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Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Halliburton litigation to reconsider, and perhaps overrule, its seminal decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In November 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Halliburton litigation to reconsider, and perhaps overrule, its seminal decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Basic legitimated the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, making securities class actions for claims of false corporate publicity viable, and such cases have become the central mechanisms for private securities fraud litigation. This move came after last Term’s Amgen decision, where four justices signaled their doubts about Basic. This essay looks at the connection between Amgen and the continuing viability of fraud-on-the-market litigation. How Halliburton comes out will likely depend on how the Court views the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 — was there an implicit Congressional endorsement of fraud-on-the-market as part of a broader political bargain to make such class actions harder (but not impossible) to bring? My essay considers that question along with others that are raised in the effort to overturn Basic.

4 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The external review laws as mentioned in this paper allow patients whose claims for care or reimbursement have been denied by MCOs to appeal through a system that uses private judging companies to review the MCO decisions.
Abstract: This article examines how legal, political and economic change has produced a new adjudicatory mechanism for resolving disputes between patients and managed care organizations. In 43 states, external review laws allow patients whose claims for care or reimbursement have been denied by MCOs to appeal through a system that uses private judging companies to review the MCO decisions. Most of the claims concern whether a particular treatment is medically necessary, and the external review companies employ a mix of legal and health professionals to make those judgments. In essence, regulation of this critically important aspect of MCOs has been outsourced to a small but growing industry niche, which provides due process lite for patients. The article begins by describing how a substantive standard of deference to medical authority in tort law leaked into and defined process aspects of health law as well. Then, because of the transformation to managed care models for service delivery, the old deference model fell victim to economic constraints. External review laws were enacted as part of the backlash against the abruptness of that transformation. They emerged from political coalitions searching for a new mechanism of accountability for the private sector. Second, the article revisits procedural due process theory, which was a vibrant field of scholarship 25 years ago, but which today is virtually moribund. I describe how external review laws illustrate the use of dispute resolution procedures to achieve accountability and the emergence of accountability as a primary process value. I also argue that a second process value reflected in the new external review systems - deliberativeness - may be of equal or greater significance than the right to a hearing, the traditional flash point for debates about process. Third, I articulate both the link between procedure and regulation, and also the connection between regulation by procedure to theories of governance. Specifically I argue that we can understand the use of adjudicatory process as one technique of governing at a distance, a method through which preferred policies and norms can be advanced indirectly, by non-governmental as well as governmental actors, rather than by direct, command-and-control state policies.

4 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: Sunstein's "Do People Like Nudges?" survey of public opinion on nudges and their rival policy options is discussed in this paper, where the authors suggest that researchers have come to use the term "nudge" as a shorthand for a wide set of policies, many of which do not meet Thaler & Sunstein's criterion that nudges be both essentially costless as well as "surprising" from a rational-choice perspective.
Abstract: This Essay is an invited response to Prof. Sunstein’s “Do People Like Nudges?,” a thoughtful survey of public opinion on nudges and their rival policy options. I try to situate the survey in the larger context of Sunstein’s pathbreaking work, and then to reflect on the power and limits of both. I suggest that researchers have come to use the term “nudge” as a shorthand for a wide set of policies, many of which do not meet Thaler & Sunstein’s criterion that nudges be both essentially costless as well as “surprising” from a rational-choice perspective. This definitional confusion produces analytic confusion, as well. My view, however, is that other researchers are right not to limit themselves to the scope of what Thaler & Sunstein have been inclined to defend. The zero-cost restriction is unnecessary to a convincing defense of regulation, even “paternalistic” regulation. Further, describing some policies as zero cost tends to lead us to neglect opportunity costs or interactions with other policies, as I show with the example of disclosure rules. I therefore close by proposing a more careful analytic taxonomy of modern regulation.

4 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
18 Sep 2013-JAMA
TL;DR: The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, which established the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), exemplifies the nation’s extraordinary compassion and generosity—granting $48 billion over the current 5-year period (2009-2013).
Abstract: The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, which established the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), exemplifies the nation’s extraordinary compassion and generosity—granting $48 billion over the current 5-year period (2009-2013). PEPFAR, however, has mired successive administrations in controversy for politicizing public health. PEPFAR must report to Congress if a country fails to spend at least one-half of its prevention funding to promote “abstinence, delay of sexual début, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction.” PEPFAR’s “conscience clause” allows organizations to withhold particular services (eg, condoms) or deny individuals care (eg, based on sexual orientation) if the organization has a moral or religious objection. PEPFAR grants also come with 2 categorical conditions. First, funds cannot be used to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.” Second, grants may go only to groups with a policy “explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”1 AIDS organizations must refrain from any speech or activity the government deems “inconsistent” with the antiprostitution pledge (the “Policy Requirement”). This extends to what a recipient says or does, not only with PEPFAR funds, but even with its private funds. On June 23, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by compelling grant recipients to adopt and espouse, as their own, the government’s view on a vital public issue— the moral disapproval of commercial sex work.2 Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International will have major implications, not only for the global fight against AIDS, but also for the government’s power to control public health activities domestically and globally.

4 citations


Authors

Showing all 585 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Lawrence O. Gostin7587923066
Michael J. Saks381555398
Chirag Shah343415056
Sara J. Rosenbaum344256907
Mark Dybul33614171
Steven C. Salop3312011330
Joost Pauwelyn321543429
Mark Tushnet312674754
Gorik Ooms291243013
Alicia Ely Yamin291222703
Julie E. Cohen28632666
James G. Hodge272252874
John H. Jackson271022919
Margaret M. Blair26754711
William W. Bratton251122037
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202174
2020146
2019115
2018113
2017109
2016118