Teri L. White

Bio: Teri L. White is an academic researcher from University of California, Los Angeles. The author has contributed to research in topics: Behavioral activation & Reinforcement sensitivity theory. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 4 publications receiving 7554 citations.

Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales

Abstract: J. A. Gray (1981, 1982) holds that 2 general motivational systems underlie behavior and affect: a behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and a behavioral activation system (BAS). Self-report scales to assess dispositional BIS and BAS sensitivities were created. Scale development (Study 1) and convergent and discriminant validity in the form of correlations with alternative measures are reported (Study 2). In Study 3, a situation in which Ss anticipated a punishment was created. Controlling for initial nervousness, Ss high in BIS sensitivity (assessed earlier) were more nervous than those low in BIS sensitivity. In Study 4, a situation in which Ss anticipated a reward was created. Controlling for initial happiness, Ss high in BAS sensitivity (Reward Responsiveness and Drive scales) were happier than those low in BAS sensitivity. In each case the new scales predicted better than an alternative measure. Discussion is focused on conceptual implications.

Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression

Abstract: In a first experiment, subjects verbalizing the stream of consciousness for a 5-min period were asked to try not to think of a white bear, but to ring a bell in case they did. As indicated both by mentions and by bell rings, they were unable to suppress the thought as instructed. On being asked after this suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these subjects showed significantly more tokens of thought about the bear than did subjects who were asked to think about a white bear from the outset. These observations suggest that attempted thought suppression has paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy, perhaps even producing the very obsession or preoccupation that it is directed against. A second experiment replicated these findings and showed that subjects given a specific thought to use as a distracter during suppression were less likely to exhibit later preoccupation with the thought to be suppressed.

Ego depletion: is the active self a limited resource?

Abstract: Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. In Experiment 2, making a meaningful personal choice to perform attitude-relevant behavior caused a similar decrement in persistence. In Experiment 3, suppressing emotion led to a subsequent drop in performance of solvable anagrams. In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.

Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: does self-control resemble a muscle?

Abstract: The authors review evidence that self-control may consume a limited resource. Exerting self-control may consume self-control strength, reducing the amount of strength available for subsequent self-control efforts. Coping with stress, regulating negative affect, and resisting temptations require self-control, and after such self-control efforts, subsequent attempts at self-control are more likely to fail. Continuous self-control efforts, such as vigilance, also degrade over time. These decrements in self-control are probably not due to negative moods or learned helplessness produced by the initial self-control attempt. These decrements appear to be specific to behaviors that involve self-control; behaviors that do not require self-control neither consume nor require self-control strength. It is concluded that the executive component of the self--in particular, inhibition--relies on a limited, consumable resource.

A hierarchical model of approach and avoidance achievement motivation

Abstract: A hierarchical model of approach and avoidance achievement motivation was proposed and tested in a college classroom. Mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoidance goals were assessed and their antecedents and consequences examined. Results indicated that mastery goals were grounded in achievement motivation and high competence expectancies; performance-avoidance goals, in fear of failure and low competence expectancies; and performance-approach goals, in ach.ievement motivation, fear of failure, and high competence expectancies. Mastery goals facilitated intrinsic motivation, performance-approach goals enhanced graded performance, and performanceavoidance goals proved inimical to both intrinsic motivation and graded performance. The proposed model represents an integration of classic and contemporary approaches to the study of achievement motivation. Achievement motivation is a ubiquitous feature of daily life. In the classroom, at the workplace, and on the ballfield individuals strive to be competent in their effortful activities. In the past decade, many theorists have utilized a social-cognitive, achievement goal approach in accounting for individuals' competence-relevant strivings. "Achievement goal" is commonly defined as the purpose of task engagement (Maehr, 1989), and the specific type of goal adopted is posited to create a framework for how individuals interpret, experience, and act in their achievement pursuits (Dweck, 1986; Nicholls, 1989). Achievement goal theorists commonly identify two distinct orientations toward competence: a performance goal focused on the demonstration of competence relevant to others, and a mastery goal focused on the development of competence and task mastery (Ames & Archer, 1987; for similar conceptualizations with different nomenclature see Dweck, 1986; NichoUs, 1984). The adoption of a performance goal is hypothesized to produce susceptibility to a "helpless" pattern of responses in achievement settings (e.g., a preference for easy or difficult tasks, withdrawal of effort in the face of failure, and decreased task enjoyment), whereas the adoption of a mastery goal is presumed to lead to a "mastery" motivational pattern (e.g., a preference for moderately challenging tasks, persistence in the face of failure, and enhanced task enjoyment; Ames, 1992; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1989). Most achievement goal theorists conceptualize both perfor

Toward an instance theory of automatization

Abstract: This article presents a theory in which automatization is construed as the acquisition of a domainspeciSc knowledge base, formed of separate representations, instances, of each exposure to the task. Processing is considered automatic if it relies on retrieval of stored instances, which will occur only after practice in a consistent environment. Practice is important because it increases the amount retrieved and the speed of retrieval; consistency is important because it ensures that the retrieved instances will be useful. The theory accounts quantitatively for the power-function speed-up and predicts a power-function reduction in the standard deviation that is constrained to have the same exponent as the power function for the speed-up. The theory accounts for qualitative properties as well, explaining how some may disappear and others appear with practice. More generally, it provides an alternative to the modal view of automaticity, arguing that novice performance is limited by a lack of knowledge rather than a scarcity of resources. The focus on learning avoids many problems with the modal view that stem from its focus on resource limitations.