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William W. Bratton
Researcher at University of Pennsylvania
Publications - 114
Citations - 2083
William W. Bratton is an academic researcher from University of Pennsylvania. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Corporate law. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 112 publications receiving 2037 citations. Previous affiliations of William W. Bratton include University of California, Berkeley & University of Miami.
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Journal ArticleDOI
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value
TL;DR: The authors of as mentioned in this paper argue that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed, and that the Enron collapse holds out for the self-regulatory system of corporate governance.
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The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History
TL;DR: The economic theory of the firm as mentioned in this paper is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships among individual factors of production, which can be explained in terms of contracting parties and transaction costs.
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The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the financial crisis exposes major weaknesses in the shareholders' case, and that the fact that management bears primary responsibility for the disastrous results does not suffice to effect a policy connection between increased shareholder power and sound regulatory reform.
Journal Article
Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal
TL;DR: The work of as mentioned in this paper is part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations (BAM) program at the University of Pennsylvania.Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarships.
Journal Article
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value
TL;DR: The authors of as mentioned in this paper argue that the incentive structure that motivates actors in the system generates much less powerful checks against abuse than many observers have believed, and that the Enron collapse holds out for the self-regulatory system of corporate governance.