Author
Yoshitsugu Kanemoto
Other affiliations: University of Tsukuba, Queen's University, Université de Montréal ...read more
Bio: Yoshitsugu Kanemoto is an academic researcher from University of Tokyo. The author has contributed to research in topics: Economies of agglomeration & Urban agglomeration. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 60 publications receiving 1310 citations. Previous affiliations of Yoshitsugu Kanemoto include University of Tsukuba & Queen's University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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Book•
01 Jan 1980
TL;DR: In this article, several aspects of externalities in cities are analyzed using extensions of a standard residential land use model, including optimal and market city sizes, local public goods, traffic congestion, externalities between different types of households, and the growth of a system of cities.
Abstract: In this monograph several aspects of externalities in cities are analyzed using extensions of a standard residential land use model. Topics covered are optimal and
market city sizes, local public goods, traffic congestion, externalities between different types of households, and the growth of a system of cities.
184 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the spatial distribution of economic activities in China and Japan has been studied and a central policy issue, the high extent of urban agglomeration in Tokyo is addressed.
Abstract: In this chapter we look at the spatial distribution of economic activities in China and Japan. Japan has excellent data and relatively uniform institutions since World War II, which allow us to track its spatial evolution and detail its key features today. For Japan we show how structural shifts in the national economy involved major transformations of the regional structure of economic activity. We address a central policy issue, the high extent of urban agglomeration in Tokyo. Then we turn to the details of the spatial distribution of industrial activity across cities, to see what general patterns hold and what they imply for our understanding of the role of different cities in the urban hierarchy. For China the approach is different. With the radical institutional changes since 1978 moving China away from being a planned economy, there is little consistency in data definitions and coverage over time and less detailed data are available. We focus on the last decade and on policy issues. We observe that Chinese cities tend to be over-capitalized and undersized, with strong spatial biases to policies, concerning migration, capital allocations, infrastructure allocations and location of FDI.
135 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the direction of err ors and showed that the use of cross-sectional land rent differentials leads to overestimation of the benefits of a large public project.
Abstract: S. Scotchmer has shown that, even if the population is homogeneous, hedonic prices do not correctly measure long-run benefit s of a large public project. This paper examines the direction of err ors and shows that the use of cross-sectional land rent differentials leads to overestimation of the benefits. The short-run benefits with fixed lot size are also considered. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
103 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether the naive cost-benefit analysis based on market prices tends to overinvest in roads in the second best situation where traffic congestion is unpriced.
82 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors estimate aggregate production functions for metrpolitan areas in Japan to derive the magnitudes of agglomeration economies, and test if Japanese cities, in particular, Tokyo, are too large.
Abstract: We estimate aggregate production functions for metrpolitan areas in Japan to derive the magnitudes of agglomeration economies. Using the estimates of agglomeration economies, we test if Japanese cities, in particular, Tokyo, are too large. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1996, 10 (4), pp. 379–398. Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan; Socio-Economic Research Center, Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 1-6-1 Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan; and Institute of Socio-Economic Planning, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305, Japan.
66 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, an overview of multi-agent system models of land-use/cover change (MAS/LUCC) is presented, which combine a cellular landscape model with agent-based representations of decisionmaking, integrating the two components through specification of interdependencies and feedbacks between agents and their environment.
Abstract: This paper presents an overview of multi-agent system models of land-use/cover change (MAS/LUCC models). This special class of LUCC models combines a cellular landscape model with agent-based representations of decisionmaking, integrating the two components through specification of interdependencies and feedbacks between agents and their environment. The authors review alternative LUCC modeling techniques and discuss the ways in which MAS/LUCC models may overcome some important limitations of existing techniques. We briefly review ongoing MAS/LUCC modeling efforts in four research areas. We discuss the potential strengths of MAS/LUCC models and suggest that these strengths guide researchers in assessing the appropriate choice of model for their particular research question. We find that MAS/LUCC models are particularly well suited for representing complex spatial interactions under heterogeneous conditions and for modeling decentralized, autonomous decision making. We discuss a range of possible roles for MAS/LUCC models, from abstract models designed to derive stylized hypotheses to empirically detailed simulation models appropriate for scenario and policy analysis. We also discuss the challenge of validation and verification for MAS/LUCC models. Finally, we outline important challenges and open research questions in this new field. We conclude that, while significant challenges exist, these models offer a promising new tool for researchers whose goal is to create fine-scale models of LUCC phenomena that focus on human-environment interactions.
1,779 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the main reasons for the formation of economic clusters involving firms and/or households are analyzed: (i) externalities under perfect competition; (ii) increasing returns under monopolistic competition; and (iii) spatial competition under strategic interaction.
Abstract: We address the fundamental question arising in geographical economics: why do economic activities agglomerate in a small number of places? The main reasons for the formation of economic clusters involving firms and/or households are analyzed: (i) externalities under perfect competition; (ii) increasing returns under monopolistic competition; and (iii) spatial competition under strategic interaction. We review what has been accomplished in these three domains and identify a few general principles governing the organization of economic space. A few alternative, new approaches are also proposed. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1996, 10 (4), pp. 339–378. Kyoto University and University of Pennsylvania; and CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain and CERAS–ENPC (URA 2036, CNRS).
1,496 citations
Posted Content•
1,448 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, career concerns are taken into account, and the authors find that the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief.
Abstract: This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a worker's current output to update its belief about the worker's ability and competition then forces future wages (or wage contracts) to reflect these updated beliefs Career concerns are stronger when a worker is further from retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance
1,302 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns and find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance, showing that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concern and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract.
Abstract: This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. We show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance.
1,195 citations