Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

The Americans With Disabilities Act and HIV/AIDS Discrimination: Unfinished Business

Abstract: Twenty-five years ago when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and AIDS were significant sources of anxiety and public concern. There was only one transiently effective treatment, and HIV was the third leading cause of death in the United States among adults aged 25 to 44 years and the leading cause of death among black men and Hispanic men in this age group. Indeed, whether to include people living with HIV/AIDS under the umbrella of protection being established by this legislation was part of the congressional debate around the law. Today, people with HIV who are diagnosed early, engaged in care, and able to continue treatment may live a normal lifespan.1 A broad array of effective, simple, and well-tolerated antiretroviral therapies (ART) are now available for treatment. Effective ART also has changed the prevention landscape as data have shown that viral suppression substantially decreases the risk of HIV transmission. Additionally, tenofovir/emtricitabine has been proven effective in preventing infection as preexposure prophylaxis. Despite remarkable progress in both treatment and prevention, however, stigma and discrimination are still pervasive, and the ADA remains an essential cornerstone of protection for people living with HIV.

Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene

Abstract: Darwin’s (1871) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The problem is whether a certain class of moral judgments is “constituted” or “driven by” emotion (Greene 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner et al. 2008). With one exception, all of the “personal” vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al. 2007) in their fMRI and behavioral studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment involve violent crimes or torts. These studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.

The constructed voice in courtroom cross-examination

Abstract: This article examines the evidential and evaluative functions of ‘constructed dialogue’ (Tannen 1989), also called direct reported speech, in the cross-examination of two defendants in a US civil suit. The lawsuit is brought against two detention officers who were on duty when the plaintiff’s husband, an inmate at a prison, died from meningitis. The plaintiff’s attorney constructs the dialogue of the defendants in an ‘alternate reality’ to suggest what the defendants should have done but failed to do to help, thereby providing evidence for his argument that the defendants acted unreasonably and inviting the jury to evaluate the defendants’ conduct as indifferent and blameworthy. The attorney also imputes dialogue to the defendants and other individuals involved in the case, again providing evidence for his claims and leading the jury to evaluate the defendants’ conduct as morally reprehensible and legally culpable.

Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds

Abstract: In recent years, originalism as a method of interpretation has grown in its intellectual and practical appeal. The latest challenge to originalism from nonoriginalists is based on the doctrine of precedent. Acceptance of originalism, it is charged, would necessitate the reversal of crucially important landmark decisions and thereby provides a reductio ad absurdum of originalism. Until recently, few originalists have considered carefully the relationship between originalism and the doctrine of stare decisis (though this situation is starting to change). In this short essay, I contend that original meaning should indeed trump previous Supreme Court decisions that are inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. But the main thrust of the essay explains why this implication is not as radical as it sounds because there remains much room for the doctrine of precedent in originalism. It is not incompatible with original public meaning originalism to adhere to precedent in cases involving (a) nonconstitutional issues, (b) matters of constitutional construction, (c) detrimental reliance by identifiable individuals, (d) epistemic concerns about the correctness of originalist claims, and perhaps also (e) where the text was originally ambiguous. Knowing the degree to which a commitment to originalism entails the rejection of the doctrine of precedent may well influence the degree to which originalism is deemed acceptable by academics, judges, and the general public. For this reason, it is important to make clear that a commitment to following original meaning where it conflicts with judicial precedent is far less radical a stance than critics of originalism, and perhaps even some originalists, assume.

Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy

Abstract: The most recent round of state budget crises has resulted in calls to permit states to file for bankruptcy in order to restructure and reduce their financial obligations. This Article argues that these proposals are misguided because states’ financial distress is primarily a political problem created by fiscal federalism - the financial relationship between the federal government and the states - and exacerbated by political agency problems. Accordingly, state bankruptcy proposals need to be evaluated in political, rather than financial terms. Bankruptcy can no more remake fiscal federalism than it can fix a firm with an untenable business model. While bankruptcy might provide a tool for mitigating political agency problems, it is more likely to be used to provide judicial cover for partisan agendas. Attempts to use bankruptcy to solve political problems invite a reevaluation of the “creditors’ bargain,” the dominant theory of bankruptcy law, which argues that bankruptcy law tries to replicate the bargain that creditors would have made themselves. This Article argues that contractarian approaches to bankruptcy are necessarily incomplete because they do not account for the politics of bankruptcy. Instead, this Article sketches out a new theory of bankruptcy law as the dynamic “armistice line” between competing interest groups. Bankruptcy is fundamentally a distributional exercise and the shape of bankruptcy law is an expression of distributional norms and interest group politics rather than an exercise in economic efficiency. A proper theoretical understanding of bankruptcy must therefore commence from a political rather than economic perspective.