V
Vitaly Shmatikov
Researcher at Cornell University
Publications - 153
Citations - 22828
Vitaly Shmatikov is an academic researcher from Cornell University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Anonymity & Information privacy. The author has an hindex of 64, co-authored 148 publications receiving 17801 citations. Previous affiliations of Vitaly Shmatikov include University of Texas at Austin & French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Privacy-preserving data exploration in genome-wide association studies
Aaron Johnson,Vitaly Shmatikov +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of privacy-preserving data mining algorithms for genome-wide association studies (GWAS) datasets, where the analyst does not know a priori how many and which SNPs to consider.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
TL;DR: An extensive case study is presented, in which the function view framework is used to systematically classify and rigorously define a rich domain of identity-related properties, and to demonstrate that privacy and anonymity are independent.
Proceedings Article
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
TL;DR: This study demonstrates the feasibility of using formal methods to analyze commercial protocols and identifies the main shortcomings in SSL 2.0 that led to the design of SSL 3.0.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations
TL;DR: This work designs, implements, and applies the first methodology for large-scale testing of certificate validation logic in SSL/TLS implementations, and implements and applies "frankencerts," synthetic certificates that are randomly mutated from parts of real certificates and thus include unusual combinations of extensions and constraints.
Book ChapterDOI
Efficient Two-Party Secure Computation on Committed Inputs
TL;DR: A homomorphic, semantically secure variant of the Camenisch-Shoup verifiable cryptosystem, which uses shorter keys, is unambiguous, and allows efficient proofs that a committed plaintext is encrypted under a committed key.