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Velichka Milina

Bio: Velichka Milina is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Energy security & Mociology. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 5 publications receiving 14 citations.

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TL;DR: In this article, an analysis and assessment of the changes demanding a new paradigm of efficient energy security that is adequate to the changed realities of energy markets and global economic development is presented.
Abstract: Since the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, energy security has been among the highest priorities in the security strategies and policies of developed countries. The potential risks and threats related to energy security mainly grew out of two circumstances: the predicted upcoming production peak of hydrocarbon resources vital for the modem economy, and the security of their supplies. Two key factors in the past years, however, have dramatically changed the energy sector. The first factor is the global economic crisis of the 2010s, and the other is the strategic shock from the yield of non-conventional hydrocarbon resources. Today, energy security policy requires a paradigm shift and a new model of factors and conditions for its implementation. This article offers an analysis and assessment of the changes demanding a new paradigm of efficient energy security that is adequate to the changed realities of energy markets and global economic development.The Old Paradigm* 1The concept of energy security that dominated for almost forty years (following the energy crisis of the 1970s) was rooted in the relatively plentiful availability of and easy access to fossil fuels, while the main threat to global energy security was considered to be the discontinuation of energy supplies. Thus, the old paradigm could be briefly summarized as "stable and continuous supplies at affordable prices." The significance of this problem was suggested by the common statement of geopolitical strategists, investment bankers, geologists, and physicists on the foreseeable depletion of oil and natural gas, and by the "final countdown" that had started in the production of hydrocarbon resources at an acceptable "energy price."2 This fact, as well as the severe competition for energy resources due to increasing demand and consumption in developed and emerging economies, shaped the context of energy policies.This was a period when the major consumers of energy resources (the U.S., EU, China, and India) were highly dependent on the producing countries dominating the energy market from the Middle East and the Caspian region, Russia, etc. The basic principles of the energy market were energy nationalism, the active role of "transit" countries, and the domination of producers over consumers.Energy nationalism was the major principle that shaped the behavior of the key participants on the energy market, whether they were producing countries, transit countries, or heavy consumers of energy resources.3 Energy nationalism created a reality where the behavior and decisions of energy markets and the supply of resources ultimately depended not on economic market factors but rather on the producers, whereas the energy market turned into an arena of interstate relations. Oil and natural gas were used as geopolitical weapons, while energy geopolitics and geoeconomics became the most essential part of global politics and the foreign policy of the key players on the energy market.Energy (resource) nationalism is typical of exporting countries rich in hydrocarbon resources. As a rule, they follow the scenario of a phenomenon that experts diagnose as "the resource curse,"4 or "the Dutch disease."5 Its common feature is slow social and economic development of the country due to a lack of domestic economic stimuli, and because of local political elites who take advantage of the high export revenues to maintain closed political regimes. The main consequences are weak government institutions or authoritarian governments, restriction of civil and political liberties, lack of an independent judicial system and independent political parties, low economic effectiveness, and underdevelopment of the economy outside the extraction sector.Negative internal economic and socio-political implications of the "resource curse" are the main reason for the big producers of resources to implement highly accentuated policies of energy nationalism. …

6 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The phenomena that fall under the rubric of "Web 2.0" have radically changed the characteristics of the objects of security as well as the problems facing security - starting from Twitter revolutions, going through the protests of "the indignant," and culminating in the key role of social media as tools of "soft power."
Abstract: Information can often provide a key power resource, and more people have access to more information than ever before. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power.3Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Power always depends on context.2 The year 2011 has made Joseph Nye's statement starkly visible concerning all actors in the realm of security policy. The Arab Spring uprisings (still ongoing in Syria) and the protests that have erupted in nations around the world of ineffective government policies regarding the global financial and economic crisis have categorically proven that political stability (security) cannot be considered and achieved only in the context of traditional institutions and norms of representative democracy, or through inspiring fear and beliefs in a closed society. These events have demonstrated new forms and scales of political activity, and have called for competent political participation. What unites them, in spite of their widespread geography, is that they were organized and conducted with the help of new communications technologies.The current context of security policy is the communications society. The phenomena that fall under the rubric of "Web 2.0" have radically changed the characteristics of the objects of security (individuals, society, state), as well as the problems facing security - starting from Twitter revolutions, going through the protests of "the indignant," and culminating in the key role of social media as tools of "soft power." This article is an attempt to assess and analyze the parameters of these changes as challenges and new opportunities for security systems in a communications society.The Communications SocietyUntil recently, we used to define the world that we live in as an "information society." But if we carefully analyze the trends of the past decade, we could argue that this statement does not reflect well enough the specifics of the present anymore. Although the quantity of accessible information continuously increases, today it is more appropriate to say that we are witnessing a revolution that provides new alternative instruments for communication. These communication technologies focus not on increasing the volume of accessible information, but on developing various innovative and effective forms of mass communication from central points to large numbers of people, and also on creating new modes of information exchange between individual actors. The phenomenon of "communication" is moving toward obtaining the status of the main explanatory principle in many of the social sciences.The evolution of the Internet at the beginning of the twenty-first century saw the development of a variety of technologies that combined to create what is known as Web 2.0. This stage in the Internet's evolution is characterized by social networks, social media, and user-generated content - by the granting of creative agency to individual users, not just traditional media outlets. A vital feature is the use of the Internet not only as a "communication medium" but also as a "platform."3 These platforms can be created and improved upon both by designers and users. One of the most significant outcomes of Web 2.0 is the creation of social ("new") media as a new means for online mass information, where every Internet user - even those without any special programming abilities - can take part in the process of creating, storing, and disseminating socially important information, addressed to a wide audience.4The widespread dissemination of these "new media" has turned them simply into "the media" for a large number of people. The following are considered the "traditional" media: printed material (newspapers, magazines, etc.), radio, television, cinema and video programs, and digital editions (so-called Web 1 .0) of newspapers, information, and news feeds. Although no official "scientific" definition exists yet, the notion of "new media" characterizes Internet-based (Web 2. …

6 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: According to a number of geopolitical strategists, investment bankers, geologists, and physicists, much of humankind will radically change their way of existence in the next twenty to thirty years as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: According to a number of geopolitical strategists, investment bankers, geologists, and physicists, much of humankind will radically change their way of existence in the next twenty to thirty years. The reason? The supplies of cheap energy sources, which are the basis of the modern economy, will be exhausted. This event will be preceded by a number of conflicts over the control of the last locations of natural energy sources. Undoubtedly, these processes will influence the life of each of us. The events we are witnessing in international relations are being described by many people as “the last Great Game.” Oil (as well as natural gas more recently) has been the lifeblood of the modern economy. The reduction of their production and the increase of world consumption are two factors that point toward a coming economic crisis. This process is inevitable, since all resources will be gradually depleted and finally exhausted. This curve represents oil production over time:

4 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that, with large changes taking place within the functioning of the state, it is necessary to purposefully introduce norms and practices of the model of shared responsibility into the overall context of civil-military relations.
Abstract: The past ten years have been witness to a remarkable set of achievements in Bulgaria: the basic goals of post-totalitarian transition in civil-military relations have been broadly attained; a parliamentary democratic regime is functioning steadily; civil society is being structured on an institutional level; the principles of a market economy are establishing themselves; the process of change of ownership has almost been completed; the foundations of civil control over the military have been laid; and the armed forces are politically neutral, obeying solely the legitimately elected political institutions and the laws which result from that process. However, much work remains to be done. Consolidating the process of democratization poses many questions. What paradigm of civil-military relations will prove sustainable for Bulgaria? Which form of control over the armed forces would be most appropriate for the development of society within the newly constituted state? And what are the problems caused by the details of societal transformation? In this paper, we argue that, with large changes taking place within the functioning of the state, it is necessary to purposefully introduce norms and practices of the model of shared responsibility into the overall context of civil-military relations. After 1989, the military and civil spheres found themselves in the unique situation of taking part in the total transformation of Bulgarian society. All three parties to civil-military relations (the political elite, the military professionals, and the citizens) have been adopting new cultural models of behavior and relations. Political institutions, ideas about their ideal functions, and visions of the relations among them—all have been changing. The role, organizational structure, competencies, political leadership, and means of control over the armed forces are in transition. The essential relations between the citizens and the state have been altered.1 None of this has been easy. The complexity of the situation is emphasized by the comparative lack of any practical or theoretical models of such largescale transformations. The aim, obviously, is to fully replace totalitarian political control of the military by the party/state with sustainable principles and mechanisms that lead to democratic and objective controls over the armed forces, after the classical scheme suggested by Samuel Huntington. The desired result is primacy on the part of the civil and political spheres over the previously and largely

Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis and assessment of the changes demanding a new paradigm of efficient energy security that is adequate to the changed realities of energy markets and global economic development is presented.
Abstract: Since the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, energy security has been among the highest priorities in the security strategies and policies of developed countries. The potential risks and threats related to energy security mainly grew out of two circumstances: the predicted upcoming production peak of hydrocarbon resources vital for the modem economy, and the security of their supplies. Two key factors in the past years, however, have dramatically changed the energy sector. The first factor is the global economic crisis of the 2010s, and the other is the strategic shock from the yield of non-conventional hydrocarbon resources. Today, energy security policy requires a paradigm shift and a new model of factors and conditions for its implementation. This article offers an analysis and assessment of the changes demanding a new paradigm of efficient energy security that is adequate to the changed realities of energy markets and global economic development.The Old Paradigm* 1The concept of energy security that dominated for almost forty years (following the energy crisis of the 1970s) was rooted in the relatively plentiful availability of and easy access to fossil fuels, while the main threat to global energy security was considered to be the discontinuation of energy supplies. Thus, the old paradigm could be briefly summarized as "stable and continuous supplies at affordable prices." The significance of this problem was suggested by the common statement of geopolitical strategists, investment bankers, geologists, and physicists on the foreseeable depletion of oil and natural gas, and by the "final countdown" that had started in the production of hydrocarbon resources at an acceptable "energy price."2 This fact, as well as the severe competition for energy resources due to increasing demand and consumption in developed and emerging economies, shaped the context of energy policies.This was a period when the major consumers of energy resources (the U.S., EU, China, and India) were highly dependent on the producing countries dominating the energy market from the Middle East and the Caspian region, Russia, etc. The basic principles of the energy market were energy nationalism, the active role of "transit" countries, and the domination of producers over consumers.Energy nationalism was the major principle that shaped the behavior of the key participants on the energy market, whether they were producing countries, transit countries, or heavy consumers of energy resources.3 Energy nationalism created a reality where the behavior and decisions of energy markets and the supply of resources ultimately depended not on economic market factors but rather on the producers, whereas the energy market turned into an arena of interstate relations. Oil and natural gas were used as geopolitical weapons, while energy geopolitics and geoeconomics became the most essential part of global politics and the foreign policy of the key players on the energy market.Energy (resource) nationalism is typical of exporting countries rich in hydrocarbon resources. As a rule, they follow the scenario of a phenomenon that experts diagnose as "the resource curse,"4 or "the Dutch disease."5 Its common feature is slow social and economic development of the country due to a lack of domestic economic stimuli, and because of local political elites who take advantage of the high export revenues to maintain closed political regimes. The main consequences are weak government institutions or authoritarian governments, restriction of civil and political liberties, lack of an independent judicial system and independent political parties, low economic effectiveness, and underdevelopment of the economy outside the extraction sector.Negative internal economic and socio-political implications of the "resource curse" are the main reason for the big producers of resources to implement highly accentuated policies of energy nationalism. …

6 citations

01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, an ex-ante institutional analysis following neofunctional and new institutional economic thinking is carried out to examine whether existing decision-making structures in the EU are adequate to address these issues.
Abstract: Energy security has been back on the political agenda since Ukraine seized supplies of natural gas to the European Union (EU) in 2006. Though it was the first substantial supply disruption in several decades, the incident sparked lengthy and sometimes heated debates about the availability of supplies, reliability of suppliers and diversification of supply routes. Since 2010 the European Commission (EC) has openly acknowledged that the aforementioned supply disruptions could have been dealt with if the EU internal energy system were functioning properly. This analysis shows that there are abundant gas supplies available to the EU gas system but that they cannot always flow freely, which weakens the system’s capacity to respond to disruptions. Despite the fact that attracting sufficient investment in gas infrastructure and streamlining national regulations have been on the agenda for a substantial period of time, the EU still has challenges to overcome in both these fields. This study examines whether existing decision-making structures in the EU are adequate to address these issues. It does so by carrying out an ex-ante institutional analysis following neofunctionalist and new institutional economic thinking. Neofunctionalist theory seems applicable to energy policy development in the EU for a number of reasons, e.g. because it acknowledges the notion that newly designed institutions in Europe pursue their own interests and appear to actively steer the integration process. New institutional economists attribute value to the context in which economic activity takes place, i.e. the interplay between supply and demand and how that determines prices. This idea is relevant when analyzing the EU internal gas system’s functioning, because some of the described inefficiencies are found in institutions, e.g. the lack of implementation of existing legislation, or the inadequate streamlining of national regulatory regimes. Finally a multilevel governance framework has been applied to dissect decision-making structures in two of the case studies. Though its merits as a theory of European integration have been widely debated, the framework is helpful in this context, because it distinguishes between geographical scales, and also allows for a distinction between public and private actors. Also, multilevel governance has been applied to the case of the United States, which is used as a benchmark in all three case studies, because it is widely viewed as being the only well-functioning gas system in the world.

4 citations