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Tansu Alpcan

Bio: Tansu Alpcan is an academic researcher from University of Melbourne. The author has contributed to research in topics: Game theory & Nash equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 293 publications receiving 7840 citations. Previous affiliations of Tansu Alpcan include Sabancı University & Carnegie Mellon University.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that use game-theoretic approaches and provides a discussion on the advantages, drawbacks, and future direction of using game theory in this field.
Abstract: This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that use game-theoretic approaches. We present a selected set of works to highlight the application of game theory in addressing different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. We organize the presented works in six main categories: security of the physical and MAC layers, security of self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, we identify security problems, players, and game models. We summarize the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs. In addition, we provide a discussion on the advantages, drawbacks, and future direction of using game theory in this field. In this survey, our goal is to instill in the reader an enhanced understanding of different research approaches in applying game-theoretic methods to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking.

791 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A cost function is introduced as the difference between the pricing and utility functions, and the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is established, and two update algorithms are shown to be globally stable under specific conditions.
Abstract: We present a game-theoretic treatment of distributed power control in CDMA wireless systems. We make use of the conceptual framework of noncooperative game theory to obtain a distributed and market-based control mechanism. Thus, we address not only the power control problem, but also pricing and allocation of a single resource among several users. A cost function is introduced as the difference between the pricing and utility functions, and the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is established. In addition, two update algorithms, namely, parallel update and random update, are shown to be globally stable under specific conditions. Convergence properties and robustness of each algorithm are also studied through extensive simulations.

530 citations

Book
01 Oct 2010
TL;DR: Covering attack detection, malware response, algorithm and mechanism design, privacy, and risk management, this comprehensive work applies unique quantitative models derived from decision, control, and game theories to understanding diverse network security problems.
Abstract: Covering attack detection, malware response, algorithm and mechanism design, privacy, and risk management, this comprehensive work applies unique quantitative models derived from decision, control, and game theories to understanding diverse network security problems It provides the reader with a system-level theoretical understanding of network security, and is essential reading for researchers interested in a quantitative approach to key incentive and resource allocation issues in the field It also provides practitioners with an analytical foundation that is useful for formalising decision-making processes in network security

456 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that nano servers in Fog computing can complement centralized DCs to serve certain applications, mostly IoT applications for which the source of data is in end-user premises, and lead to energy saving if the applications are off-loadable from centralizedDCs and run on nDCs.
Abstract: Tiny computers located in end-user premises are becoming popular as local servers for Internet of Things (IoT) and Fog computing services. These highly distributed servers that can host and distribute content and applications in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion are known as nano data centers (nDCs). Despite the growing popularity of nano servers, their energy consumption is not well-investigated. To study energy consumption of nDCs, we propose and use flow-based and time-based energy consumption models for shared and unshared network equipment, respectively. To apply and validate these models, a set of measurements and experiments are performed to compare energy consumption of a service provided by nDCs and centralized data centers (DCs). A number of findings emerge from our study, including the factors in the system design that allow nDCs to consume less energy than its centralized counterpart. These include the type of access network attached to nano servers and nano server’s time utilization (the ratio of the idle time to active time). Additionally, the type of applications running on nDCs and factors such as number of downloads, number of updates, and amount of preloaded copies of data influence the energy cost. Our results reveal that number of hops between a user and content has little impact on the total energy consumption compared to the above-mentioned factors. We show that nano servers in Fog computing can complement centralized DCs to serve certain applications, mostly IoT applications for which the source of data is in end-user premises, and lead to energy saving if the applications (or a part of them) are off-loadable from centralized DCs and run on nDCs.

358 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2003
TL;DR: The basic trade-offs, analysis and decision processes involved in information security and intrusion detection, as well as possible application of game theoretic concepts to develop a formal decision and control framework are investigated.
Abstract: We investigate the basic trade-offs, analysis and decision processes involved in information security and intrusion detection, as well as possible application of game theoretic concepts to develop a formal decision and control framework. A generic model of a distributed intrusion detection system (IDS) with a network of sensors is considered, and two schemes based on game theoretic techniques are proposed. The security warning system is simple and easy-to-implement, and it gives system administrators an intuitive overview of the security situation in the network. The security attack game, on the other hand, models and analyzes attacker and IDS behavior within a two-person, nonzero-sum, noncooperative game with dynamic information. Nash equilibrium solutions in closed form are obtained for specific subgames, and two illustrative examples are provided.

272 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

3,569 citations

01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: The work of the IPCC Working Group III 5th Assessment report as mentioned in this paper is a comprehensive, objective and policy neutral assessment of the current scientific knowledge on mitigating climate change, which has been extensively reviewed by experts and governments to ensure quality and comprehensiveness.
Abstract: The talk with present the key results of the IPCC Working Group III 5th assessment report. Concluding four years of intense scientific collaboration by hundreds of authors from around the world, the report responds to the request of the world's governments for a comprehensive, objective and policy neutral assessment of the current scientific knowledge on mitigating climate change. The report has been extensively reviewed by experts and governments to ensure quality and comprehensiveness.

3,224 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 May 1975
TL;DR: The Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition as discussed by the authors provides a comprehensive overview of simple and more advanced queuing models, with a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae.
Abstract: Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

2,562 citations