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Xueping Li

Bio: Xueping Li is an academic researcher from University of Tennessee. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supply chain & Computer science. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 133 publications receiving 1902 citations. Previous affiliations of Xueping Li include University Of Tennessee System & University of Tennessee Health Science Center.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Several typical covering models and their extensions ordered from simple to complex are introduced, including Location Set Covering Problem (LSCP), Maximal Covering Location Problem (MCLP), Double Standard Model (DSM), Maximum Expected Covering location problem (MEXCLP, and Maximum Availability Location problem (MALP) models.
Abstract: With emergencies being, unfortunately, part of our lives, it is crucial to efficiently plan and allocate emergency response facilities that deliver effective and timely relief to people most in need. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) allocation problems deal with locating EMS facilities among potential sites to provide efficient and effective services over a wide area with spatially distributed demands. It is often problematic due to the intrinsic complexity of these problems. This paper reviews covering models and optimization techniques for emergency response facility location and planning in the literature from the past few decades, while emphasizing recent developments. We introduce several typical covering models and their extensions ordered from simple to complex, including Location Set Covering Problem (LSCP), Maximal Covering Location Problem (MCLP), Double Standard Model (DSM), Maximum Expected Covering Location Problem (MEXCLP), and Maximum Availability Location Problem (MALP) models. In addition, recent developments on hypercube queuing models, dynamic allocation models, gradual covering models, and cooperative covering models are also presented in this paper. The corresponding optimization techniques to solve these models, including heuristic algorithms, simulation, and exact methods, are summarized.

356 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One of the major findings is that buyer’s warning capability plays a vital role in enhancing supply chain resilience, and a scenario-based mathematical model is developed such that it considers objectives under uncertainties including disruption risks and operational risks.
Abstract: This paper investigates the use of sourcing strategies to achieve supply chain resilience under disruptions. The coping strategies considered are single and multiple sourcing, backup supplier contracts, spot purchasing, and collaboration and visibility. Collaboration and visibility, which affect suppliers’ recovery capabilities and a buyer’s warning capability, have not been similarly modelled in the past. A scenario-based mathematical model is developed such that it considers objectives under uncertainties including disruption risks and operational risks. A broad numerical study examines its output for various risk attitudes in a decision-maker, ranging from risk neutral to risk averse. The sensitivity of procurement strategies to other key parameters such as recovery and warning capabilities is examined. One of the major findings is that buyer’s warning capability plays a vital role in enhancing supply chain resilience. We seek to build on these efforts to further support disruption planning and mitigat...

197 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It was showed that the operations of the logistics system were significantly different for harvesting and non-harvesting seasons, and that under the well-designed biomass logistics system, the mass production with a steady and sufficient supply of biomass can increase the unit profit of bioenergy.

127 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results showed that the ACO algorithm combined with the candidate list was more robust and consistently outperformed genetic algorithm, CPLEX, and the other two heuristics, especially for large job instances.

93 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper investigates an integrated supplier selection and inventory control problems in supply chain management by developing a mathematical model for a multi-echelon system by decomposing the mixed integer nonlinear programming model into two sub-models.

84 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Reading a book as this basics of qualitative research grounded theory procedures and techniques and other references can enrich your life quality.

13,415 citations

Book
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

3,569 citations

Proceedings Article
01 Jan 2003

1,212 citations