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Thomas W. Hazlett

Bio: Thomas W. Hazlett is an academic researcher from Clemson University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cable television & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 117 publications receiving 2214 citations. Previous affiliations of Thomas W. Hazlett include Manhattan Institute for Policy Research & Yale University.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content, the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the U.S. Constitution, and the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services, are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms.
Abstract: While Leo Herzel (1951) and Ronald Coase (1959) persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), not until 1993 did the U.S. Congress grant the FCC authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding. Why were auctions, with obvious efficiency and equity advantages, so long in coming? Why were comparative hearings in the “public interest” first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions, but for lotteries? And why were radio and TV licenses pointedly excluded from auctions? Four factors—the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content, the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the U.S. Constitution, the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services, and the agency problem embedded in central planning—are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms.

164 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors point out that while spectrum is regulated on the "physical scarcity" premise, it is awarded to private users on a no-fee basis, thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc.
Abstract: IN his classic 1983 Technologies of Freedom, Ithiel de Sola Pool so elucidated the prevailing wisdom concerning broadcast licensure in the United States. While the key legal questions surrounding this institution involve important First Amendment questions (hence, Pool's scarcity analogy to paper, ink, and presses), economists and other policy analysts have often remarked on the more general incongruity in federal licensing: while spectrum is regulated on the "physical scarcity" premise, it is awarded to private users on a no-fee basis, thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc. Moreover, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)2 policies have openly sought, virtually throughout the agency's entire life span, to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters (particularly cable television) to far below the quantity technically available.3 The

134 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine marketplace trends driving regulators' change of humor, and consider the path of spectrum policy liberalization in light of emerging technologies, theories of unlimited bandwidth, reforms such as FCC license auctions, and recent progress in deregulating wireless markets in the U.S. and around the globe.
Abstract: In 1959 the Federal Communications Commission invited economist Ronald Coase to testify about his proposal for market allocation of radio spectrum rights. The FCC's first question: "Is this all a big joke?" Today, however, leading policy makers - including the current FCC Chair - decry the "spectrum drought" produced by administrative allocation and call for the creation of private bandwidth markets. This essay examines marketplace trends driving regulators' change of humor, and considers the path of spectrum policy liberalization in light of emerging technologies, theories of unlimited bandwidth, reforms such as FCC license auctions, and recent progress in deregulating wireless markets in the U.S. and around the globe.

115 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between spectrum policy (including license auctions) and efficiency in output markets has been investigated, and empirical estimates suggest that countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures realize demonstrable social welfare benefits.
Abstract: Economic analysis of spectrum allocation policies focuses on competitive bidding for wireless licenses Auctions generating high bids, as in Germany and the UK, are identified as successful, while those producing lower receipts, as in Switzerland and the Netherlands, are deemed fiascoes Yet, even full and costless extraction of license rents does not map directly to social welfare, because spectrum policies creating rents impose social costs For example, rules favoring monopoly market structure predictably increase license values, but reduce welfare This paper attempts to shift analytical focus to the relationship between spectrum policy (including license auctions) and efficiency in output markets In cross-country comparisons of performance metrics in mobile telephone service markets, empirical estimates suggest that countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures realize demonstrable social welfare benefits These gains generally dominate efficiencies associated with license sales Spectrum policies and rules intended to increase auction receipts (eg reserve prices and subsidies for weak bidders), should be evaluated in this light

105 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Nancial markets reveal compelling evidence against the joint hypothesis that (a) Microsoft conduct is anticompetitive and (b) antitrust policy enforcement produces net e$ciency gains.

102 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, applied linear regression models are used for linear regression in the context of quality control in quality control systems, and the results show that linear regression is effective in many applications.
Abstract: (1991). Applied Linear Regression Models. Journal of Quality Technology: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77.

1,811 citations

Book
Paul Milgrom1
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications and explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders and the theory of Auction with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

1,287 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an integrative framework is proposed to advance management research on technological platforms, bridging two theoretical perspectives: economics, which sees platforms as double-sided markets, and engineering design, which see platforms as technological architectures.

1,074 citations

01 Apr 1994
Abstract: THIS paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the far' ory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analyris seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other

1,070 citations