计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management

For the last 30 years a growing number of scholars and practitioners have been experimenting with concepts and models that facilitate our understanding of the complexities of today’s business challenges. Among these, “stakeholder theory” or “stakeholder thinking” has emerged as a new narrative to understand and remedy three interconnected business problems—the problem of understanding how value is created and traded, the problem of connecting ethics and capitalism, and the problem of helping managers think about management such that the first two problems are addressed. In this article, we review the major uses and adaptations of stakeholder theory across a broad array of disciplines such as business ethics, corporate strategy, finance, accounting, management, and marketing. We also evaluate and suggest future directions in which research on stakeholder theory can continue to provide useful insights into the practice of sustainable and ethical value creation.

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Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art

Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings

This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives—arising from stock‐based compensation and stock ownership—and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock‐based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993–2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointm...

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1828&context=soa_research

Equity incentives and earnings management

This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives - arising from stock-based compensation and stock ownership - and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993-2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID626850_code292475.pdf?abstractid=457840&rulid=71293&mirid=1

Equity Incentives and Earnings Management

In this paper, we examine firms' use of the Internet to enhance the relevance of their financial reporting. We define a firm as practicing Internet Financial Reporting (IFR) when it provides in its web site either (1) a comprehensive set of financial statements (including footnotes and the auditors' report), (2) a link to its annual report elsewhere on the Internet or (3) a link to the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. While 70 percent of the firms in our sample engage in IFR, we find substantial variation in the quality of firms' IFR practices. Specifically, the variations in quality pertain to the timeliness and therefore, the usefulness of firms' financial reporting on the Internet. We find that some firms provide more timely financial disclosures via the Internet (e.g., monthly sales) while other firms report outdated financial data (e.g., two‐year old annual reports). We also observe that the usefulness of firms' financial ...

Corporate Reporting on the Internet

Firms' use of the Internet to enhance the relevance of their financial reporting is examined. A firm is defined as practicing Internet Financial Reporting (IFR) when it provides in its web site either: 1. a comprehensive set of financial statements, 2. a link to its annual report elsewhere on the Internet, or 3. a link to the US Security and Exchange Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system. While 70% of the firms in the sample engage in IFR, substantial variation in the quality of firms' IFR practices is found. Specifically, the variations in quality pertain to the timeliness and therefore, the usefulness of firms' financial reporting on the Internet. It is found that some firms provide more timely financial disclosures via the Internet while other firms report outdated financial data. It is observed that the usefulness of firms' financial reporting on the Internet depends on how easy it is to access that data, the amount of data disclosed and/or whether users can download or analyze the data.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID934198_code112789.pdf?abstractid=934198&type=2

Terry D. Warfield

Papers

Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings

Equity incentives and earnings management

Equity Incentives and Earnings Management

Corporate Reporting on the Internet

Corporate Reporting on the Internet