计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

https://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/WP/2000/pdf/wpa00041.pdf

Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects $

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned. Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur. An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

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This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly

In this book, Andrew Harvey sets out to provide a unified and comprehensive theory of structural time series models. Unlike the traditional ARIMA models, structural time series models consist explicitly of unobserved components, such as trends and seasonals, which have a direct interpretation. As a result the model selection methodology associated with structural models is much closer to econometric methodology. The link with econometrics is made even closer by the natural way in which the models can be extended to include explanatory variables and to cope with multivariate time series. From the technical point of view, state space models and the Kalman filter play a key role in the statistical treatment of structural time series models. The book includes a detailed treatment of the Kalman filter. This technique was originally developed in control engineering, but is becoming increasingly important in fields such as economics and operations research. This book is concerned primarily with modelling economic and social time series, and with addressing the special problems which the treatment of such series poses. The properties of the models and the methodological techniques used to select them are illustrated with various applications. These range from the modellling of trends and cycles in US macroeconomic time series to to an evaluation of the effects of seat belt legislation in the UK.

Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter

This study investigates whether marketwide liquidity is a state variable important for asset pricing. We find that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate liquidity. Our monthly liquidity measure, an average of individual-stock measures estimated with daily data, relies on the principle that order flow induces greater return reversals when liquidity is lower. From 1966 through 1999, the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5 percent annually, adjusted for exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors. Furthermore, a liquidity risk factor accounts for half of the profits to a momentum strategy over the same 34-year period.

/pdf/liquidity-risk-and-expected-stock-returns-xh68en0c2i.pdf

Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns

https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/acharya_pedersen.pdf

Asset pricing with liquidity risk

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has given way to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012, yet many of the banking issues remain the same. We discuss a method to estimate the capital that a financial firm would need to raise if we have another financial crisis. This measure of capital shortfall is based on publicly available information but is conceptually similar to the stress tests conducted by US and European regulators. We argue that this measure summarizes the major characteristics of systemic risk and provides a reliable interpretation of the past and current financial crises.

/pdf/capital-shortfall-a-new-approach-to-ranking-and-regulating-2oipn77zcb.pdf

Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks †

Foreword. Acknowledgments. Prologue: A Bird's Eye View. The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies By (Viral Acharya, Thomas Philippon, Matthew Richardson, and Nouriel Roubini). Section I: Causes of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 By (Matthew Richardson). Chapter 1: Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis By (Dwight Jaffee, Anthony Lynch, Matthew Richardson and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh). Chapter 2: How Banks Played the Leverage "Game" By (Viral Acharya and Philipp Schnabl). Chapter 3: The Rating Agencies Is Regulation the Answer By (Matthew Richardson and Lawrence White)? Section II: Financial Institutions By (Matthew Richardson). Chapter 4: What to Do About the Government Sponsored Enterprises By (Dwight Jaffee, Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Lawrence White and Robert Wright)? Chapter 5: Enhanced Regulation of Large Complex Financial Institutions By (Anthony Saunders, Roy Smith & Ingo Walter). Chapter 6: Hedge Funds in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis By (Stephen Brown, Marcin Kacperczyk, Alexander Ljungqvist, Anthony Lynch, Lasse Pedersen, and Matthew Richardson). Section III: Governance, Incentives and Fair Value Accounting Overview By (Viral Acharya and Rangarajan Sundaram). Chapter 7: Corporate Governance in the Modern Financial Sector By (Viral V. Acharya, Jennifer Carpenter, Xavier Gabaix, Kose John, Matthew Richardson, Marti Subrahmanyam, Rangarajan Sundaram, Eitan Zemel). Chapter 8: Rethinking Compensation in Financial Firms By (Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter). Chapter 9: Fair Value Accounting Policy Issues Raised by the Credit Crunch By (Stephen G. Ryan). Section IV: Derivatives, Short-Selling and Transparency By (Viral Acharya). Chapter 10: Derivatives The Ultimate Financial Innovation By (Viral Acharya, Menachem Brenner, Robert Engle, Anthony Lynch and Matthew Richardson). Chapter 11: Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives By (Viral Acharya, Robert Engle, Stephen Figlewski, Anthony Lynch, and Marti Subrahmanyam). Chapter 12: Short Selling By (Menachem Brenner and Marti G. Subrahmanyam). Section V: The Role of the Fed By (Thomas Cooley and Thomas Philippon). Chapter 13: Regulating Systemic Risk By (Viral Acharya, Lasse Pedersen, Thomas Philippon and Matthew Richardson). Chapter 14: Private Lessons for Public Banking: The Case for Conditionality in LOLR Facilities By (Viral Acharya and David Backus). Section VI: The Bailout By (Thomas Cooley and Thomas Philippon). Chapter 15: The Financial Sector "Bailout" Sowing the Seeds of the Next Crisis By (Viral Acharya and Rangarajan Sundaram)? Chapter 16: Mortgages and Households By (Andrew Caplin and Thomas Cooley). Chapter 17: Where Should the Bailout Stop By (Edward I. Altman and Thomas Philippon)? Section VII: International Coordination. Chapter 18: International Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation By (Viral Acharya, Paul Wachtel and Ingo Walter). NYU Stern Author Biographies. Index.

Restoring financial stability : how to repair a failed system

http://facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/acharyabharathsrinivasan.pdf

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries ☆

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank's failure on the health of other banks give rise to a "systemic risk-shifting" incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank's own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Optimal prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID236401_code020210600.pdf?abstractid=236401&mirid=1&type=2

Viral V. Acharya

Papers

Asset pricing with liquidity risk

Capital Shortfall: A New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks †

Restoring financial stability : how to repair a failed system

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries ☆

A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation