Author
William E. Walsh
Other affiliations: IBM
Bio: William E. Walsh is an academic researcher from University of Michigan. The author has contributed to research in topics: Bidding & Supply chain. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 19 publications receiving 2736 citations. Previous affiliations of William E. Walsh include IBM.
Papers
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01 May 1998
TL;DR: The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a scalable and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents and is used extensively in classroom exercises and is available to the general Internet population.
Abstract: Market mechanisms such as auctions will likely rep resent a common interaction medium for agents on the Internet The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a ex ible scalable and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents The server manages many simultaneous auctions by separating the interface from the core auction procedures This design provides a responsive interface and tolerates system and network disruptions but necessitates careful timekeeping proce dures to ensure temporal accuracy The AuctionBot has been used extensively in classroom exercises and is available to the general Internet population Its exi ble speci cation of auctions in terms of orthogonal pa rameters makes it a useful device for agent researchers exploring the design space of auction mechanisms
573 citations
TL;DR: This work formalizes decentralized scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and brings to bear some relevant economic concepts about the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions.
505 citations
01 Nov 1998
TL;DR: The economic incentives facing participants in auction mechanisms are analyzed, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids.
Abstract: We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids. We also perform a computational analysis of the auctioneer's task, exhibiting efficient algorithms for processing bids and calculating allocations.
361 citations
TL;DR: An extensive breakdown of the auction design space is presented that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies.
281 citations
17 Oct 2000
TL;DR: It is found that producers can sometimes gain significantly by bidding strategically, however, when the available surplus is small relative to the consumers’ values, the producers’ strategic behavior may prevent the supply chain from forming at all, resulting in zero gains for all agents.
Abstract: Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem by global optimization over expressed offers to engage in compound exchanges. A one-shot combinatorial auction that optimizes the reported value of the bids results in optimal allocations with truthful bids. But autonomous self-interested agents have an incentive to bid strategically in an attempt to gain extra surplus. We investigate a particular combinatorial protocol consisting of a one-shot auction and a strategic bidding policy. We experimentally analyze the efficiency and producer surplus obtained in five networks, and compare this performance to that of a distributed, progressive auction protocol with non-strategic bidding. We find that producers can sometimes gain significantly by bidding strategically. However, when the available surplus is small relative to the consumers’ values, the producers’ strategic behavior may prevent the supply chain from forming at all, resulting in zero gains for all agents. We examine the robustness of the combinatorial protocol by investigating agent incentives to deviate, identifying quasi-equilibrium behavior for an example network.
199 citations
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Book•
15 Dec 2008TL;DR: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multi agent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics.
Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.
2,068 citations
TL;DR: This work considers algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest, and suggests a framework for studying such algorithms.
1,301 citations
TL;DR: This paper presents several solutions to the problem of task allocation among autonomous agents, and suggests that the agents form coalitions in order to perform tasks or improve the efficiency of their performance.
1,170 citations
Book•
09 Dec 2005
TL;DR: It's important for you to start having that hobby that will lead you to join in better concept of life and reading will be a positive activity to do every time.
Abstract: combinatorial auctions What to say and what to do when mostly your friends love reading? Are you the one that don't have such hobby? So, it's important for you to start having that hobby. You know, reading is not the force. We're sure that reading will lead you to join in better concept of life. Reading will be a positive activity to do every time. And do you know our friends become fans of combinatorial auctions as the best book to read? Yeah, it's neither an obligation nor order. It is the referred book that will not make you feel disappointed.
1,139 citations
TL;DR: The state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions is surveyed and some new insights are presented.
Abstract: Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution effects between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or combinations of different assets. This paper surveys the state of knowledge about the design of combinatorial auctions and presents some new insights. Periodic updates of portions of this survey will be posted to this journal's Online Supplements web page at http://joc.pubs.informs.org/OnlineSupplements.html.
1,096 citations