scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Yuehua Qi

Other affiliations: Hong Kong Baptist University
Bio: Yuehua Qi is an academic researcher from City University of Hong Kong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Audit committee & Medicine. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 187 citations. Previous affiliations of Yuehua Qi include Hong Kong Baptist University.

Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000 and found that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavorable prices compared to similar arms-length deals.
Abstract: We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavorable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms' length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.

123 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000 and found that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms-length deals.
Abstract: We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.

104 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , a novel hemostatic hydrogel was prepared by cross-linking inorganic polyphosphate (PolyP) conjugated poly(aspartic acid) hydrazide (PAHP) and PEO90 dialdehyde (PEO90 DA).

10 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors showed that I3C inhibited cell proliferation, migration, and the expression levels of glycolysis-related gene LDHAs, and predicted and validated LDHA-targeting miRNA from the databases.
Abstract: Certain cancer cells prefer aerobic glycolysis rather than oxidative phosphorylation for energy supply. Lactate dehydrogenase A (LDHA) catalyzes the reduction of pyruvate to lactate and regains NAD+ so that glycolysis is continued. As a pivotal enzyme to promote smooth glycolysis, LDHA plays an important role in carcinogenesis. Indole-3-carbinol (I3C) has displayed antitumor activity, but the exact mechanism remains to be identified. In this study, we treated liver cancer cells with I3C, performed colony formation and cell migration, measured the expression of glycolysis-related proteins, and predicted and validated LDHA-targeting miRNA from the databases. In addition, the mRNA and protein levels of p53, glycolysis-related genes and miRNAs that regulate glycolysis were detected after I3C and siRNA-p53 treatment alone or in combination. Next, the expression and colocalization of p53 and MDM2 in liver cancer cells were evaluated after I3C treatment, and the effect of I3C on p53 protein stability was examined. The results showed that I3C inhibited cell proliferation, migration, and the expression levels of glycolysis-related gene LDHAs. MiR-34a was predicted to target LDHA, and I3C downregulated its expression. Furthermore, the combined I3C and siRNA-p53 treatment demonstrated that I3C regulated the expression of LDHA via miR-34a in a p53-dependent manner. Finally, I3C inhibited MDM2 expression and its colocalization with p53 and stabilized p53 expression. In summary, I3C inhibited the degradation of p53 by MDM2 in liver cancer cells; stable p53 induced miR-34a, which targeted LDHA, a key enzyme for aerobic glycolysis, suggesting cancer metabolism is an important target for I3C in liver cancer cells.

2 citations


Cited by
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of country-level institutional characteristics on the underpricing of IPOs through hierarchical linear modeling and found that about 10% of the variation in the level of under pricing is between countries.
Abstract: Using a large firm-level dataset of 2920 IPOs from 21 countries we examine the impact of country-level institutional characteristics on the underpricing of IPOs. Through hierarchical linear modeling we are able to control for firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics and test whether country-specific institutional characteristics add explanatory power to explain the level of underpricing. Our results show that about 10% of the variation in the level of underpricing is between countries. The quality of a country’s legal framework, as measured by its level of investor protection, the overall quality of its legal system and its level of legal enforcement, reduces the level of underpricing significantly.

179 citations

10 Mar 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, a fine-grained understanding about the role of ownership in different contexts is provided, taking into account the subtly different formal and informal institutional that can be found around the world on the one hand, and distinguish between the identity of concentrated owners on the other.
Abstract: textThe past two decades have witnessed an exponential growth of research on corporate governance around the world and on the role of the ownership concentration more specifically. In line with a longer tradition of ownership studies in U.S. context, most corporate governance researchers have commonly taken a classical agency theoretical view of ownership concentration. The research presented in this dissertation show that classical view of ownership seems overly crude. I provide a more fine-grained understanding about the role of ownership in different contexts; one that takes into account the subtly different formal and informal institutional that can be found around the world on the one hand, and that distinguish between the identity of concentrated owners on the other. I show, first, that a crucial factor with respect to the ownership concentration – firm strategy and performance relationships involve owner identity: i.e. who owns a firm matters significantly for that firm’s objectives, strategies, and performance. Second, I contribute to emerging institution-based view of corporate governance by expanding its empirical domain and testing empirically the interaction between formal and informal institutions.

96 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self-dealing as discussed by the authors, however, there are possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders.
Abstract: Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self-dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin’s Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex-ante RPTs, transactions that pre-date a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin’s Q whereas ex-post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex-post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex-post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.

90 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self-dealing as mentioned in this paper, however, the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q.
Abstract: Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self-dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.

90 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether related party transactions (RPT) are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms belonging to large business groups in Korea (chaebols), and they found that the control-ownership wedge is positively associated with the magnitude of RPTs.
Abstract: In this study, we examine whether related party transactions (RPT) are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms belonging to large business groups in Korea (chaebols). Using 982 firm-year data of publicly traded firms in Korea, we find that the control–ownership wedge is positively associated with the magnitude of RPTs. RPTs increase as voting rights increase, while RPTs decrease as cash flow rights increase. The control–ownership wedge is more closely related to RPTs among the top 5 chaebol firms where the agency conflicts between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders are more severe than in non-top 5 chaebol firms. While the significant positive association between the control–ownership wedge and RPTs holds for both operating and non-operating RPTs, we find that non-top 5 chaebols use only non-operating RPTs whereas the top 5 firms use both operating and non-operating RPTs. Finally, we find that RPTs of Korean chaebol firms, on average, reduce firm value, but this value destruction is observed only when the control–ownership wedge is high and is more pronounced with the top 5 chaebol firms. Overall, our results together suggest that RPTs occur when the agency problem is severe and they are used as a means of tunneling, thus destroying firm value.

75 citations