W. Ross Ashby

Bio: W. Ross Ashby is an academic researcher from University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. The author has contributed to research in topics: Iterative design & Biocybernetics. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 13 publications receiving 3708 citations.

Every Good Regulator of a System Must Be a Model of That System

Abstract: Today, as a step towards the control of complex dynamic systems, models are being used ubiquitously. Being modelled, for instance, are the air traffic flows around New York, the endocrine balances of the pregnant sheep, and the flows of money among the banking centres.

Requisite Variety and Its Implications for the Control of Complex Systems

Abstract: Recent work on the fundamental processes of regulation in biology (Ashby, 1956) has shown the importance of a certain quantitative relation called the law of requisite variety. After this relation had been found, we appreciated that it was related to a theorem in a world far removed from the biological—that of Shannon on the quantity of noise or error that could be removed through a correction-channel (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; theorem 10). In this paper I propose to show the relationship between the two theorems, and to indicate something of their implications for regulation, in the cybernetic sense, when the system to be regulated is extremely complex.

Principles of the Self-Organizing System

Abstract: Questions of principle are sometimes regarded as too unpractical to be important, but I suggest that that is certainly not the case in our subject. The range of phenomena that we have to deal with is so broad that, were it to be dealt with wholly at the technological or practical level, we would be defeated by the sheer quantity and complexity of it. The total range can be handled only piecemeal; among the pieces are those homomorphisms of the complex whole that we call “abstract theory” or “general principles.” They alone give the bird’s-eye view that enables us to move about in this vast field without losing our bearings. I propose, then, to attempt such a bird’s-eye survey.

General Systems Theory as a New Discipline

Abstract: The emergence of general system theory is symptomatic of a new movement that has been developing in science during the past decade: Science is at last giving serious attention to systems that are intrinsically complex. This statement may seem somewhat surprising. Are not chemical molecules complex? Is not the living organism complex? And has not science studied them from its earliest days? Let me explain what I mean.

Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning

Abstract: This paper considers the relation between the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning. It examines some complications in allocating resources between the two, particularly those introduced by the distribution of costs and benefits across time and space, and the effects of ecological interaction. Two general situations involving the development and use of knowledge in organizations are modeled. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an organization and an organizational code. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in competition for primacy. The paper develops an argument that adaptive processes, by refining exploitation more rapidly than exploration, are likely to become effective in the short run but self-destructive in the long run. The possibility that certain common organizational practices ameliorate that tendency is assessed.

Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives

Abstract: Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'