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Yong Huang

Bio: Yong Huang is an academic researcher from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Virtue & Chinese philosophy. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 35 publications receiving 236 citations. Previous affiliations of Yong Huang include Kutztown University of Pennsylvania & Harvard University.

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TL;DR: This article explored the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi.
Abstract: As the ethics of virtue, with a focus on cultivating admirable traits of character instead of commanding adherence to rigid rules, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary moral discourses, scholars have tried to find evidence of virtue ethics in such ancient traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This article explores the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi. Contrary to a common misconception of the Zhuangzi as skeptical, relativistic, and therefore empty of any guide to moral life, it presents a solid normative ethics through various stories, and this normative ethics is a virtue ethics. The most important trait of character in this Daoist virtue ethics is respect for different ways of life—a virtue not discussed in any familiar versions of virtue ethics in the West and yet most valuable to contemporary life in a global and pluralistic society.

35 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper, an ethics of difference is proposed, which pays full attention to individual differences without falling into relativism (at least not any type of relativism that is problematic and that we are familiar with).
Abstract: Most ethical systems that we are familiar with are, to a greater or lesser extent, what I regard as ethics of commonality, as they assume that all human beings are similar, if not the same, in all morally relevant senses. Thus what is the right thing to do to one person must be the right thing to do to another, and what I would like to be done unto me must be what others would like to be done unto them. I argue in this essay that such an ethics, if it ever has been appropriate, is no longer when we are living in an increasingly global village, where we have daily interactions with people who are very different from us in terms of ideas and ideals, interests and preferences, habits and customs, and cultures and religions. While there have been strong criticisms of such an ethics of commonality, particularly in contemporary philosophy, such criticisms have been characteristically relativistic, which makes it almost impossible to make any moral judgments. In this essay, inspired by one of the most important Chinese Daoist classics, the Zhuangzi, I develop an ethics of difference, which pays full attention to individual differences without falling into relativism (at least not any type of relativism that is problematic and that we are familiar with). According to such an ethics of difference, whether an action is morally right or wrong should be ultimately determined by the recipient of this action.

30 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Yong Huang1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model of contrastes de pluralisme religieux which possedent des consequences for le dialogue interreligieux authentique.
Abstract: Le pluralisme religieux s'oppose a des notions comme l'exclusivisme ou l'inclusivisme. Le dialogue interreligieux authentique ne peut prendre place que dans une conception pluraliste des religions et des verites qu'elles professent. Cependant, il existe deux modeles contrastes de pluralisme religieux qui possedent des consequences pour le dialogue interreligieux. D'un cote, les religions sont envisagees comme l'expression d'une essence universelle. De l'autre cote, les religions sont considerees comme differentes du point de vue fondamental. L'A. developpe alors un modele alternatif de pluralisme religieux

24 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that to be moral is to do (or to be) what one should or ought to do or be, which is a tautology.
Abstract: IntroductionIf someone asks ‘‘Why should I (or ought I to) do x?’’—where x can be any particularaction that may require some self-sacrifice in the interests of others—we normallythink that this person asks a reasonable question that deserves a serious answer.One such answer can be: ‘‘it is moral to do x,’’ meaning that to do x is somethinggood or right; in other words, it is something that one should or ought to do. How-ever, if the person further asks: ‘‘Why should I (or ought I to) be moral?’’ we maythink that this person is starting to become unreasonable or even irrational. On theone hand, to be moral is to do (or to be) what one should or ought to do (or be). So toask ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ is equivalent to asking ‘‘Why should I be (or do) whatI should be (or do)?’’—which is a tautology. On the other hand, to be moral is pre-sumably to be concerned with the interests and welfare of others, and it seems thatthe person who asks the question is looking for a self-interested reason to be moral.So to ask ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ is equivalent to asking ‘‘What self-interestedreasons are there for me to be not self-interested?’’—which is a contradiction.However, as I shall argue below, if we think this way we may have missed thepoint of the question. If the person is satisfied with our initial answer to his or herquestion ‘‘Why should I do x?’’ it is clear that this person is already motivated to bemoral. The only reason he or she asks the question is to be sure that x is a moralthing to do. However, if the person is not satisfied with our initial answer and furtherasks the question ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ it is clear that the person perhapsalready knows, even before asking the question, that x is a moral thing to do butlacks the motivation to be moral. In other words, the person who asks the questionis not in search of a theoretical answer that explains the nature of the action (to do x)but is interested in a practical answer that can motivate him or her to do x. In thissense, I think that the question is clearly a legitimate one. What is not so clear iswhether there is any legitimate answer to this question. Since the person who asksthe question, if I am right, lacks the motivation to be moral, this person must bean egoist. Here, I do not think that it is necessarily contradictory to provide egoisticreasons to motivate the egoist to be not egoistic (actually this is what we often hearfrom some discussions in business ethics. For example, we are often told that to befair to customers is the best way to make money, particularly in the long run). Theproblem is that when we provide such egoistic reasons to motivate a person to bemoral, even if we do succeed, we are afraid that we are providing the wrong reasonsfor being moral.

23 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine an apparent paradox in Confucius' view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand he says that common people cannot be made to know things.
Abstract: In this paper I shall first examine an apparent paradox in Confucius’ view on whether everyone is perfectible through education: on the one hand, he states that education should be provided to all, on the other hand, he says that common people cannot be made to know things. To understand this apparent paradox, I shall argue that education for Confucius is primarily moral education, as he teaches his students to become virtuous persons. So the apparent paradox is really one about whether virtue can be taught. I shall argue in the last section that while Confucius’ answer to the question is affirmative, he does not think that virtue can be taught in the same way as theoretical knowledge or technical skills are taught. For Confucius, the most effective way to teach people to be virtuous is through personal example.

20 citations


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Book
01 Jan 2000

1,762 citations

01 Jan 2003
TL;DR: Fukuyama's seminal work "The End of History and the Last Man" as discussed by the authors was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like, outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, and speculated what was going to come next.
Abstract: 20th anniversary edition of "The End of History and the Last Man", a landmark of political philosophy by Francis Fukuyama, author of "The Origins of Political Order". With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 the threat of the Cold War which had dominated the second half of the twentieth century vanished. And with it the West looked to the future with optimism but renewed uncertainty. "The End of History and the Last Man" was the first book to offer a picture of what the new century would look like. Boldly outlining the challenges and problems to face modern liberal democracies, Frances Fukuyama examined what had just happened and then speculated what was going to come next. Tackling religious fundamentalism, politics, scientific progress, ethical codes and war, "The End of History and the Last Man" remains a compelling work to this day, provoking argument and debate among its readers. "Awesome ...a landmark ...profoundly realistic and important ...supremely timely and cogent ...the first book to fully fathom the depth and range of the changes now sweeping through the world." (George Gilder, "The Washington"). Post Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. His work includes "America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy" and "After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong". He now lives in Washington D.C. with his wife and children, where he also works as a part time photographer.

235 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

152 citations