Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Public health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Abstract: The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control originated in 1993 with a decision by Ruth Roemer and Allyn Taylor to apply to tobacco control Taylor's idea that the WHO should utilize its constitutional authority to develop international conventions to advance global health. In 1995, Taylor and Ruth Roemer proposed various options to WHO, recommending the framework convention-protocol approach conceptualized by Taylor. Despite initial resistance by some WHO officials, this approach gained wide acceptance. In 1996, the World Health Assembly voted to proceed with its development. Negotiations by WHO member states led the World Health Assembly in May 2003 to adopt by consensus the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control - the first international treaty adopted under WHO auspices. The treaty formally entered into force for state parties on February 27, 2005.

Executing the Treaty Power

Abstract: The canonical Missouri v. Holland holds that Congress has power to enact legislation to implement a treaty, even if it would lack the power to enact the same legislation absent the treaty. It holds, in other words, that the legislative power may be increased by treaty. This proposition is of enormous theoretical importance, because it is in deep tension with the fundamental constitutional principle of enumerated legislative powers. It is also of great and increasing practical importance, because it lies at the intersection of the two most dramatic trends in American law: the explosion of the United States' commitments under international law on matters of distinctly local concern, and the new willingness of the Supreme Court to police the limits of the enumerated powers of Congress. These two trends, in combination, are creating an increasing gap between what Congress is called upon to do by treaty and what it otherwise has enumerated power to do. It is this widening gap that implicates Missouri v. Holland.This Article endeavors to prove that Missouri v. Holland is wrongly decided. It shows, first, that Justice Holmes misunderstood the relationship between the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Second, it demonstrates that the standard historical defense of Missouri v. Holland is based on a false premise. It concludes, based on constitutional text, history, and structure, as well as an examination of public choice and practical consequences, that Missouri v. Holland is wrong - treaties cannot increase the legislative power of Congress. Whether or not this Article definitively resolves this issue, however, it should, at a minimum, serve to launch a new debate in the constitutional law of foreign affairs: what is the scope of Congress's power to legislate pursuant to treaty?

Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do What?

Abstract: Academic scholarship on privacy has focused on the substantive rules and policies governing the protection of personal data. An extensive literature has debated alternative approaches for defining how private and public institutions can collect and use information about individuals. But, the attention given to the what of U.S. privacy regulation has overshadowed consideration of how and by whom privacy policy should be formulated and implemented. U.S. privacy policy is an amalgam of activity by a myriad of federal, state, and local government agencies. But, the quality of substantive privacy law depends greatly on which agency or agencies are running the show. Unfortunately, such implementation-related matters have been discounted or ignored -- with the clear implication that they only need to be addressed after the "real" work of developing substantive privacy rules is completed. As things stand, the development and implementation of U.S. privacy policy is compromised by the murky allocation of responsibilities and authority among federal, state, and local governmental entities -- compounded by the inevitable tensions associated with the large number of entities that are active in this regulatory space. These deficiencies have had major adverse consequences, both domestically and internationally. Without substantial upgrades of institutions and infrastructure, privacy law and policy will continue to fall short of what it could (and should) achieve.

The Objects of the Constitution

Abstract: The Constitution empowers and restricts different officials differently. Because different government actors are vested with different powers and bound by different restrictions, one cannot determine whether the Constitution has been violated without knowing who has allegedly violated it. The predicates of judicial review inevitably depend upon the subjects of judicial review. Thus, every constitutional inquiry should begin with the subject of the constitutional claim. And the first question in any such inquiry should be the who question: who has allegedly violated the Constitution? The who question establishes the two basic forms of judicial review. The dichotomy between judicial review of legislative action and judicial review of executive action is the organizing dichotomy of constitutional law. Judicial review of legislative action and judicial review of executive action are two fundamentally different enterprises - formally, structurally, temporally different. And these basic differences dictate both the structure and the substance of judicial review. Properly understood, a facial challenge is nothing more nor less than a challenge to legislative action, and an as-applied challenge is nothing more nor less than a challenge to executive action. Clear thinking about the who question thus solves deep jurisdictional riddles. And the solutions to these riddles, in turn, have profound feedback effects on the substantive scope of constitutional rights and powers. This article begins with the intellectual primogenitor of this approach: Barron v. Baltimore. It then presses beyond Barron, using Chief Justice Marshall's method to address the questions that he left unanswered. It proceeds to analyze several clauses of the Bill of Rights, in the first systematic effort to identify their implied objects. As it turns out, these objects form a pattern, which amounts to a central, structural theme of the Bill of Rights that has long been overlooked. This article then turns to the Fourteenth Amendment, to determine exactly who is bound by its most resonant clauses. Building on Akhil Amar's insight that the Bill of Rights underwent refinement when incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, this article identifies perhaps the most important refinement of all: refinement of the actors bound by the Bill - refinement of its objects. In short, this article and its predecessor, The Subjects of the Constitution, amount to a new model of constitutional review, a new lens through which to read the Constitution. This approach begins with a grammatical exercise: identifying the subjects and objects of the Constitution. But this is hardly linguistic casuistry or grammatical fetishism. The subjects and objects of the Constitution are not merely features of constitutional text; they are the pillars of constitutional structure. The very words federalism and separation of powers are simply shorthand for the deep truth that the Constitution empowers and restricts different governmental actors in different ways. To elide the who question is to overlook the central feature of our constitutional structure. And it is this structure, above all, that is the object of the Constitution.

Argentina's pathway through financial crisis

Abstract: Political support for Argentina's currency board rested on distributing the early gains from ending hyper-inflation and the spending made possible with access to external credit. When these gains were exhausted and external shocks left the peso overvalued, neither Argentina's political system nor its economy could adjust. The needed adjustment went well beyond simple fiscal tightening: it required deciding who would incur the financial losses associated with the deep contraction needed to correct a real over-valuation in a heavily indebted economy. By 2000, Argentina faced the prospect of further economic contraction, a banking crisis and an external sovereign debt crisis. Even if none of the three crises was avoidable, preemptive action might have made one or more of them less severe. Yet preemption was a political orphan - no political constituency in Argentina argued to bring some pain forward for a chance of less pain down the road, and the IMF and G-7 preferred continued financing to the political risk of supporting a new macroeconomic strategy.