Xi Lu

Bio: Xi Lu is an academic researcher from National University of Singapore. The author has contributed to research in topics: China & Corruption. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 7 publications receiving 207 citations. Previous affiliations of Xi Lu include University of California, Berkeley & Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Son preference in rural China: patrilineal families and socioeconomic change.

Abstract: This article draws on a survey conducted in six provinces in summer 2008 to investigate the determinants of son preference in rural China. The analysis confirms the conventional wisdom that son preference is embedded within patrilineal family structures and practices. We extend our analysis by exploring specific aspects of variation within patrilineal family culture. We find that the patrilineal group (clan) composition of villages and family participation in practices such as building ancestral halls and updating genealogies significantly influence son preference. Yet even though son preference is embedded within patrilineal family culture our analysis suggests that over time the attenuation of son preference is likely. This is because determinants associated with socioeconomic change-for instance higher levels of education direct exposure to official policy education materials higher income (a proxy for rural industrialization) and agricultural mechanization-all attenuate son preference. Being younger and female are also associated with weaker son preference and both characteristics are likely to interact with education and industrialization to further dilute son preference in the longer term. Nevertheless our findings suggest that concerted efforts are needed to ameliorate institutional discrimination against rural people in welfare provisioning and in labor markets and to promote multiple dimensions of gender equality including in land rights wage rates and education.

How does political trust affect social trust? An analysis of survey data from rural China using an instrumental variables approach

Abstract: Using an instrumental variable approach, we analyze survey data to untangle the relationship between social and political trust in contemporary China. We find strong evidence that political trust enhances social trust in China and the results are robust to a range of measures, including the generalized social trust question, as well as three contextualized trust questions. We also shed light on the impact of economic modernization on social trust. Our findings contribute to the general literature on trust and provide a better understanding of the complicated relationship between political trust and social trust. They also offer insight into the dynamics of trust production and reproduction in China and thus into China’s socio-political development.

Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China's Anti-Corruption Campaign

Abstract: In order to maintain popular support or at least acquiescence, autocrats must control the rapacious tendencies of other members of the governing elite. At the same time, the support of this elite is at least as important as the support of the broader population. This creates difficult tradeoffs and limits the autocrat's ability to enforce discipline. We explore this issue in the context of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. There have been two schools of thought about this campaign. One holds that it is nothing but a cover for intra-elite struggle and a purge of Xi's opponents, while the other finds more credibility in the CCP's claim that the movement is sincere. In this article, we demonstrate three facts, using a new dataset we have created. First, we use the political connections revealed by legal documents and media reports to visualize the corruption network. We demonstrate that although many of the corrupt officials are connected, Xi's most prominent political opponent, Bo Xilai, is less central by any network measure than other officials who were not viewed as challenging Xi's leadership. Second, we use a recursive selection model to analyze who the campaign has targeted, providing evidence that even personal ties to top leaders provided little protection. Finally, using another comprehensive dataset on the prefectural-city level, we show that the provinces later targeted by the corruption campaign differed from the rest in important ways. In particular, it appears that promotion patterns departed from the growth-oriented meritocratic selection procedures evidence in other provinces. Overall, our findings contradict the factional purge view and are more consistent with the view that the campaign is indeed primarily an attempt to root out systemic corruption problems.

Grain Procurement, Tax Instrument and Peasant Burdens during China's Rural Transition

Abstract: In this paper, we argue that China's grain procurement system as a major instrument in rural taxation survived the communes and lost its importance only gradually in recent years. However, as agricultural liberalization progressed, the traditional tax instruments of ‘tax deduction prior to grain procurement payment’ and implicit taxation through ‘price scissors’ gradually eroded. Under such a circumstance, local governments in agriculture-based regions resorted to informal fees collected directly from individual rural households while the more industrialized regions shifted to non-agricultural taxes that are less costly in terms of tax collection. Empirical evidence based on a large panel data set supports our hypotheses of rural taxation in China.

Why people don't trust government

Abstract: Preface Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government Joseph S. Nye, Jr. PART ONE: The Scope and Performance of Government The Evolving Scope of Government Ernest R. May Measuring the Performance of Government Derek Bok Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government Gary Orren PART TWO: The Menu of Explanations Is It Really the Economy Stupid? Robert Z. Lawrence Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government Jane Manbridge The Polarization of American Parties and Mistrust of Government David C. King The Politics of Mistrust Richard E. Neustadt PART THREE: Data on Public Attitudes toward Governance Changing Attitudes in America Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Richard Morin, Drew E. Altman, Mollyann Brodie, Mario Brossard, And Matt James Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority Ronald Inglehart Public Trust and Democracy in Japan Susan J. Pharr Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Philip D. Zelikow Notes Contributors Index

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Abstract: The Economic Effects of Constitutions. By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003. 320p. $35.00.Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have produced the most ambitious study yet that attempts to identify and estimate the effects of constitutional design on economic outcomes. They draw on data from more than 80 countries and control for demographic, historical, regional, and economic characteristics. The purpose is to determine whether the shape of political institutions has measurable impact on economic policies (e.g., fiscal balance, social welfare spending), on government performance (e.g., corruption indices, protection of property rights), and on direct measures of economic performance (e.g., productivity of capital and labor). The political institutions that draw the most attention are constitutional regime type and the method of electing legislators.

Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China [Book Review]

Abstract: Review(s) of: Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China, by Lily L. Tsai, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xvi + 347 pp. 45.00/US$85.00 (hardcover), 15.99/US$29.99 (paperback).

Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market

Abstract: Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.