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Xavier Vives

Bio: Xavier Vives is an academic researcher from University of Navarra. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Oligopoly. The author has an hindex of 59, co-authored 306 publications receiving 17809 citations. Previous affiliations of Xavier Vives include INSEAD & Pompeu Fabra University.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly and shows that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).
Abstract: This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).

2,516 citations

Book
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this article, Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing, using two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games.
Abstract: The "oligopoly problem"--the question of how prices are formed when the market contains only a few competitors--is one of the more persistent problems in the history of economic thought. In this book Xavier Vives applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. Vives begins by relating classic contributions to the field--including those of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, Chamberlin, and Robinson--to modern game theory. In his discussion of basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, he pays particular attention to recent developments in the theory of supermodular games. The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides specialized existence results, characterizations of equilibria, extensions to large markets, and an analysis of comparative statics with a view toward applied work. The final chapters examine commitment issues, entry, information transmission, and collusion using a variety of tools: two-stage games, the modeling of competition under asymmetric information and mechanism design theory, and the theory of repeated and dynamic games, including Markov perfect equilibrium and differential games.

1,581 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence and order structure of Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games where payoffs satisfy certain monotonicity properties (which are directly related to strategic complementarities) but need not be quasiconcave.

949 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that if the goods are substitutes (not) to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Bertrand (Cournot) competition, then the market outcome is always optimal.

777 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot's view and derive policy implications about banking regulation (solvency and liquidity ratios) and interventions of the Lender of Last Resort as well as on the disclosure policy of the Central Bank.
Abstract: The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort, elaborated by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873), asserts that the Central Bank should lend to 'illiquid but solvent' banks under certain conditions. Several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete: when interbank markets are efficient, a solvent bank cannot be illiquid. This Paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot's view. Our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs. We build a model of banks' liquidity crises that possesses a unique Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market. We derive policy implications about banking regulation (solvency and liquidity ratios) and interventions of the Lender of Last Resort as well as on the disclosure policy of the Central Bank.

689 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: A Course in Game Theory as discussed by the authors presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.
Abstract: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

7,018 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of the authors' brain’s wiring.
Abstract: In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

4,351 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors examined three sectors of the economy: the State Sector (state-owned firms), the Listed Sector (publicly listed firms), and the Private Sector (all other firms with various types of private and local government ownership).
Abstract: China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature: neither its legal nor financial system is well developed by existing standards, yet it has one of the fastest growing economies. We examine 3 sectors of the economy: the State Sector (state-owned firms), the Listed Sector (publicly listed firms), and the Private Sector (all other firms with various types of private and local government ownership). The law-finance-growth nexus established by existing literature applies to the State and Listed Sectors: with poor legal protections of minority and outside investors, external markets are weak, and the growth of these firms is slow or negative. However, with arguably poorer applicable legal and financial mechanisms, the Private Sector grows much faster than the State and Listed Sectors, and provides most of the economy's growth. This suggests that there exist effective alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, to support this growth.

2,829 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly and shows that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).
Abstract: This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).

2,516 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The theories of supermodular optimization and games provide a framework for the analysis of systems marked by complementarity and are used to analyze the characteristic features of the Lincoln Electric Company's strategy and structure.

2,415 citations