Zoltán Barta

Bio: Zoltán Barta is an academic researcher from University of Debrecen. The author has contributed to research in topics: Population & Foraging. The author has an hindex of 39, co-authored 138 publications receiving 4277 citations. Previous affiliations of Zoltán Barta include Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University & University of Bristol.

How is sexual conflict over parental care resolved? A meta-analysis

Abstract: Biparental care of offspring is both a form of cooperation and a source of conflict. Parents face a trade-off between current and future reproduction: caring less for the current brood allows individuals to maintain energy reserves and increase their chances of remating. How can selection maintain biparental care, given this temptation to defect? The answer lies in how parents respond to changes in each other’s effort. Game-theoretical models predict that biparental care is evolutionarily stable when reduced care by one parent leads its partner to increase care, but not so much that it completely compensates for the lost input. Experiments designed to reveal responses to reduced partner effort have mainly focused on birds. We present a meta-analysis of 54 such studies, and conclude that the mean response was indeed partial compensation. Males and females responded differently and this was in part mediated by the type of manipulation used.

The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation.

Abstract: If natural selection favours selfish behaviour, how is it that cooperation is so common in many species, including humans? Working with evolutionary simulations, McNamara et al. propose a novel evolutionary mechanism based on a positive coevolutionary feedback between cooperativeness and choosiness. If individuals vary in their degree of cooperativeness, and if they can decide whether or not to continue interacting with each other on the basis of their respective levels of cooperativeness, then cooperation can gradually evolve from an uncooperative state. On this model, individual behavioural differences are the key to the evolution of cooperation. It is shown that if individuals vary in their degree of cooperativeness, and if they can decide whether or not to continue interacting with each other on the basis of their respective levels of cooperativeness, then cooperation can gradually evolve from an uncooperative state. These results highlight the importance of individual behavioural differences in fostering the evolution of cooperation. Explaining the rise and maintenance of cooperation is central to our understanding of biological systems1,2 and human societies3,4. When an individual’s cooperativeness is used by other individuals as a choice criterion, there can be competition to be more generous than others, a situation called competitive altruism5. The evolution of cooperation between non-relatives can then be driven by a positive feedback between increasing levels of cooperativeness and choosiness6. Here we use evolutionary simulations to show that, in a situation where individuals have the opportunity to engage in repeated pairwise interactions, the equilibrium degree of cooperativeness depends critically on the amount of behavioural variation that is being maintained in the population by processes such as mutation. Because our model does not invoke complex mechanisms such as negotiation behaviour, it can be applied to a wide range of species. The results suggest an important role of lifespan in the evolution of cooperation.

Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Abstract: The Prisoner's Dilemma game is widely used to investigate how cooperation between unrelated individuals can evolve by natural selection. In this game, each player can either 'cooperate' (invest in a common good) or 'defect' (exploit the other's investment). If the opponent cooperates, you get R if you cooperate and T if you defect. If the opponent defects, you get S if you cooperate and P if you defect. Here T > R > 0 and P > S, so that 'defect' is the best response to any action by the opponent. Thus in a single play of the game, each player should defect. In our game, a fixed maximum number of rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is played against the same opponent. A standard argument based on working backwards from the last round shows that defection on all rounds is the only stable outcome. In contrast, we show that if extrinsic factors maintain variation in behaviour, high levels of co-operation are stable. Our results highlight the importance of extrinsic variability in determining the outcome of evolutionary games.

Should young ever be better off with one parent than with two

Abstract: We analyze models of parental care, providing the first systematic comparison of the care given to young by one parent versus by two parents. In the Houston-Davies model of care, young always do better with two parents rather than with one parent. When one parent decides about its level of care before the other, then the young may do better with one parent when the costs of care for the parents are asymmetric. When the level of parental effort is reached by negotiation, there are cases in which young do better with one parent, even when costs are symmetric. The analysis suggests empirical ways to differentiate between different response rules. Copyright 2003.

Optimal moult strategies in migratory birds

Abstract: Avian migration, which involves billions of birds flying vast distances, is known to influence all aspects of avian life. Here we investigate how birds fit moult into an annual cycle determined by the need to migrate. Large variation exists in moulting patterns in relation to migration: for instance, moult can occur after breeding in the summer or after arrival in the wintering quarters. Here we use an optimal annual routine model to investigate why this variation exists. The modelled bird's decisions depend on the time of year, its energy reserves, breeding status, experience, flight feather quality and location. Our results suggest that the temporal and spatial variations in food are an important influence on a migratory bird's annual cycle. Summer moult occurs when food has a high peak on the breeding site in the summer, but it is less seasonal elsewhere. Winter moult occurs if there is a short period of high food availability in summer and a strong winter peak at different locations (i.e. the food is very seasonal but in opposite phase on these areas). This finding might explain why only long-distance migrants have a winter moult.

Sex differences in immune responses

Abstract: Males and females differ in their immunological responses to foreign and self-antigens and show distinctions in innate and adaptive immune responses. Certain immunological sex differences are present throughout life, whereas others are only apparent after puberty and before reproductive senescence, suggesting that both genes and hormones are involved. Furthermore, early environmental exposures influence the microbiome and have sex-dependent effects on immune function. Importantly, these sex-based immunological differences contribute to variations in the incidence of autoimmune diseases and malignancies, susceptibility to infectious diseases and responses to vaccines in males and females. Here, we discuss these differences and emphasize that sex is a biological variable that should be considered in immunological studies.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

Abstract: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.

The bottlenose dolphin community of Doubtful Sound features a large proportion of long-lasting associations

Abstract: More than 12 studies of different bottlenose dolphin populations, spanning from tropical to cold temperate waters, have shown that the species typically lives in societies in which relationships among individuals are predominantly fluid. In all cases dolphins lived in small groups characterised by fluid and dynamic interactions and some degree of dispersal from the natal group by both sexes. We describe a small, closed population of bottlenose dolphins living at the southern extreme of the species' range. Individuals live in large, mixed-sex groups in which no permanent emigration/immigration has been observed over the past 7 years. All members within the community are relatively closely associated (average half-weight index>0.4). Both male–male and female–female networks of preferred associates are present, as are long-lasting associations across sexes. The community structure is temporally stable, compared to other bottlenose dolphin populations, and constant companionship seems to be prevalent in the temporal association pattern. Such high degrees of stability are unprecedented in studies of bottlenose dolphins and may be related to the ecological constraints of Doubtful Sound. Fjords are low-productivity systems in which survival may easily require a greater level of co-operation, and hence group stability. These conditions are also present in other cetacean populations forming stable groups. We therefore hypothesise that ecological constraints are important factors shaping social interactions within cetacean societies.

Coevolutionary games--a mini review.

Abstract: Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.