Georgetown University Law Center

About: Georgetown University Law Center is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Supreme court & Global health. The organization has 585 authors who have published 2488 publications receiving 36650 citations. The organization is also known as: Georgetown Law & GULC.

Information Privacy Law Scholars' Brief in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

Abstract: This brief, submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States by 15 information privacy law scholars in the case of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (No 13-1339), argues that in enacting the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Congress crafted a bargain between aggressive, secretive data-aggregating businesses and the public: if those businesses limited disclosures and made reasonable efforts to adhere to practices ensuring “maximum possible accuracy,” they would enjoy a safe harbor from litigation under many other state and federal theories. The FCRA’s consumer transparency requirements and remedial provisions were designed to encourage steady improvement in consumer reporting practices and to relieve pressure on public enforcement authorities. The Petitioner’s claim that Respondents cannot pursue it for its violations of the FCRA would unravel that bargain, preserving consumer reporting agencies’ broad immunity from suit while diminishing incentives to handle data fairly.In an era in which employers increasingly practice “hiring by algorithm,” inaccurate consumer reports — even those that contain putatively favorable inaccuracies — can cause real economic injury to consumers. Such inaccuracies can lead employers to screen out prospective employees as overqualified or too well-paid. Alternatively, employers may suspect resume inflation and dishonesty if background checks reveal inconsistencies or unearned honors. More generally, lawmakers historically have recognized and responded to non-economic and dignity-based injuries by creating rights of action to remedy such wrongs in court. The FCRA follows that pattern. In enacting the FCRA, Congress did not create injury but rather recognized the injury worked by improper disclosure and mishandling of information. Petitioner’s argument to the contrary threatens to upset numerous privacy, consumer protection, and other laws.

Tom Paine's Constitution

Abstract: In Common Sense, our brief for the American Revolution, the pamphleteer Tom Paine famously declared that "in America the law is king." What, precisely, is the "law" that Paine declared to have dethroned the king? Does the phrase, penned by the advocate not only of our revolution but also of the rights of man everywhere, presage our modern practice of rights-based constitutionalism? This reading – in America, constitutional law is king – might also make Paine an early friend of judicial review, as he was unquestionably also a friend of United States constitutionalism, both federal and state. Paine’s manifesto can thus be read as having foreseen the unfolding of our modern court-centered constitutional consciousness. This Article argues that this is an attractive but untenable reading of Paine’s philosophy and offers evidence that Paine’s conception of the Constitution and law itself diverge crucially from dominant understandings. The Article then asks how modern constitutional practices might be different if Justice Marshall had enforced Paine’s conception of the Constitution in Marbury and McCulloch, and concludes with some thoughts on what we have lost by turning away from Paine’s constitutional vision.

From Guantanamo to Nuremberg and Back: An Analysis of Conspiracy to Commit War Crimes under International Humanitarian Law

Abstract: The use of military commissions by the United States for terrorism-related prosecutions has brought to the forefront a number of issues regarding the military commissions’ jurisdiction to try alleged terrorists under the law of war. This Note addresses one such issue: whether conspiracy to commit war crimes, as used in the military commissions, constitutes a valid basis for liability under IHL. This issue is important for at least three reasons. First, the majority of cases pending in the military commissions contain allegations of conspiracy to commit war crimes, with many of these cases relying on conspiracy as the primary charge. Second, as a matter of U.S. constitutional law and international law, the jurisdiction of the military commissions over these cases depends in part on whether conspiracy to commit war crimes can be considered a violation of IHL. Third, the combination of conspiracy - a doctrine that disposes with the stringent mens rea and actus reus requirements of other forms of criminal liability - with military commissions trials - which lack many of the procedural safeguards of Article III courts - presents a dangerously high risk of convicting individuals who have not played a meaningful role in any crime. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines conspiracy in its two main forms and describes its use in the military commissions’ war crimes trials. Part II analyzes conspiracy to commit war crimes under an IHL framework, focusing on relevant legal provisions and jurisprudence in the immediate aftermath of World War II and in modern IHL. This Part concludes that conspiracy to commit war crimes is not a cognizable law of war violation or liability theory under IHL. Part III discusses the potential application in the military commissions of a modern relative of conspiracy that is supported by IHL: joint criminal enterprise (JCE) liability. This Part concludes that although JCE is a valid theory for attaching liability in war crimes prosecutions, its potential use by the United States in terrorism-related military commissions trials presents significant theoretical and practical issues that require further consideration. This Note is in a draft version. Please do not cite without the author's approval.

The Rebirth of the Neighborhood

Abstract: This essay argues that new urban residents primarily seek a type of community properly called a neighborhood. “Neighborhood” refers to a legible, pedestrian-scale area that has an identity apart from the corporate and bureaucratic structures that dominate the larger society. Such a neighborhood fosters repeated, casual contacts with neighbors and merchants, such as while one pursues Saturday errands or takes children to activities. Dealing with independent local merchants and artisans face-to-face provides a sense of liberation from large power structures, where most such residents work. Having easy access to places of sociability like coffee shops and bars permits spontaneous “meet-ups,” contrasting with the discipline of professional life. Such a neighborhood conveys an indigenous identity created by the efforts of diverse people over time, rather than marketing an image deliberatively contrived to control the perceptions of customers. At its best, a neighborhood provides a refuge from the ennui of the workplace and the idiocy of consumer culture, substituting for churches (or synagogues), labor unions, and ethnic clubs that structured earlier urban social life.What changes in land use law have contributed to or supported this transformation to neighborhood-based living? Several legal developments outside land use seem very important. Perhaps the most central legal development has been local government legal protections for gays, who often have been in the vanguard of the revival of urban neighborhoods. Crime reduction has significantly enhanced urban living since the 1970s, but which laws have contributed what to that reduction is a matter of intense debate. Civil rights laws and immigration reform have arguably nurtured a comfort with multi-ethnic urban neighborhoods that has turned discrimination and resentment to a comfort with and even celebration of diversity.But changes in land use law, broadly understood, also helped provide the context for the revival of neighborhoods. This brief essay highlights those aspects of land use law that have supported this new urbanization since the founding of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. The claim is not that legal reforms caused the revival, but that they contributed to a broader social trend. These reforms have supported neighborhood revival primarily by securing the physical environments people want to live in. The three chief legal tools for neighborhoods have been zoning for urban form, historic district preservation, and environmental protection.

Fentanyl abuse and dependence: further evidence for second hand exposure hypothesis. Comments by Peter J. Cohen.

Abstract: Drug dependence in physicians is regrettably not a new phenomenon. A compelling description1 of the illustrious physician William Halsted ravaged by addiction over 120 years ago should be read by all practitioners. It is not at all surprising that drug dependence in anesthesiologists is now acknowledged as a significant public health and occupational problem.2 Fentanylandotheropioidsaresignificantdrugs of abuse in this population.3,4 The impact of drug dependence both on anesthesiologists and their patients provides ample justification for the investigations of Mark Gold, who has published several fascinating works during the past few years,5,6 each of which has raised a number of significant questions. Thus, I read Dr. Gold’s most recent article7 with great interest. Unfortunately, while his proposed mechanism is innovative and provocative, it remains unproven. Although the hypothesis may eventually be demonstrated to be true, the data simply do not support it at this time–association is not synonymous with causation. Thereareanumberofmissingfacts thatmust beprovidedbeforeweallowtheconceptof“environmental exposure” to impel us to take costly and precipitous action. Should this model be accepted without clear and convincingproof, it isconceivablethat regulatorsmight mandate that all anesthesiologists, and perhaps other personnel, who work in an “adverse environment” (however this might be defined) receive daily observed oral naltrexone or even monthly depot administration of this antagonist.8 Indeed, it is not beyond imagination that anesthesiologists who become addicted to fentanyl might raise a legal claim of action based primarily on Dr. Gold’s premise. Among the questions that should be addressed: What are the actual blood levels of fentanyl in all operating room (OR) personnel? Have these concentrations been proven sufficient toproduceanybiologicaleffectsuchasaltered brain metabolism9,10 or central nervous system mu-receptor density?11 Is there any experimental evidence that similar blood levels can produce drug-dependency in an animal model? Are trace concentrations of other addicting drugs (e.g., cocaine, diazepam, or thiopental) also detected in OR air? How does Gold’s hypothesis explain the continuing phenomenon of heroin addiction throughout our society, affecting numerous individuals never exposed to an OR environment? Furthermore, since all OR personnel may be similarly exposed to fentanyl, why were the data from surgeons and OR nurses not evaluated? Is the incidence of drug-dependency identical inanesthesiologistswhowork in locations other than those devoted to cardiacbypass surgery (e.g., providing obstetrical anesthesia) and are presumably exposed to far lower air-borne concentrations of fentanyl? An extremely interesting, and perhaps dispositive, experiment would be to administer intravenousnaloxone to“exposed”butotherwise drug-naïveanesthesiologists toascertainwhether or not acute withdrawal is precipitated. A negative response would certainly suggest a lack of significant biologic effect.