/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Corruption and Growth

/pdf/asian-drama-an-inquiry-into-the-poverty-of-nations-2keaixhgnu.pdf

Asian drama, an inquiry intó the poverty of nations

Invention and Economic Growth.

El artículo tiene como objetivo evaluar el nivel de desarrollo de la capacidad de absorción realizada (RACAP) en las Pyme colombianas. Se parte de una muestra de 363 Pyme colombianas (Dane,2012), se usa una revisión de literatura con apoyo del análisis de contenido y un modelo de regresión lineal, que permiten mostrar la existencia de una correlación lineal positiva entre la adquisición y asimilación del conocimiento externo en las organizaciones objeto de estudio,. Palabras clave: Capacidades de absorción, capacidades de absorción potencial, medición de las capacidades de absorción ABSTRACT:

Measurement of potential absorption capacity in Colombia's innovative companies [Medición de la capacidad de absorción potencial en las empresas innovadoras de Colombia]

Innovation and firm performance in developing countries: The case of Pakistani textile and apparel manufacturers

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this paper, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty-trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high-growth and a poverty-trap equilibrium co-exist even with abundant natural resources.

Education, Rent-seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

/pdf/education-rent-seeking-and-the-curse-of-natural-resources-149f6voy6w.pdf

Education, Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Young innovative companies and employment creation, evidence from the Pakistani textiles sector

The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. We find that the government is better-off either completely eliminating corruption or accepting corruption by offering wages lower than the market wage. Offering public wage premium that does not deter bribery is suboptimal. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through wage incentives or monitoring. The role of wage incentives decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. (JEL D73, H26, J33, J41)

Waqar Wadho

Papers

Innovation and firm performance in developing countries: The case of Pakistani textile and apparel manufacturers

Education, Rent-seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Education, Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Young innovative companies and employment creation, evidence from the Pakistani textiles sector

Corruption, tax evasion and the role of wage incentives with endogenous monitoring technology