Tongxin Zheng

Bio: Tongxin Zheng is an academic researcher from ISO New England. The author has contributed to research in topics: Electricity market & Robust optimization. The author has an hindex of 27, co-authored 72 publications receiving 3667 citations. Previous affiliations of Tongxin Zheng include Clemson University.

Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Security Constrained Unit Commitment Problem

Abstract: Unit commitment, one of the most critical tasks in electric power system operations, faces new challenges as the supply and demand uncertainty increases dramatically due to the integration of variable generation resources such as wind power and price responsive demand. To meet these challenges, we propose a two-stage adaptive robust unit commitment model for the security constrained unit commitment problem in the presence of nodal net injection uncertainty. Compared to the conventional stochastic programming approach, the proposed model is more practical in that it only requires a deterministic uncertainty set, rather than a hard-to-obtain probability distribution on the uncertain data. The unit commitment solutions of the proposed model are robust against all possible realizations of the modeled uncertainty. We develop a practical solution methodology based on a combination of Benders decomposition type algorithm and the outer approximation technique. We present an extensive numerical study on the real-world large scale power system operated by the ISO New England. Computational results demonstrate the economic and operational advantages of our model over the traditional reserve adjustment approach.

Marginal loss modeling in LMP calculation

Abstract: This paper discusses the pricing of marginal transmission network losses in the locational marginal pricing approach recently deployed in the ISO New England (ISO-NE) standard market design (SMD) project implemented by ALSTOM's T&D Energy Automation and Information (EAI) Business. The traditional loss model is studied and a new model is proposed. The new model achieves more defendable and predictable market-clearing results by introducing loss distribution factors to explicitly balance the consumed losses in the lossless dc power system model. The distributed market slack reference is also introduced and discussed. The LMP components produced by the two models are studied and compared under changes in slack reference. Numerical examples are presented to further compare the two models.

Multistage Adaptive Robust Optimization for the Unit Commitment Problem.

Abstract: The growing uncertainty associated with the increasing penetration of wind and solar power generation has presented new challenges to the operation of large-scale electric power systems. Motivated ...

A Linearized OPF Model With Reactive Power and Voltage Magnitude: A Pathway to Improve the MW-Only DC OPF

Abstract: In this study, a linearized and convergence-guaranteed optimal power flow (OPF) model with reactive power ( Q ) and voltage magnitude ( v ) is proposed. Based on a linearized network model, a fully linearly-constrained OPF model is formulated with constraints on Q and v and limits on the apparent branch flow. Compared with the commonly used DC OPF method, the proposed method narrows the deviation from the AC OPF solution without requiring any additional information of the power grid. The locational marginal price (LMP) of the proposed method is closer to the AC OPF solution than the DC OPF method. The marginal price of the reactive power (Q-LMP) is provided, which offers the opportunity to price the reactive power. Case studies on several IEEE and Polish benchmark systems show that the proposed OPF method substantially enhances the performance of the prevalent DC OPF method. In addition, it is shown that if the accuracy of the linearized network model needs to be further improved, such as that during the iterative quasi-optimization process that reconstitutes the AC feasibility, a solution that is notably close to the optimum of the AC OPF model can be obtained by taking only one more iteration.

A Unified Framework for Defining and Measuring Flexibility in Power System

Abstract: Flexibility is a widely used term in planning process and real-time operation. The existing research on flexibility uses different techniques to study flexibility property from different aspects. While studying a property from various viewpoints increases the understanding on the subject, we need a consistent theoretical framework to consolidate the ideas generated in the field, compare and contrast results, and build on for future analysis. Based on the insights of the nature of flexibility, this paper proposes a unified framework for defining and measuring flexibility in power system. Under the proposed framework, we propose a flexibility metric which evaluates the largest variation range of uncertainty that the system can accommodate. Such a metric takes into account transmission network and system operations constraints, which are critical to assessing flexibility, but are often ignored in literature. A robust optimization technique is used to calculate the proposed metrics. While the illustrative example presented in this paper focuses on the flexibility in real-time system operation in the presence of wind and load uncertainty, this framework can generally be applicable to long-term studies such as system planning.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Modeling and Forecasting Electricity Loads and Prices: A Statistical Approach

Abstract: Preface. Acknowledgments. 1 Complex Electricity Markets. 1.1 Liberalization. 1.2 The Marketplace. 1.2.1 Power Pools and Power Exchanges. 1.2.2 Nodal and Zonal Pricing. 1.2.3 Market Structure. 1.2.4 Traded Products. 1.3 Europe. 1.3.1 The England and Wales Electricity Market. 1.3.2 The Nordic Market. 1.3.3 Price Setting at Nord Pool. 1.3.4 Continental Europe 13. 1.4 North America. 1.4.1 PJM Interconnection. 1.4.2 California and the Electricity Crisis. 1.4.3 Alberta and Ontario. 1.5 Australia and New Zealand. 1.6 Summary. 1.7 Further Reading. 2 Stylized Facts of Electricity Loads and Prices. 2.1 Introduction. 2.2 Price Spikes. 2.2.1 Case Study: The June 1998 Cinergy Price Spike. 2.2.2 When Supply Meets Demand. 2.2.3 What is Causing the Spikes?. 2.2.4 The Definition. 2.3 Seasonality. 2.3.1 Measuring Serial Correlation. 2.3.2 Spectral Analysis and the Periodogram. 2.3.3 Case Study: Seasonal Behavior of Electricity Prices and Loads. 2.4 Seasonal Decomposition. 2.4.1 Differencing. 2.4.2 Mean or Median Week. 2.4.3 Moving Average Technique. 2.4.4 Annual Seasonality and Spectral Decomposition. 2.4.5 Rolling Volatility Technique. 2.4.6 Case Study: Rolling Volatility in Practice. 2.4.7 Wavelet Decomposition. 2.4.8 Case Study: Wavelet Filtering of Nord Pool Hourly System Prices. 2.5 Mean Reversion. 2.5.1 R/S Analysis. 2.5.2 Detrended Fluctuation Analysis. 2.5.3 Periodogram Regression. 2.5.4 Average Wavelet Coefficient. 2.5.5 Case Study: Anti-persistence of Electricity Prices. 2.6 Distributions of Electricity Prices. 2.6.1 Stable Distributions. 2.6.2 Hyperbolic Distributions. 2.6.3 Case Study: Distribution of EEX Spot Prices. 2.6.4 Further Empirical Evidence and Possible Applications. 2.7 Summary. 2.8 Further Reading. 3 Modeling and Forecasting Electricity Loads. 3.1 Introduction. 3.2 Factors Affecting Load Patterns. 3.2.1 Case Study: Dealing with Missing Values and Outliers. 3.2.2 Time Factors. 3.2.3 Weather Conditions. 3.2.4 Case Study: California Weather vs Load. 3.2.5 Other Factors. 3.3 Overview of Artificial Intelligence-Based Methods. 3.4 Statistical Methods. 3.4.1 Similar-Day Method. 3.4.2 Exponential Smoothing. 3.4.3 Regression Methods. 3.4.4 Autoregressive Model. 3.4.5 Autoregressive Moving Average Model. 3.4.6 ARMA Model Identification. 3.4.7 Case Study: Modeling Daily Loads in California. 3.4.8 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average Model. 3.4.9 Time Series Models with Exogenous Variables. 3.4.10 Case Study: Modeling Daily Loads in California with Exogenous Variables. 3.5 Summary. 3.6 Further Reading. 4 Modeling and Forecasting Electricity Prices. 4.1 Introduction. 4.2 Overview of Modeling Approaches. 4.3 Statistical Methods and Price Forecasting. 4.3.1 Exogenous Factors. 4.3.2 Spike Preprocessing. 4.3.3 How to Assess the Quality of Price Forecasts. 4.3.4 ARMA-type Models. 4.3.5 Time Series Models with Exogenous Variables. 4.3.6 Autoregressive GARCH Models. 4.3.7 Case Study: Forecasting Hourly CalPX Spot Prices with Linear Models. 4.3.8 Case Study: Is Spike Preprocessing Advantageous?. 4.3.9 Regime-Switching Models. 4.3.10 Calibration of Regime-Switching Models. 4.3.11 Case Study: Forecasting Hourly CalPX Spot Prices with Regime-Switching Models. 4.3.12 Interval Forecasts. 4.4 Quantitative Models and Derivatives Valuation. 4.4.1 Jump-Diffusion Models. 4.4.2 Calibration of Jump-Diffusion Models. 4.4.3 Case Study: A Mean-Reverting Jump-Diffusion Model for Nord Pool Spot Prices. 4.4.4 Hybrid Models. 4.4.5 Case Study: Regime-Switching Models for Nord Pool Spot Prices. 4.4.6 Hedging and the Use of Derivatives. 4.4.7 Derivatives Pricing and the Market Price of Risk. 4.4.8 Case Study: Asian-Style Electricity Options. 4.5 Summary. 4.6 Further Reading. Bibliography. Index.

Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid

Abstract: Malicious attacks against power systems are investigated, in which an adversary controls a set of meters and is able to alter the measurements from those meters. Two regimes of attacks are considered. The strong attack regime is where the adversary attacks a sufficient number of meters so that the network state becomes unobservable by the control center. For attacks in this regime, the smallest set of attacked meters capable of causing network unobservability is characterized using a graph theoretic approach. By casting the problem as one of minimizing a supermodular graph functional, the problem of identifying the smallest set of vulnerable meters is shown to have polynomial complexity. For the weak attack regime where the adversary controls only a small number of meters, the problem is examined from a decision theoretic perspective for both the control center and the adversary. For the control center, a generalized likelihood ratio detector is proposed that incorporates historical data. For the adversary, the trade-off between maximizing estimation error at the control center and minimizing detection probability of the launched attack is examined. An optimal attack based on minimum energy leakage is proposed.