legal, moral, economic, social, and political actor.
Abstract: The term “corporation” does not appear anywhere in the United States Constitution, yet the United States Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to claim an extensive array of constitutional rights. The justifications for these rights have developed from the many different conceptions of the corporation as a legal, moral, economic, social, and political actor. In particular, the constitutional dimension of the corporation’s personhood is an extension of its legal personhood. Therefore, the fundamental legal theories of the corporate person, i.e., the artificial person, aggregate, and real entity theories, have had a role in supporting the extension of constitutional rights to corporations. The moral and sociological dimensions of the corporate person have also been important. In determining the scope of corporate constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has considered the actual and normative roles and purposes of corporations in our pluralistic and democratic society. Considerations of corporate power, both economic and political, have contributed as well to the debate over which constitutional rights appropriately apply to corporations.
TL;DR: More recently, Tocqueville as mentioned in this paper argued that "nothing has changed and nothing has changed since Democracy in America was published in the 1830's" and that "everything has changed with each exposure to it".
Abstract: more impressive with each exposure to it. Everything has changed and nothing has changed since Democracy in America was published in the 1830’s. Its author grasped with remarkable perception both the mutable and the immutable qualities of man. There could be nothing more salutary for us today than to assimilate his fine sense of what was permanent in a world which, like ours, was undergoing deep convulsions. Committed to the classical economics of Adam Smith, Tocqueville did not share Smith’s illusions about the eternal nature of the market. On the contrary, as Albert Salomon has emphasized, his point of view
TL;DR: A review of the book "A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations" by Michael Keeley can be found in this paper, where the authors describe the book as "a social-contract theory of organizations".
Abstract: The article reviews the book “A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations,” by Michael Keeley.
TL;DR: Laufer as mentioned in this paper argues that even with recent legal reforms, corporate criminal law continues to be ineffective and analyzes the games that corporations play to deflect criminal responsibility, and also demonstrates how the exchange of cooperation for prosecutorial leniency and amnesty belies true law enforcement.
Abstract: We live in an era defined by corporate greed and malfeasance—one in which unprecedented accounting frauds and failures of compliance run rampant. In order to calm investor fears, revive perceptions of legitimacy in markets, and demonstrate the resolve of state and federal regulators, a host of reforms, high-profile investigations, and symbolic prosecutions have been conducted in response. But are they enough? In this timely work, William S. Laufer argues that even with recent legal reforms, corporate criminal law continues to be ineffective. As evidence, Laufer considers the failure of courts and legislatures to fashion liability rules that fairly attribute blame for organizations. He analyzes the games that corporations play to deflect criminal responsibility. And he also demonstrates how the exchange of cooperation for prosecutorial leniency and amnesty belies true law enforcement. But none of these factors, according to Laufer, trumps the fact that there is no single constituency or interest group that strongly and consistently advocates the importance and priority of corporate criminal liability. In the absence of a new standard of corporate liability, the power of regulators to keep corporate abuses in check will remain insufficient. A necessary corrective to our current climate of graft and greed, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds will be essential to policymakers and legal minds alike. “[This] timely work offers a dispassionate analysis of problems relating to corporate crime.”— Harvard Law Review
TL;DR: The impact of Citizens United on the scope of permissible campaign finance regulation is far less substantial than commonly assumed as mentioned in this paper, arguing that even if Citizens United's incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless seems to have the feel of a final straw, with opponents invoking a broad vision of a dystopian political process overwhelmed by corporations.
Abstract: Perceived corporate power has spurred a recent populist backlash, on both political left and political right. In this atmosphere, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, granting corporations the right to spend directly on express political advocacy, has become the target of particularly heated critique.This Essay confronts the impact of Citizens United in two respects. Part I first reviews Citizens United’s place in the campaign finance constellation. It argues that although the decision was a bold stroke in many ways, its impact on the scope of permissible campaign finance regulation is far less substantial than commonly assumed. Even if Citizens United’s incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless seems to have the feel of a final straw. The decision has provoked first furor, and then fear, with opponents invoking a broad vision of a dystopian political process overwhelmed by corporations. Yet rarely is the fear of corporate political spending articulated at a level of specificity conducive to assessing, or confronting, the perceived damage. Part II takes up the challenge, parsing the pragmatic concerns at the root of opposition to corporate political spending. It then offers responsive policy proposals - including an approach to protect against monopolization of media channels, an appealingly straightforward disclaimer label to mitigate voter misperception, and a novel application of a recusal obligation to combat the appearance of corruption - all well within the regulatory space undisturbed by Citizens United.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the Court, to date, has not granted constitutional rights to corporations in their own right, but has granted them to corporations either derivatively, when necessary to protect the rights of natural persons assumed to be represented by the corporation, or instrumentally, when needed to protect rights of parties outside the corporation.
Abstract: This Article engages the two hundred year history of corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence to show that the Supreme Court has long accorded rights to corporations based on the rationale that corporations represent associations of people from whom such rights are derived. The Article draws on the history of business corporations in America to argue that the Court’s characterization of corporations as associations made sense throughout most of the nineteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, however, when the Court was deciding several key cases involving corporate rights, this associational view was already becoming a poor fit for some corporations. The Court’s failure to account for the wide spectrum of organizations labeled “corporations” became increasingly problematic with the rise of modern business corporations that could no longer be fairly characterized as an identifiable group of people acting in association. Nonetheless, the Court continued to apply the associational rationale from early case law and expand corporate rights into the realm of speech and political spending without careful analysis of when the associational approach would be appropriate. We set forth a theoretical framework that we believe is consistent with the underlying logic of the Court’s jurisprudence, based on the concepts of derivative and instrumental rights. Specifically, we argue that the Court, to date, has not granted constitutional rights to corporations in their own right. Instead, it has granted rights to corporations either derivatively, when necessary to protect the rights of natural persons assumed to be represented by the corporation, or instrumentally, when necessary to protect the rights of parties outside the corporation. Further, we consider the implications that this framework, with a more nuanced view of the spectrum of corporations in existence, would have if applied to recent corporate rights cases, such as Citizens United. We believe this framework provides a principled path forward for the difficult line drawing between corporations that needs to be done.