Takes as its departure point the criticism of Guthrie and Parker by Arnold and the Tinker et al. critique of Gray et al. Following an extensive review of the corporate social reporting literature, its major theoretical preoccupations and empirical conclusions, attempts to re‐examine the theoretical tensions that exist between “classical” political economy interpretations of social disclosure and those from more “bourgeois” perspectives. Argues that political economy, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory need not be competitor theories but may, if analysed appropriately, be seen as alternative and mutually enriching theories from alternative levels of resolution. Offers evidence from 13 years of social disclosure by UK companies and attempts to interpret this from different levels of resolution. There is little doubt that social disclosure practice has changed dramatically in the period. The theoretical perspectives prove to offer different, but mutually enhancing, interpretations of these phenomena.

Corporate social and environmental reporting

Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure

Evidence from research conducted on corporate accounting indicates that the interaction of environmental factors influences disclosure practices. The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of various corporate governance and cultural (race and education) characteristics, in addition to firm-specific factors, as possible determinants of voluntary (non-mandatory accounting and non-accounting information) disclosures in the annual reports of Malaysian listed corporations. The results of the regression analysis indicate significant associations (at the 5 percent level) between two corporate governance variables (viz. chair who is a non-executive director and domination of family members on boards) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. This finding has implications for corporate governance policy formulation by the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MISG). One cultural factor (proportion of Malay directors on the board) is significantly associated (at the 5 percent level) with the extent of voluntary disclosure suggesting that governmental focus on culture may solicit a response to secrecy from those who feel threatened.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/ABAC112.pdf?abstractid=336822&mirid=1&type=2

Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations

Evidence from research conducted on corporate accounting indicates that the interaction of environmental factors influences disclosure practices The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of various corporate governance and cultural (race and education) characteristics, in addition to firm-specific factors, as possible determinants of voluntary (non-mandatory accounting and non-accounting information) disclosures in the annual reports of Malaysian listed corporations The results of the regression analysis indicate significant associations (at the 5 per cent level) between two corporate governance variables ( viz  chair who is a non-executive director and domination of family members on boards) and the extent of voluntary disclosure This finding has implications for corporate governance policy formulation by the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MISG) One cultural factor (proportion of Malay directors on the board) is significantly associated (at the 5 per cent level) with the extent of voluntary disclosure suggesting that governmental focus on culture may solicit a response to secrecy from those who feel threatened

/pdf/culture-corporate-governance-and-disclosure-in-malaysian-2d8onpx6e0.pdf

Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in Malaysian corporations

We report strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining the market value of Korean public companies. We construct a corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) for 515 Korean companies based on a 2001 Korea Stock Exchange survey. In OLS, a worst-to-best change in KCGI predicts a 0.47 increase in Tobin's q (about a 160% increase in share price). This effect is statistically strong (t = 6.12) and robust to choice of market value variable (Tobin's q, market/book, and market/sales), specification of the governance index, and inclusion of extensive control variables. We rely on unique features of Korean legal rules to construct an instrument for KCGI. Good instruments are not available in other comparable studies. Two-stage and three-stage least squares coefficients are larger than OLS coefficients and are highly significant. Thus, this paper offers evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets. We also find that Korean firms with 50% outside directors have 0.13 higher Tobin's q (roughly 40% higher share price), after controlling for the rest of KCGI. This effect, too, is likely causal. Thus, we report the first evidence consistent with greater board independence causally predicting higher share prices in emerging markets.

Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea

Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: evidence from Singapore

This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the firm value of Singapore and Malaysia firms (as measured by Tobin's Q ) We find little evidence of relationships between most corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin's Q  However, consistent with Yermack [Higher market valuation of firms with a small board of directors J Financ Econ 40 (1996), 185–211] and Eisenberg et al [Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms J Financ Econ 48 (1998), 35–54], we find that there is an inverse relationship between board size and firm value in both countries This suggests that the negative relationship between board size and firm value transcends different corporate governance systems

Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value

Prior research examines the relation between board characteristics and financial reporting violations relating to fraud and earnings overstatement. This paper examines the relation between governance (as measured by board and audit committee characteristics) and accounting quality (as measured by abnormal accruals) where there is no a priori reason to suspect systematic management of earnings. We find both board size and audit committee independence are related to higher quality accounting (i.e., lower abnormal working capital accruals). Furthermore, the relation between audit committee independence and higher quality accounting exists only when the abnormal accruals are income increasing. This suggests that audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals. The results also indicate that audit committees are effective only when they comprise independent directors.

Y.T. Mak

Papers

Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure

Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: evidence from Singapore

Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value

Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals

The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in high R&D firms