scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Institution

Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.


Papers
More filters
Posted Content
TL;DR: For example, the authors provides guidance for law school administrators and faculty members who desire to coordinate law school LRAP benefits with those provided by federal law, and for law students and alumni who might want to suggest LRAP improvements to their schools.
Abstract: For decades, law school administrators, faculty members, students and graduates have worried about the problem of the ever-increasing cost of attendance at the nation’s law schools, and the rapidly rising average debt of graduating law students. The problem was particularly acute for students who desired careers in public service, because starting salaries in the government and non-profit sectors failed to keep pace with the increase in educational debt of law school graduates. In response, many law schools created loan repayment assistance programs (LRAPs), through which they subsidized loan repayment for some or all of their graduates who undertook public service jobs or careers. Most of these programs are insufficiently funded to meet the needs of their graduates who desire to use them, and demand for financial assistance for lower-income graduates has particularly accelerated as the recession that began in 2008 caused private sector firms to reduce their hiring, prompting more student interest in public sector employment. In addition, many law schools had no LRAP programs at all. Fortunately, Congress has significantly alleviated this problem, passing four laws between 2005 and 2010 that collectively reduce the debt repayment burdens on graduates, particularly (though not exclusively) those in public service. The new legislation also makes it possible for law schools to create or restructure LRAP programs in a way that provides a great deal of debt relief to graduates in public service at the lowest possible cost to the law school. As of this writing (in the summer of 2010), at least seven law schools - the University of California at Berkeley, Georgetown, UCLA, Duke, Northwestern, Virginia, and Suffolk - have altered their LRAP programs to take maximum advantage of the federal legislation, and several others are currently considering modifications. This article, together with an associated web-based calculator, provides guidance for law school administrators and faculty members who desire to coordinate law school LRAP benefits with those provided by federal law, and for law students and alumni who might want to suggest LRAP improvements to their schools.

14 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present evidence that much of this public debate is misdirected: the charge of subjectivity and abuse, if not a deception, is a diversion, and that if there is a problem with the law of criminal defense today, it is not with syndromes or subjectivity, but with a criminal law that purports to be neutral and precise but remains full of contested meanings.
Abstract: The law of self-defense has rarely produced as much academic or popular heat as it has in the past two decades. Widely publicized trials, such as the Goetz and Menendez cases, have generated deep-seated fears of a law unmoored from principle. Those fears have generated a standard public critique--that the criminal law has become too soft and subjective, too wedded to syndrome science and prone to weak-kneed affection for defendants. The criminal law has lost its "objectivity," so the argument goes. The poster child, and even the alleged cause of this development, is the battered woman.In this article, the author presents evidence that much of this public debate is misdirected: the charge of subjectivity and abuse, if not a deception, is a diversion. The problem with the law of self-defense is neither new nor limited to the battered woman; it is as old and as persistent as the law's search for an objective meaning for necessity. Based on a survey of twenty years of self-defense cases, the author sought to "test" claims of objectivity by focusing on what purports to be one of the most objective of self-defense rules: the requirement that the threat must have been "imminent" for the defendant's response to have been permissible. Time is not something legal scholars generally study. The author chose to study imminence, however, because it seems the quintessential definition of "objectivity," the hard case. Perhaps more importantly, there is no more controversial element in the law of self-defense. As George Fletcher has put it: "The central debate in the theory of self-defense for the last decade has been whether we should maintain a strict requirement of imminence."Part I of this article explains the legal issues of imminence and the law of self-defense as well as the construction of the legal debate as a question of subjectivity. Part II presents the results of the author’s survey and its method. Part III argues that the so-called objectivity of contemporary doctrine is belied by its content; that doctrine we call "objective" leaves open many questions and risks the embrace of contradictions. This Part traces these failures to a basic theoretical disagreement about the meaning of necessity in the law of self-defense. Part IV argues that "subjectivity" cannot resolve these questions. It argues that even the apparently most subjective aspects of self-defense law -- such as battered woman syndrome -- may rest on objective legal propositions. Finally, Part V questions whether a discourse of objectivity and subjectivity really helps us understand the criminal law, in self-defense or the many other places it may be found. The author argues that if there is a problem with the law of criminal defenses today, it is not with syndromes or subjectivity, but with a criminal law that purports to be neutral and precise but remains full of contested meanings.

14 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: Health-related human rights have evolved dramatically to offer a normative framework for public health, codifying international standards to frame government obligations and facilitate accountability for realising the highest attainable standard of health.
Abstract: Policymakers have come to look to human rights law in framing national health policy and global health governance. Human rights law offers universal frameworks to advance justice in public health, codifying international standards to frame government obligations and facilitate accountability for realising the highest attainable standard of health. Addressing threats to individual dignity as ‘rights violations’ under international law, health-related human rights have evolved dramatically to offer a normative framework for public health.

14 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the legal dimension of safe assets, and point to the policy and regulatory implications to be examined in future work, and offer a three-part framework for understanding the mechanisms by which the law fosters the production of safe asset, nurtures the development of the markets in safe assets and promotes the continuing safety of asset-backed securities in multiple states of the world.
Abstract: “Safe assets” describes a variety of financial claims on public or private sector entities that are used in financial markets as if they were risk-free. Government debt, central bank debt and money are publicly produced safe assets. Bank deposits, highly rated corporate debt, repos and asset-backed securities are privately produced safe assets. An influential strand of post-crisis economic thinking recasts safe assets as central to financial instability.Safe assets pose a high-stakes legal problem. Statutes, regulations, and private contracting practices allow, encourage, and constrain both the production of these financial contracts and market actors’ ability to use them as if they were safe. If safe assets are under- or overproduced, or misused, or if safety is misperceived, the law is at least partly to blame. Analysis and policy design suffer for lack of an overall legal framework for thinking about safe assets. This chapter considers the legal dimension of safe assets, and points to the policy and regulatory implications to be examined in future work. We offer a three-part framework for understanding the mechanisms by which the law fosters the production of safe assets, nurtures the development of the markets in safe assets, and promotes the continuing safety of safe assets in multiple states of the world. First, the law makes some assets less risky, for example, by mandating capital cushions for issuers of safe assets or giving investors in those assets repayment priorities. Second, the law labels some assets as safe, reducing or eliminating market participants’ incentives to discover their risk attributes. Third, the state guarantees the safety of assets when it perceives them to be important for the financial system as a whole. The law authorizes and frames the design of such guarantees.For any given asset, governments both recognize the safety attributes that arise through private ordering and enhance them with regulation, labeling, and guarantees. If all goes well, the three categories of tools feed a virtuous cycle: e.g., when low-risk assets are labeled safe, it increases demand, broadens the investor base, boosts liquidity, and reduces the cost of funding for their issuers. When the tools are misaligned, they can contribute to instability. Investors might herd into risky assets mislabeled as safe, then flee in panic when the perception of safety vanishes, with spillover effects on the broader economy. The government may have no choice but to step in with guarantees ex post, creating distortions and moral hazard.This chapter traces how the three categories of legal tools constructed four categories of safe assets – government debt, bank debt, repurchase agreements, and asset-backed securities – and how this construction unraveled in crisis. Each time, poor coordination among long-established legal and regulatory tools, rather than the tools themselves, stood out as a problem.The chapter outlines how dynamically aligning the three types of legal rules that construct safe assets might enlarge the macroprudential regulatory toolkit without creating brand new regulatory tools but would require additional research to function.

14 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the association between the duty to settle, settlement at limits, claim duration, and defense costs using detailed data from Texas for 1988-2005 on closed, commercially insured personal injury claims was studied.
Abstract: All insurance has coverage limits, and insurers usually control whether a case is settled or tried. If the insurer rejects a within-limits settlement offer, the insured bears the risk of an above-limits verdict. In response, virtually every state has imposed a “duty to settle” on insurers, which creates incentives for plaintiffs to make at-limits offers and for insurers to accept those offers when expected damages exceed limits. We study the association between the duty to settle, settlement at limits, claim duration, and defense costs using detailed data from Texas for 1988-2005 on closed, commercially insured personal injury claims. We focus principally on medical malpractice suits against physicians, but find consistent evidence for other types of cases. We find strong evidence that the duty to settle affects settlement dynamics. Essentially all physician-defendant cases that settle at-limits are preceded by an at-limits demand. Roughly 20% of physician-defendant cases settle at 90-100% of policy limits (“broad at-limits”) and 13% settle exactly at limits (“exact at-limits”). Broad- and exact-at-limits cases close about five months faster than similar “below-limits” cases -- a roughly 20% shorter time from suit to settlement, controlling for payout and type of harm. Broad- and exact-at-limits cases also have substantially lower defense costs, controlling for case duration and complexity. More broadly, as the payout/limits ratio approaches 1 from below, duration declines (controlling for payout) and defense costs decline (controlling for payout and duration). Payouts above-limits are uncommon; when they occur, insurers are the primary payers. Policy limits alone cannot explain these results; most likely reflect a combination of policy limits and the duty to settle.

14 citations


Authors

Showing all 585 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Lawrence O. Gostin7587923066
Michael J. Saks381555398
Chirag Shah343415056
Sara J. Rosenbaum344256907
Mark Dybul33614171
Steven C. Salop3312011330
Joost Pauwelyn321543429
Mark Tushnet312674754
Gorik Ooms291243013
Alicia Ely Yamin291222703
Julie E. Cohen28632666
James G. Hodge272252874
John H. Jackson271022919
Margaret M. Blair26754711
William W. Bratton251122037
Network Information
Related Institutions (5)
American University
13K papers, 367.2K citations

78% related

Brookings Institution
2.7K papers, 135.3K citations

78% related

London School of Economics and Political Science
35K papers, 1.4M citations

78% related

Bocconi University
8.9K papers, 344.1K citations

75% related

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
1.9K papers, 118K citations

75% related

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202174
2020146
2019115
2018113
2017109
2016118