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Institution

American Antitrust Institute

About: American Antitrust Institute is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Cartel & Price fixing. The organization has 15 authors who have published 145 publications receiving 1746 citations. The organization is also known as: AAI.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper presented a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges and found that overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened.
Abstract: The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

155 citations

Book
30 Sep 2001
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the economic effects of the Citric Acid Cartel on the world Lysine Industry and the business of fighting Cartels, and the Chicago Criminal Trial.
Abstract: Preface. Acknowledgments. 1. Introduction. 2. The Economics of Price Fixing. 3. Anticartel Laws and Enforcement. 4. The Citric Acid Industry. 5. The Citric Acid Conspiracy. 6. Economic Impacts of the Citric Acid Cartel. 7. The World Lysine Industry. 8. The Lysine Conspiracy. 9. Economic Effects of the Lysine Cartel. 10. The Global Vitamins Industry. 11. The Vitamins Conspiracies. 12. Effects of the Vitamins Cartel. 13. U.S. Government Prosecution of the Cartels. 14. Antitrust Prosecution by Foreign Governments. 15. The Chicago Criminal Trial. 16. The Civil Suits. 17. More Global Cartels. 18. The Business of Fighting Cartels. 19. Global Price Fixing: Summing Up. References. Index.

113 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The authors surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels and finds that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels.
Abstract: This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.

103 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors specify and test a control model moderated by relative dependence involving the conceptualization and measurement of governance at the level of specific control processes: incenting, monitoring, and enforcing.
Abstract: Control and governance theories recognize that exchange partners are subject to two general forms of control, the unilateral authority of one firm and bilateral expectations extending from their social bond. In this way, a supplier both exerts unilateral, authority-based controls and is subject to socially-based, bilateral controls as it attempts to manage its brand successfully through reseller channels. Such control is being challenged by suppliers’ growing relative dependence on increasingly dominant resellers in many industries. Yet the impact of supplier relative dependence on the efficacy of control-based governance in the supplier’s channel is not well understood. To address this gap, we specify and test a control model moderated by relative dependence involving the conceptualization and measurement of governance at the level of specific control processes: incenting, monitoring, and enforcing. Our empirical findings show relative dependence undercuts the effectiveness of certain unilateral and bilateral control processes while enhancing the effectiveness of others, largely supporting our dual suppositions that each control process operates through a specialized behavioral mechanism and that these underlying mechanisms are differentially impacted by relative dependence. We offer implications of these findings for managers and identify our contributions to channel theory and research.

101 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a particular form of category management involves "category captain" (CC) arrangements, in which a supplier, often the category leader, takes on a significant role in the retail management of the category, including the brands of competing suppliers.
Abstract: Category management (CM) is a widely practiced supplier-retailer process for managing entire product categories as strategic business units and for customizing them on a store-by-store basis to produce enhanced business results through a focus on delivering consumer value. A particular form of CM involves “category captain” (CC) arrangements, in which a supplier, often the category leader, takes on a significant role in the retail management of the category, including the brands of competing suppliers. Although CC arrangements are capable of yielding benefits to competition, they may also enable a CC to take advantage of its role in ways that restrict competition and harm consumers. Recent antitrust litigation that targets CC arrangements illustrates the nature and magnitude of competitive issues that can arise in the arrangements. Competitive concerns about CC arrangements have also attracted the attention of public policymakers in the United States and abroad. In response to public policy devel...

74 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
20214
20204
20194
20186
20172
20168