Yue Chen

Bio: Yue Chen is an academic researcher from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Distributed generation & Topology (electrical circuits). The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 19 publications receiving 34 citations. Previous affiliations of Yue Chen include Tsinghua University & National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

An Energy Sharing Mechanism Achieving the Same Flexibility as Centralized Dispatch

Abstract: Deploying distributed renewable energy at the demand side is an important measure to implement a sustainable society. However, the massive small solar and wind generation units are beyond the control of a central operator. To encourage users to participate in energy management and reduce the dependence on dispatchable resources, a peer-to-peer energy sharing scheme is proposed which releases the flexibility at the demand side. Every user makes decision individually considering only local constraints; the microgrid operator announces the sharing prices subjective to the coupling constraints without knowing users’ local constraints. This can help protect privacy. We prove that the proposed mechanism can achieve the same disutility and flexibility as centralized dispatch, and develop an effective modified best-response based algorithm for reaching the market equilibrium. The concept of “absorbable region” is presented to measure the operating flexibility under the proposed energy sharing mechanism. A linear programming based polyhedral projection algorithm is developed to compute that region. Case studies validate the theoretical results and show that the proposed method is scalable.

Approaching Prosumer Social Optimum via Energy Sharing With Proof of Convergence

Abstract: With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this article, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate prosumers’ strategic decision-making on their self-production and demand in the presence of capacity constraints. Under this setting, prosumers play a generalized Nash game. We prove main properties of the game: an equilibrium exists and is partially unique; no prosumer is worse off by energy sharing and the price-of-anarchy is $1-O(1/I)$ where $I$ is the number of prosumers. In particular, the PoA tends to 1 with a growing number of prosumers, meaning that the resulting total cost under the proposed energy sharing approaches social optimum. We prove that the corresponding prosumers’ strategies converge to the social optimal solution as well. Finally we propose a bidding process and prove that it converges to the energy sharing equilibrium under mild conditions. Illustrative examples are provided to validate the results.

Learning the Optimal Strategy of Power System Operation With Varying Renewable Generations

Abstract: Optimal dispatch of modern power systems often entails efficiently solving large-scale optimization problems, especially when generators have to respond to the fast fluctuation of renewable generation. This paper develops a method to learn the optimal strategy from a mixed-integer quadratic program with time-varying parameters, which can model many power system operation problems such as unit commitment and optimal power flow. Different from existing machine learning methods that learn a map from the parameter to the optimal action, the proposed method learns the map from the parameter to the optimal integer solution and the optimal basis, forming a discrete pattern. Such a framework naturally gives rise to a classification problem: the parameter set is partitioned into polyhedral regions; in each region, the optimal 0-1 variable and the set of active constraints remain unchanged, and the optimal continuous variables are affine functions in the parameter. The outcome of classification is compared with analytical results derived from multi-parametric programming theory, showing interesting connections between traditional mathematical programming theory and the interpretability of the learning-based method. Tests on a small-scale problem demonstrate the partition of the parameter set learned from data meets the theoretical outcome. More tests on the IEEE 57-bus system and a real-world 1881-bus system validate the performance of the proposed method with a high-dimensional parameter for which the analytical method is intractable.

Solving Optimal Power Flow for Distribution Networks with State Estimation Feedback

Abstract: Conventional optimal power flow (OPF) solvers assume full observability of the involved system states. However in practice, there is a lack of reliable system monitoring devices in the distribution networks. To close the gap between the theoretic algorithm design and practical implementation, this work proposes to solve the OPF problems based on the state estimation (SE) feedback for the distribution networks where only a part of the involved system states are physically measured. The SE feedback increases the observability of the under-measured system and provides more accurate system states monitoring when the measurements are noisy. We analytically investigate the convergence of the proposed algorithm. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed approach is more robust to large pseudo measurement variability and inherent sensor noise in comparison to the other frameworks without SE feedback.

I and i

Abstract: There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality. Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure

Abstract: The article reviews the book "Information and Learning in Markets: The Impact of Market Microstructure," edited by Xavier Vives.

Peer-to-Peer Electricity Market Analysis: From Variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

Abstract: We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where a global market operator optimizes the flows (trades) between the nodes, local demand and flexibility activation to maximize the system overall social welfare; (ii) a distributed peer-to-peer market design where prosumers in local energy communities optimize selfishly their trades, demand, and flexibility activation. We first characterizethe solution of the peer-to-peer market as a Variational Equilibrium and prove that the set of Variational Equilibria coincides with the set of social welfare optimal solutions of market design (i). We give several results that help understanding the structure of the trades at an equilibriumor at the optimum. We characterize the impact of preferences on the network line congestion and renewable energy waste under both designs. We provide a reduced example for which we give the set of all possible generalized equilibria, which enables to give an approximation of the price ofanarchy. We provide a more realistic example which relies on the IEEE 14-bus network, for which we can simulate the trades under different preference prices. Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium(variational) is optimal.