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Institution

Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.


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TL;DR: In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court both decriminalized consensual homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously and paradoxically, authorized a regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court both decriminalized consensual homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously and paradoxically, authorized a regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality. Decriminalization is not deregulation, however. Rather, it is one stage in a regulatory process, one which is likely, in Michel Foucault's words, to produce even more institutional incitement to speak about sexuality, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail. Lawrence did not end state involvement with sexuality. Future legal disputes are likely to center on the extent to which the indirect mechanisms of fields such as family and employment law will supplant criminal law in the machinery of state regulation of homosexuality. The impact of Lawrence is to deprive the state of easy invocations of morals or tradition to justify regulation. Courts will be forced to engage in more particularized assessments of whether there is a legitimate state interest justifying classifications based on sexual orientation: to hear homosexuality spoken about and to cause it to speak. Whatever standard of review is used, the inquiries into the reasonableness of differentiating based on sexual orientation will become more detailed and contextual. The paradox of this new form of heightened scrutiny is that such examinations will constitute even more intrusion by the state than occurred under the old criminal law regime, a development which is the seeming antithesis of the liberty principle of Lawrence.

14 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: For instance, the authors found that the majority of the current Justices cite law review articles with less frequency than their predecessors did in the three decades before, which suggests that they view current law review scholarship as generally less useful than the members of the Court did a generation ago.
Abstract: An analysis of the twenty-first century Justices’ citations of law review scholarship — how often they cite articles, the professional identities of authors of the cited articles, and the rankings of the law reviews in which the cited articles appear — provides an excellent prism through which to assess today’s law reviews. In addition to having had varied and rich legal careers as practitioners, policy-makers, and lower court judges, the majority of the current Justices were, at earlier points in their careers, full-time law professors. Presumably, the Justices are able to separate the wheat from the chaff in the law reviews. The present study examined whether something meaningful can be gleaned from an analysis of the modern Justices’ practice of citing law review articles.This article describes the results of an empirical study of the nearly two thousand “signed” opinions authored by the Justices — majority opinions, plurality opinions, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions issued after oral arguments — dated between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2011, which cited at least one American law review article. Opinions were coded to determine the following: (1) whether one or more law review articles (including law student “notes” or “comments”) were cited in the opinions; (2) which Justices wrote the opinions citing law review articles; (3) the professional status of the articles’ authors at the time that the cited articles were published (as a full-time law professor, legal practitioner, judge, law student, or “other”); and (4) the ranking of the law reviews that published the cited articles according to Washington and Lee University School of Law’s “combined score” ranking system (the “WL the median is 21; and the mode is 1. The mode ranking means that the top-ranked law review, Harvard Law Review, was cited the most times (102 times, or 10.1%) among the 1,023 total citations. Although “elite” law reviews were cited in disproportionate numbers — articles in the top-ten law reviews were cited 384 times (or 37.5% of the 1,023 citations) — the Justices cited over 100 articles appearing in law reviews ranked at 300 or below. Data from an earlier study of cited law review articles in the 1970s through 1990s, when compared with data from the present study, show that the Justices have cited articles published in “elite” law reviews at a steadily declining rate since 1970 and have cited articles in lower-rank reviews at a much greater rate, particularly in the last decade. In sum, the current Justices have cited law review articles with less frequency than their predecessors did in the three decades before, which suggests that the current Justices may view current law review scholarship as generally less useful than the members of the Court did a generation ago. Nearly four out of ten of the authors of the cited articles were not full-time members of the legal academy. Considering that writing law review articles is the primary activity of America’s ten thousand-plus full time law professors, the fact that the Justices cite so many articles written by other authors permits the inference that much of the professiorate’s scholarship does not have value or relevance to the Justices (or to the bench and bar generally). The Justices also have cited articles from the full gamut of law reviews in the rankings, including many law reviews that are not deemed “tenure-worthy,” at least from the perspective of the hiring and promotion committees at many “elite” law schools.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046293

14 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The chapter describes how HIV/AIDS perfected a change in the use of public health power, and focuses on the effort to use law to reduce social risk, and the development and application of a human rights framework in public health practice.
Abstract: Historically, public health law has been shaped by the social response to serious epidemics. Boards of health and full-fledged health departments were created in the late 18 and 19th centuries in response to yellow fever and cholera. Disease reporting, mandatory screening, and compulsory treatment became common in the law in response to TB and syphilis. HIV proved to be no exception. The need to respond, and the special role of law as a medium for resolving social disputes in the U.S., gave public health law a renewed importance. Advocates turned to law as a tool for promoting their desired HIV policies. Lawyers, judges, policy-makers and public health officials were challenged to adapt old practices to new needs, and develop new solutions to new problems. In the process, public health law has re-emerged as a vital discipline of public health, with a stronger connection to practice and a deeper intellectual foundation. After a brief overview of the statutes and cases arising from the epidemic, the chapter describes how HIV/AIDS perfected a change in the use of public health power. In the face of HIV/AIDS, public health has accepted the limits of law as a means to coerce behavior change among people with or at risk of communicable disease; at the same time, it has become more interested in understanding and addressing how law contributes to the social conditions in which people would be most likely to behave in healthy ways. The chapter focuses on two examples of this change in practice: the effort to use law to reduce social risk, and the development and application of a human rights framework in public health practice. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the influence of HIV/AIDS on the future course of law in public health.

14 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Confirming a number of observational studies, three randomized controlled trials in Africa have shown that circumcision reduces the likelihood of female-to-male HIV transmission by 50-60%, leading WHO/UNAIDS to conclude that the evidence is "compelling".
Abstract: UNAIDS and WHO recommend safe, voluntary male circumcision as an additional, important strategy for the prevention of heterosexually-acquired HIV in men in areas with high HIV prevalence and low levels of male circumcision. Comprehensive male circumcision services should include HIV testing and counseling, partner reduction, and male and female condom use. Yet, male circumcision can have deep symbolic meaning that could pose barriers to implementation. In some parts of the world, it is a traditional practice with religious or cultural significance, in others it is a common hygiene intervention, and in yet others it is unfamiliar or foreign. Consequently, the proportion of men who are circumcised varies from 80%, with an estimated 30-40% of adult men circumcised worldwide.Confirming a number of observational studies, three randomized controlled trials in Africa have shown that circumcision reduces the likelihood of female-to-male HIV transmission by 50-60%, leading WHO/UNAIDS to conclude that the evidence is "compelling." Male circumcision is a relatively simple, inexpensive one-time surgical procedure that is cost-effective, but raises a host of ethical, legal, and human rights challenges.

14 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present four major objections to Waldron's claim that for the rule of law to exist, we must move beyond basic formal requirements that laws be general and knowable rules we can all comply with, towards substantive requirements that when the law imposes its censorial and punitive will upon us, it is applied in a way that acknowledges our intelligence and respects our individual dignity.
Abstract: This article presents four major objections to Jeremy Waldron’s claim that for “Rule of Law” to exist it we must move beyond basic formal requirements that laws be general and knowable rules we can all comply with, towards substantive requirements that when the law imposes its censorial and punitive will upon us, it is applied in a way that acknowledges our intelligence and respects our individual dignity. After challenging Waldron’s claim, the author suggests that if Rule of Law theorizing is intended to capture our ideals of law, then the three paradigms of Rule of Law scholarship that Waldron has usefully identified and distinguished — formal, procedural, and substantive — need to move beyond identifying the Rule of Law as a means to counter the pernicious abuse of power by a too-fierce state besotted by its own political will, and acknowledge the ways in which the law expresses the will of the state to protect weaker parties harmed not by the state but by powerful private entities.

14 citations


Authors

Showing all 585 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Lawrence O. Gostin7587923066
Michael J. Saks381555398
Chirag Shah343415056
Sara J. Rosenbaum344256907
Mark Dybul33614171
Steven C. Salop3312011330
Joost Pauwelyn321543429
Mark Tushnet312674754
Gorik Ooms291243013
Alicia Ely Yamin291222703
Julie E. Cohen28632666
James G. Hodge272252874
John H. Jackson271022919
Margaret M. Blair26754711
William W. Bratton251122037
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202174
2020146
2019115
2018113
2017109
2016118