William L. Thompson

Bio: William L. Thompson is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Mental image & Auditory imagery. The author has an hindex of 39, co-authored 59 publications receiving 11048 citations. Previous affiliations of William L. Thompson include University of Oxford.

Neural foundations of imagery.

Abstract: Mental imagery has, until recently, fallen within the purview of philosophy and cognitive psychology. Both enterprises have raised important questions about imagery, but have not made substantial progress in answering them. With the advent of cognitive neuroscience, these questions have become empirically tractable. Neuroimaging studies, combined with other methods (such as studies of brain-damaged patients and of the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation), are revealing the ways in which imagery draws on mechanisms used in other activities, such as perception and motor control. Because of its close relation to these basic processes, imagery is now becoming one of the best understood 'higher' cognitive functions.

The role of area 17 in visual imagery: convergent evidence from PET and rTMS.

Abstract: Visual imagery is used in a wide range of mental activities, ranging from memory to reasoning, and also plays a role in perception proper. The contribution of early visual cortex, specifically Area 17, to visual mental imagery was examined by the use of two convergent techniques. In one, subjects closed their eyes during positron emission tomography (PET) while they visualized and compared properties (for example, relative length) of sets of stripes. The results showed that when people perform this task, Area 17 is activated. In the other, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) was applied to medial occipital cortex before presentation of the same task. Performance was impaired after rTMS compared with a sham control condition; similar results were obtained when the subjects performed the task by actually looking at the stimuli. In sum, the PET results showed that when patterns of stripes are visualized, Area 17 is activated, and the rTMS results showed that such activation underlies information processing.

Changes in cortical activity during mental rotation. A mapping study using functional MRI.

Abstract: Summary Mental imagery is an important cognitive method for problem solving, and the mental rotation of complex objects, as originally described by Shepard and Metzler (1971), is among the best studied of mental imagery tasks. Functional MRI was used to observe focal changes in blood flow in the brains of 10 healthy volunteers performing a mental rotation task. On each trial, subjects viewed a pair of perspective drawings of three-dimensional shapes, mentally rotated one into congruence with the other, and then determined whether the two forms were identical or mirror-images. The control task, which we have called the ‘comparison’ condition, was identical except that both members of each pair appeared at the same orientation, and hence the same encoding, comparison and decision processes were used but mental rotation was not required. These tasks were interleaved with a baseline ‘fixation’ condition, in which the subjects viewed a crosshair. Technically adequate studies were obtained in eight of the 10 subjects. Areas of increased signal were identified according to sulcal landmarks and are described in terms of the Brodmann's area (BA) definitions that correspond according to the atlas of Talaraich and Tournoux. When the rotation task was contrasted with the comparison condition, all subjects showed consistent foci of activation in BAs 7a and 7b (sometimes spreading to BA 40); 88% had increased signal in middle frontal gyrus (BA 8) and 75% showed extrastriate activation, including particularly BAs 39 and 19, in a position consistent with area V5/human MT as localized by functional and histological assays. In more than half of the subjects, hand somatosensory cortex (3-1-2) was engaged, and in 50% of subjects there was elevated signal in BA 18. In frontal cortex, activation was above threshold in half the subjects in BAs 9 and/or 46 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). Some (four out of eight) subjects also showed signal increases in BAs 44 and/or 46. Premotor cortex (BA 6) was active in half of the subjects during the rotation task. There was little evidence for lateralization of the cortical activity or of engagement of motor cortex. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that mental rotation engages cortical areas involved in tracking moving objects and encoding spatial relations, as well as the more general understanding that mental imagery engages the same, or similar, neural imagery as direct perception.

Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cortex

Abstract: WE report here the use of positron emission tomography (PET) to reveal that the primary visual cortex is activated when subjects close their eyes and visualize objects. The size of the image is systematically related to the location of maximal activity, which is as expected because the earliest visual areas are spatially organized1–5. These results were only evident, however, when imagery conditions were compared to a non-imagery baseline in which the same auditory cues were presented (and hence the stimuli were controlled); when a resting baseline was used (and hence brain activation was uncontrolled), imagery activation was obscured because of activation in visual cortex during the baseline condition. These findings resolve a debate in the literature about whether imagery activates early visual cortex6–11 and indicate that visual mental imagery involves 'depictive' representations, not solely language-like descriptions12–14. Moreover, the fact that stored visual information can affect processing in even the earliest visual areas suggests that knowledge can fundamentally bias what one sees.

Sources of Method Bias in Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to Control It

Abstract: Despite the concern that has been expressed about potential method biases, and the pervasiveness of research settings with the potential to produce them, there is disagreement about whether they really are a problem for researchers in the behavioral sciences. Therefore, the purpose of this review is to explore the current state of knowledge about method biases. First, we explore the meaning of the terms “method” and “method bias” and then we examine whether method biases influence all measures equally. Next, we review the evidence of the effects that method biases have on individual measures and on the covariation between different constructs. Following this, we evaluate the procedural and statistical remedies that have been used to control method biases and provide recommendations for minimizing method bias.

Perceptual symbol systems.

Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The stor- age and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual expe- riences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a com- mon frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspec- tion (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and ab- stract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinato- rially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a per- ceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal sym- bol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.