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Yukio Koriyama
Researcher at École Polytechnique
Publications - 13
Citations - 101
Yukio Koriyama is an academic researcher from École Polytechnique. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory & Public good. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 12 publications receiving 92 citations.
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Journal Article
A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Yukio Koriyama,Balázs Szentes +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal size of a deliberating committee where there is no conflict of interest among individuals and information acquisition is costly is analyzed, and it is shown that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2.
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The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
TL;DR: The experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size and bolster other experimental effects that are relevant for macroeconomic issues such as price fluctuations and nominal rigidity.
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Inclusive cognitive hierarchy
Yukio Koriyama,Ali Ihsan Ozkes +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose an inclusive cognitive hierarchy model, in which players do not rule out the possibility of facing opponents at their own thinking level, and show that inclusiveness is crucial for asymptotic properties of deviations from equilibrium behavior in expansive games.
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Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem☆
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a situation in which the public good is never provided, and they show that a majority voting with uniform cost-sharing is the relevant status quo.
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How proper is the dominance-solvable outcome?
Yukio Koriyama,Matías Núñez +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the conditions under which iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies refines the set of proper outcomes of a normal-form game and showed that the proper inclusion holds in terms of outcome if the subset of outcomes of all proper equilibria in the reduced game is included in the original game.