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Yuichiro Kamada

Bio: Yuichiro Kamada is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Matching (statistics) & Stochastic game. The author has an hindex of 12, co-authored 28 publications receiving 631 citations. Previous affiliations of Yuichiro Kamada include Cowles Foundation & Harvard University.

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints and show that existing matching mechanisms suffer from inefficiency and instability, and propose a mechanism that is better in terms of efficiency, stability, and incentives while respecting the distributional constraint.
Abstract: Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master’s programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We show that existing matching mechanisms suffer from inefficiency and instability, and propose a mechanism that is better in terms of efficiency, stability, and incentives while respecting the distributional constraints. (JEL C70, D61, D63)

217 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate situations in which agents can only communicate to each other through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols, and they assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver.
Abstract: We investigate situations in which agents can only communicate to each other through a chain of intermediators, for example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic, and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of outcomes that can be induced in pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a subset of the equilibrium outcomes that can be induced in direct communication, characterized by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Moreover, the set of supportable outcomes in pure equilibria is monotonic in each intermediator’s bias, and the intermediator with the largest bias serves as a bottleneck for the information flow. On the other hand, there can be mixed strategy equilibria of intermediated communication that ex ante Pareto-dominate all equilibria in direct communication, as mixing by an intermediator can relax the incentive compatibility constraints on the sender. We provide a partial characterization of mixed strategy equilibria, and show that the order of intermediators matters with respect to mixed equilibria, as opposed to pure strategy ones.

79 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is demonstrated a weakly stable matching always exists, implies efficiency, and is characterized by standard normative axioms, which are obtained in a more general environment than those in existing studies, accommodating a wide variety of applications.

77 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution and show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is suciently convex.
Abstract: In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justied in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others such as moral or religious issues. In this paper we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters’ utility function is suciently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in \concave issues" and diverge in \convex issues."

48 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks, where agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between them.
Abstract: This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between them. We characterize the clustering coefficient and average path length in stable networks, and analyze how they are related to the way agents measure social distances. The model predicts the small-world properties under a class of social distance that violates the triangle inequality. Allowing for heterogeneity in link-formation costs, the model also accommodates other well documented empirical patterns of social networks such as skewed degree distributions, positive assortativity of degrees, and clustering-degree correlation.

42 citations


Cited by
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Posted Content
TL;DR: A theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification.
Abstract: Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

4,284 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent vanishes as the society grows.
Abstract: We study learning in a setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the true value of a variable and then communi cate in a network. They naively update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent vanishes as the society grows. We also identify obstructions to this, including prominent groups, and pro vide structural conditions on the network ensuring efficient learn ing. Whether agents converge to the truth is unrelated to how quickly consensus is approached. (JEL D83, D85, Z13)

1,044 citations

Book
20 Mar 2013
TL;DR: This book builds on the author’s prior research in this area, and also his practical experience of developing algorithms for matching kidney patients to donors in the UK, for assigning medical students to hospitals in Scotland, and for allocating students to elective courses and projects.
Abstract: Preliminary Definitions, Results and Motivation Stable Matching Problems: The Stable Marriage Problem: An Update SM and HR with Indifference The Stable Roommates Problem Further Stable Matching Problems Other Optimal Matching Problems: Pareto Optimal Matchings Popular Matchings Profile-Based Optimal Matchings.

488 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare centralized and decentralized coordination when managers are privately informed and communicate strategically, and show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal coordination in multi-divisional organizations.
Abstract: This paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag - ers are privately informed and communicate strategically. We consider a multi- divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self-interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk. The only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights. We show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

368 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions.
Abstract: The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

348 citations