Institution
Georgetown University Law Center
About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.
Topics: Supreme court, Global health, Public health, Health policy, Human rights
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the implications of asymmetry in a model of litigation with endogenous effort, and show that asymmetric stakes do not create any distortion, because the prospect of ex post (post-judgment) settlement makes the litigants behave as if the stakes are symmetric.
Abstract: Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival. In such cases, the defendant generally has a much larger financial stake in the outcome. We explore the implications of this asymmetry in a model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead antitrust defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing a downward bias in the plaintiff's success probability---a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. Enhanced damages cannot prevent this systematic bias. We show that, in most private litigation contexts, asymmetric stakes do not create any distortion, because the prospect of ex post (post-judgment) settlement makes the litigants behave as if the stakes are symmetric. But this does not occur in antitrust, because it proscribes certain ex post settlements. We consider how courts might mitigate the distortion by altering the plaintiff's evidentiary burden.
7 citations
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TL;DR: Gostin et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed an international call to action through a Global Plan for Justice (GPJ), a voluntary compact among states and their partners, to close the health gap in a generation.
7 citations
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TL;DR: The Workshop on Refugee and Asylum Policy in Practice in Europe and North America was organized to facilitate a transatlantic dialogue aimed at understanding just how well these asylum systems are balancing the dual goals.
Abstract: The Workshop on Refugee and Asylum Policy in Practice in Europe and North America was organized to facilitate a transatlantic dialogue aimed at understanding just how well these asylum systems are balancing the dual goals. The Workshop was convened by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) of Georgetown University and the Center for the Study of Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies (CEPIC) of the Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique, with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. It was held on July 1-3, 1999, at Oxford University.
The workshop examined key issues as to the workings of the U.S. and European asylum systems: decision making on claims, deterrence of abuse, independent review, return of rejected asylum seekers, scope of the refugee concept, social rights and employment, international cooperation, and data and evaluation. In this opening paper, we explain the significance of these issues and raise central questions about them.
7 citations
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TL;DR: A theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general is provided and it is explained why foreground conditions on a promisor's intent to perform are likely to result in material promissory misrepresentation, while background conditions are not.
Abstract: No promisor intends to perform come what may. Yet some undisclosed conditions on a promisor's intent are so material that they can support a claim of fraud. A theory of promissory fraud should be able distinguish such foreground conditions on a promisor's intent to perform from the background conditions that attach to all intentions. Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention provides resources to explain the difference. A background condition is one that the agent accepts as satisfied or not satisfied in her practical reasoning; a foreground condition is one whose satisfaction she treats as an open question. Foreground conditions permit an agent to plan for futures in which she does not perform the act in question and reduce the rational pressure to adopt necessary means of performing it. Background conditions do neither. This planning theory of conditional intentions provides a more complete account of why a promisee should care about foreground conditions on the promisor's intent to perform. An undisclosed foreground condition is likely material not only because it reduces probability of performance (background conditions do that too), but also because it is likely to affect the promisor's preperformance deliberations and behavior. The promisor is more likely to continue planning for possible futures in which she does not perform and less likely to invest in necessary means of performance. A foreground condition on the promisor's intent to perform also reduces the rational pressure to fill contract gaps in ways that accord or mesh with the promisee's plans and preferences, as described by the theory of shared intentions. These conclusions suggest revisions to the analysis of what a promise says about the promisor's intent to perform and any conditions on it. They also supply the beginning of a philosophical account of the relationship-based, extralegal expectations and obligations that attend agreements for consideration, and of the law's proper response to them.
7 citations
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TL;DR: In addition to funding government and redistributing income, a redistributive tax-and-transfer system, and a progressive income tax in particular, provides insurance against the risk of uncertain future income as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In addition to funding government and redistributing income, a redistributive tax-and-transfer system, and a progressive income tax in particular, provides insurance against the risk of uncertain future income. By providing for high taxes for high incomes, and low taxes, exemptions, and transfers for low incomes, a progressive income tax lowers the volatility of potential after-tax income relative to a lump-sum tax. This insurance function is distinct from the redistributive function of the system, since it provides a direct risk-mitigation benefit to the taxpayer himself, rather than simply redistributing income from one taxpayer to another.This article analyzes the question of at what level of government to assign the income tax role in a federal system, given both its redistributive and insurance functions. The standard view in the literature is that redistribution is best done centrally, and thus that an income tax is best used by the federal government, rather than by state governments. Yet recent work suggests that states can effectively have some role in redistribution. Income insurance, however, can be more effectively done by the federal government, because of its larger risk pool and better ability to handle revenue volatility.This article argues that states will, and likely should, use progressive income taxes as a tool of greater redistribution. At the same time, the insurance function of a progressive income tax can still be nationalized through policies that resemble re-insurance. In particular, this article looks at the idea of a multi-state rainy-day fund as a form of pooled state revenue insurance, as well as federal policies that may achieve some of the same benefits.
7 citations
Authors
Showing all 585 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Lawrence O. Gostin | 75 | 879 | 23066 |
Michael J. Saks | 38 | 155 | 5398 |
Chirag Shah | 34 | 341 | 5056 |
Sara J. Rosenbaum | 34 | 425 | 6907 |
Mark Dybul | 33 | 61 | 4171 |
Steven C. Salop | 33 | 120 | 11330 |
Joost Pauwelyn | 32 | 154 | 3429 |
Mark Tushnet | 31 | 267 | 4754 |
Gorik Ooms | 29 | 124 | 3013 |
Alicia Ely Yamin | 29 | 122 | 2703 |
Julie E. Cohen | 28 | 63 | 2666 |
James G. Hodge | 27 | 225 | 2874 |
John H. Jackson | 27 | 102 | 2919 |
Margaret M. Blair | 26 | 75 | 4711 |
William W. Bratton | 25 | 112 | 2037 |