https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=soa_research_all

Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience☆

Diversified business (or corporate) groups, consisting of legally independent firms operating in multiple markets, are ubiquitous in emerging markets and even in some developed economies. The study of groups, a hybrid organizational form between firm and market, is of relevance to industrial organization, corporate finance, development, economic growth and other domains of economic inquiry. This survey begins with stylized facts on groups around the world, and proceeds to a critical review the existing literature, which has focused almost entirely on groups as diversified entities and on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Other schools of thought on the political economy of corporate groups, on groups and monopoly power, and on groups as networks are discussed next. We then proceed to promising, yet virtually unexplored, alternative lenses for viewing groups, for example, as quasi venture-capitalists or as family-based structures. The analysis points out important biases in the literature including the avoidance of a serious discussion of the origins of business groups, and the unfounded assumption that rentseeking is the only feasible political economy equilibrium in an interaction between groups and the government. We note that the empirical tendency to use recent data implies that the vast majority of studies exploit cross-sectional variation; the absence of (long) time-series data ensures that some conceptually important issues, such as how groups shape the environment in which they operate, receive relatively little attention. Lastly, we outline an agenda for future research.

/pdf/business-groups-in-emerging-markets-paragons-or-parasites-3ht943lzfy.pdf

Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?

Diversified business groups, consisting of legally independent firms operating across diverse industries, are ubiquitous in emerging markets. Groups around the world share certain attributes but also vary substantially in structure, ownership, and other dimensions. This paper proposes a business group taxonomy, which is used to formulate hypotheses and present evidence about the reasons for the formation, prevalence, and evolution of groups in different environments. In interpreting the evidence, the authors pay particular attention to two aspects neglected in much of the literature: the circumstances under which groups emerge and the historical evidence on some of the questions addressed by recent studies. They argue that business groups are responses to different economic conditions and that, from a welfare standpoint, they can sometimes be "paragons" and, at other times, "parasites." The authors conclude with an agenda for future research.

/pdf/business-groups-in-emerging-markets-paragons-or-parasites-4d4n8n1i70.pdf

In this article, we examine the empirical association between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement by investigating their causal effects. Employing a large and extensive US sample, we first find that while the lag of CSR does not affect CG variables, the lag of CG variables positively affects firms’ CSR engagement, after controlling for various firm characteristics. In addition, to examine the relative importance of stakeholder theory and agency theory regarding the associations among CSR, CG, and corporate financial performance (CFP), we also examine the relation between CSR and CFP. After correcting for endogeneity bias, our results show that CSR engagement positively influences CFP, supporting the conflict-resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory, but not the CSR overinvestment argument based on agency theory. Furthermore, firms’ CSR engagement with the community, environment, diversity, and employees plays a significantly positive role in enhancing CFP.

The Causal Effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility

Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1998 through 2002, this paper documents that listed firms prop up earnings by using abnormal related sales to their controlling owners. Such related sales propping is more prevalent among state-owned firms and in regions with weaker economic institutions. We also find that these abnormal related sales are not entirely accrual-based but can be cash-based as well, and they serve as a substitute rather than complement to accruals management for meeting earnings targets. Since these abnormal related sales can be cash-based, there is significant cash transfer via related lending from listed firms back to controlling owners after the propping. However, no cash transfer via related lending is found to be associated with accruals earnings management.

Propping through related party transactions

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/9127.pdf

Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

A transparency disclosure index measuring disclosures: Chinese listed companies

This study addresses the question whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) matters in Asian Emerging Markets. Based on CSR scores compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia), we assess the CSR performance of major Asian firms over a period of 3 years, from 2001 to 2004. The results show that there is a positive and significant relation between CSR and market valuation among Asian firms. We further find that CSR is positively related to the market valuation of the subsequent year. More importantly, Asian firms are rewarded by the market for improving their CSR practice.

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Matter in Asian Emerging Markets

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Yan Leung Stephen Cheung

Papers

Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

A transparency disclosure index measuring disclosures: Chinese listed companies

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Matter in Asian Emerging Markets

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms

Does corporate governance matter in China