Institution
Georgetown University Law Center
About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.
Topics: Supreme court, Public health, Global health, Health policy, Human rights
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
••
TL;DR: The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature as mentioned in this paper, with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative” courts.
Abstract: The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus, and most, but not all, federal courts are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach further ignores the full range of federal courts, which are rooted in different constitutional provisions: Art. III(1), Art. I(8); Art. IV(3); Art. II(2)/I(8)(3); and Art. II(1). These distinctions matter for defining jurisdiction and understanding the scope of the authorities—and constitutional protections—that apply. The failure of scholars to take into account the full panoply of the federal judicial system has contributed to inaccurate analyses and cabined the debate. This article takes a significant step forward, providing a conceptual framework for each type of court and delineating, based on their legal and historical underpinning, which adjudicatory bodies in the history of the United States fall within each category. It details the constitutive elements of the courts and their jurisdiction as supported by doctrine, statutory law, and scholarly literature, providing the first, comprehensive taxonomy of federal courts in the United States.
6 citations
•
TL;DR: In a recent issue of the Stanford Law Review, the authors of as discussed by the authors argued that relying on foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution is very likely to be correct under certain circumstances.
Abstract: In a recent issue of the Stanford Law Review, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein offered a new argument for reliance on foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. They contended that the Condorcet Jury Theorem supports the practice, because it demonstrates that, under certain circumstances, the majority view of foreign governments is very likely to be correct. This invited Response concludes that, neat as it is, the Posner-Sunstein argument puts the cart before the horse. Their article begins with the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which it presents in an entirely ahistorical way. Only afterwards does it turn, briefly, to the U.S. Constitution. This Response demonstrates how one might approach the same question from a more traditional starting point - constitutional text, history, and structure. As it turns out, Condorcet and his Jury Theorem do have a proper role to play in this discussion, but it is quite different from the one that Posner and Sunstein suggest. While there are, in fact, intriguing historical connections between Condorcet and the Framers, the Constitution that the Framers ultimately wrote demonstrates a conception of governmental structure sharply different from that of Condorcet. In short, Condorcet's ideas can usefully inform constitutional interpretation but primarily by way of contrast. It turns out that Condorcet's vision of law and politics was distinctly universalist, imagining all people everywhere seeking the correct answer to questions of law and policy. This universalist vision is central to the Jury Theorem, the most basic condition of which is that each juror answer the same question. And it is also essential to the Posner-Sunstein application of the Theorem, which posits that questions of law will often be relevantly similar from country to country. But the Framers' vision, as reflected in many of the Constitution's textual and structural features, was distinctly more localist. As careful analysis of features like bicameralism, federalism, juries, and the amendment mechanism demonstrate, the Constitution favors decision-making mechanisms that harness multiple collective bodies with distinctly varied geographic and institutional perspectives, each answering subtly different questions. In short, despite Condorcet, the Constitution itself ultimately refutes the notion that it should be interpreted by reference to the law of other states.
6 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of market intermediation in securities transactions has reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public companies and the evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market transactions and the theoretical understanding of private enforcement claims needs to evolve to encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the securities regulatory impulse and the publicness of those goals.
Abstract: Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of securities fraud and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical understanding of these private enforcement claims needs to evolve to encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the securities regulatory impulse and the publicness of those goals. Further, a clear grasp of the modern securities class action also requires an updated understanding of how the role of market intermediation in securities transactions has reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public companies and the evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market transactions. The Supreme Court’s embrace of market efficiency as a mechanism to establish reliance in its 1988 decision, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, illustrates the necessary adaptation of common law fraud to the modern market setting, and Congressional enactment of the PSLRA in 1995 exemplifies the efforts to respond to the litigation risks inherent in that adaptation. Together, Basic and the PSLRA provide a frame for understanding both a series of recent Supreme Court decisions on securities class actions and a different understanding of the theory undergirding those class actions. To develop this understanding, we expand the conversation about the goals of securities regulation to include the set of goals that are rooted in publicness and focus on market protection, innovation, and growth, as well as stability and systemic considerations. We posit that this broader theoretical understanding explains why the Court rejected a challenge to the fraud on the market doctrine and, instead, permitted the continued use of market efficiency: the Court chose to preserve the deterrence and enforcement role of these cases in promoting market growth and innovation. We then apply this understanding of publicness and market intermediation to the interpretation of the Court’s limited, but ambiguous, use of “price impact” in securities fraud cases. Our analysis reveals that the practical balance established by Basic and the PSLRA has prevailed over pure doctrinal approaches to issues like reliance or other, more incomplete theoretical explanations focused solely on compensation, deterrence, and investor protection, but neglecting the role of publicness in the securities markets.
6 citations
••
6 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns and calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and refer to this proxy measure as the dHHI.
Abstract: This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and we refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) that are involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (1) vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures); and (2) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among competitors that raise unilateral effects concerns (and the associated modified GUPPI and modified HHI measures). This dHHI measure can be a useful tool for vertical merger analysis.
6 citations
Authors
Showing all 585 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Lawrence O. Gostin | 75 | 879 | 23066 |
Michael J. Saks | 38 | 155 | 5398 |
Chirag Shah | 34 | 341 | 5056 |
Sara J. Rosenbaum | 34 | 425 | 6907 |
Mark Dybul | 33 | 61 | 4171 |
Steven C. Salop | 33 | 120 | 11330 |
Joost Pauwelyn | 32 | 154 | 3429 |
Mark Tushnet | 31 | 267 | 4754 |
Gorik Ooms | 29 | 124 | 3013 |
Alicia Ely Yamin | 29 | 122 | 2703 |
Julie E. Cohen | 28 | 63 | 2666 |
James G. Hodge | 27 | 225 | 2874 |
John H. Jackson | 27 | 102 | 2919 |
Margaret M. Blair | 26 | 75 | 4711 |
William W. Bratton | 25 | 112 | 2037 |