Author
Ying Fu
Bio: Ying Fu is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: China. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 8 citations.
Topics: China
Papers
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TL;DR: For instance, this article pointed out that most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power.
Abstract: pinnings of international relations in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause. Other causes include the relative decline of U.S. inouence and authority in Asia, the expanding normative inouence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the growth of regional multilateral institutions, increased technological and economic interdependence throughout the region, and the amelioration of several formerly antagonistic bilateral relationships. As a result of these processes, the structure of power and the nature of the regional system are being fundamentally altered. China’s growing economic and military power, expanding political inouence, distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions are key developments in Asian affairs. China’s new proactive regional posture is reoected in virtually all policy spheres— economic, diplomatic, and military—and this parallels China’s increased activism on the global stage.1 Bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region. As a result, most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power. This regional perspective is striking, given that just a few years ago, many of China’s neighbors voiced growing concerns about the possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful military threat. Today these views are muted. China’s new conadence is also reoected in how it perceives itself, as it gradually sheds its dual identity of historical victim and object of great power manipulation. These phenomena have begun to attract
449 citations
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TL;DR: The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, China is a country that scores quite low as mentioned in this paper, which is the result of disregarding the existence of a different public administration model in China-the cadre organization.
Abstract: Much research has argued for the importance of state's administrative capacity for development. Disregard for the rule of law and failure to get corruption under control are seen as detrimental to economic and social development. The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, China is a country that scores quite low. China also lacks the Weberian model of bureaucracy that is seen as central for development. It is argued that this paradox is the result of disregarding the existence of a different public administration model in China-the cadre organization. Instead of rule following, this organization is marked by high commitment to a specific policy doctrine. The argument is that while very different from Weberian bureaucracy, this organization is well suited for effectively implementing policies for economic and social development.
110 citations
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TL;DR: Although Chinese leaders and analysts believe it is too early to judge the U.S. to be in fundamental decline, they do recognize that "newly emerging powers" (xinxing daguo) are an increasingly important force in international politics as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Although Chinese leaders and analysts believe it is too early to judge the U.S. to be in fundamental decline, they do recognize that “newly emerging powers” (xinxing daguo) are an increasingly important force in international politics. In the past couple of years, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have transformed themselves from an abstract notion into a more formal political grouping. For China, besides helping to minimize dependence on the U.S. and possibly to constrain American unilateralism, BRIC cooperation serves several other functions. China also benefits from this cooperation by stabilizing its international environment, helping other developing countries, strengthening its identity as a developing country, coordinating its position with other BRICs to maximize leverage, and hiding in a group to avoid negative attention. This recent cooperation and interaction with the BRICs has been important, but the space for future BRIC cooperation is limited by fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued importance of the U.S. for each of the BRICs, and intra-BRIC competition. To date, there is little evidence that China and the BRICs are trying to overthrow the existing international order. Instead, China has accepted and joined the existing order, and has been working together with other powers to reform its shortcomings. Although this negotiation is in its early stages and will likely be difficult, the willingness of China and the BRICs to work within the system and the openness of western countries to meet some of their demands makes it much less likely that China and other rising powers will try to overthrow the order.
91 citations
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01 Jan 2010TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the relationship of the United States and China to the evolution of global order issues since 1945 and investigate how the bilateral relationship of each country influences the stances that each country takes.
Abstract: The United States and China are the two most important states in the international system and are crucial to the evolution of global order. Both recognize each other as vital players in a range of issues of global significance, including the use of force, macroeconomic policy, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, climate change and financial regulation. In this book, Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, both experts in the fields of international relations and the East Asian region, explore the relationship of the two countries to these global order issues since 1945. They ask whether the behaviour of each country is consistent with global order norms, and which domestic and international factors shape this behaviour. They investigate how the bilateral relationship of the United States and China influences the stances that each country takes. This is a sophisticated analysis that adroitly engages the historical, theoretical and policy literature.
80 citations
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01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the effect of a rising power's grand strategy on the severity of the balancing response by other major powers, and developed a theory of successful reassurance to explain why the emergence of a new power sometimes leads to tension, rivalry, and war, and other times leads to lesscompetitive responses.
Abstract: This dissertation asks: what explains variation in
how other great powers respond to rising powers? It tries to
explain why the emergence of a rising power sometimes leads to
tension, rivalry, and war, and other times leads to less
competitive responses. This project analyzes the effect of the
rising power's grand strategy-whether it is reassurance or
coercion – on the severity of the balancing response by the other
major powers. I develop a theory of successful reassurance that
shows how a rising power can prevent or minimize the severity of
the balancing response by other great powers. Reassurance can limit
the balancing response through two causal mechanisms: 1) reduced
estimates that rising power is a threat; and 2) reaping the
benefits from a rising power. I also develop a theory of coercion
backfire that shows how a rising power that implements a grand
strategy of coercion is more likely to make others feel especially
threatened, and therefore more likely to provoke an early and
especially firm response, exacerbating the severity of the
balancing response. I apply this theory to explain the balancing
responses to the rise of Germany from 1871 to 1907 and the rise of
China in the post-Cold War world. The empirical tests and process
tracing evidence demonstrate that rising powers, contrary to the
expectations of most realist balance of power and rationalist
accounts, have considerable agency to affect the balancing
response. In the cases of the rising powers of contemporary China
and Bismarckian Germany, grand strategies of reassurance convinced
states to minimize the severity of their balancing responses, even
as the rising power's material power continued to grow. In
contrast, Wilhelmine Germany's grand strategy of coercion
antagonized the other powers and pushed them to respond by
balancing very severely. For the contemporary case of the rise of
China, I use a variety of sources such as Chinese-language
materials and extensive interviews from over two years of field
work in China and Asia to examine China's grand strategy of
reassurance and its effect on the responses by the United States,
Japan, Russia, and India.
23 citations